Electoral Platforms, Implemented Policies, and Abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations. In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Fiat Money, Intrinsic Properties, and Government Transaction Policy

Why do people coordinate on the use of valueless pieces of paper as generally accepted money? A possible answer is that these objects have intrinsic properties that make them better candidates to be used as media of exchange. Another answer stresses the fact that unconvertible fiat money will not easily appear unless there is a centralized institution that favors its use. The main objective of the paper is to analyze these questions. In order to do this, we take a model of commodity money in which fiat money does not play any significant role and modify it to examine under which circumstances fiat money might come to circulate as medium of exchange. Some of the results obtained from the model differ in a rather substantial way from previous related literature.

Pitfalls to Avoid when Measuring Institutions: Is 'Doing Business' Damaging Business?

Over recent years, both governments and international aid organizations have been devoting large amounts of resources to "simplifying" the procedures for setting up and formalizing firms. Many of these actions have focused on reducing the initial costs of setting up the firm, disregarding the more important role of business registers as a source of reliable information for judges, government departments and, above all, other firms. This reliable information is essential for reducing transaction costs in future dealings with all sorts of economic agents, both public and private. The priorities of reform policies should therefore be thoroughly reviewed, stressing the value of the legal institutions rather than trivializing them as is often the case.

The Speed of the Financial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare’s Bank

Finance is important for development, yet the onset of modern economic growth in Britain lagged the British financial revolution by over a century. We present evidence from a new West-End London private bank to explain this delay. Hoare’s Bank loaned primarily to a highly select and well-born clientele, although it did not discriminate against “unknown” borrowers in the early 18th century. It could not extend credit more generally because of government restrictions (usury limits) and policies (frequent wars). Britain’s financial development could have aided growth substantially, had it not been for the rigidities and turmoil introduced by government interference.

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

The drift of public spending towards the elderly: A generational analysis of the trend of public policies in Spain

The tendency for public welfare spending to be increasingly aimed at the elderly has been pointed out for the US and other developed countries. While population ageing is a common trend, it is not obvious why the shift in spending exceeds the trend in ageing, or why per capita spending on the elderly increases.We show that this is the case in Spain, identify the losers from this development, discuss the policies that underlie this trend, and propose adjustments based on Musgrave s fixed proportions rule as an inter-generationally fair distribution.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

How accurate are surveyed preferences for public policies? Evidence from a unique institutional setup

Opinion polls are widely used to capture public sentiments on a varietyof issues. If citizens are unwilling to reveal certain policy preferences toothers, opinion polls may fail to characterize population preferences accurately.The innovation of this paper is to use unique data to measurebiases in opinion polls for a broad range of policies. I combine data on184 referenda held in Switzerland between 1987 and 2007, with postballotsurveys that ask for each proposal how the citizens voted. Thedifference between stated preferences in the survey and revealed preferences at the ballot box provides a direct measure of bias in opinion polls.I find that these biases vary by policy areas, with the largest ones occurring in policies on immigration, international integration, and votesinvolving liberal/conservative attitudes. Also, citizens show a tendencyto respond in accordance to the majority.

Research joint ventures in an international economy

D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to studyalternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integratedworld economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that:1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantageover foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policygame, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contraryto other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result,welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation.4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition isformed.

Does direct democracy reduce the size of government? New evidence from historical data, 1890-2000

Using historical data for all Swiss cantons from 1890 to 2000, we estimate the causal effect of direct democracy on government spending. The main innovation in this paper is that we use fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity and instrumental variables to address the potential endogeneity of institutions. We find that the budget referendum and lower costs to launch a voter initiative are effective tools in reducing canton level spending. However, we find no evidence that the budget referendum results in more decentralized government or a larger local government. Our instrumental variable estimates suggest that a mandatory budget referendum reduces the size of canton spending between 13 and 19 percent. A 1 percent lower signature requirement for the initiative reduces canton spending by up to 2 percent.

Putting health in all policies: The National Institute for Welfare Enhancement

Welfare is a rather vague term whose meaning depends on ideology, values andjudgments. Material resources are just means to enhance people s well-being, butgrowth of the Gross Domestic Production is still the standard measure of thesuccess of a society. Fortunately, recent advances in measuring social performanceinclude health, education and other social outcomes. Because what we measureaffects what we do it is hoped that social policies will change. The movementHealth in all policies and its associated Health Impact Assessment methodologywill contribute to it. The task consists of designing transversal policies thatconsider health and other welfare goals, the short term and long-term implicationsand intergenerational redistributions of resources. As long as marginalproductivity on health outside the healthcare system is higher than inside it,efficiency needs cross-sectoral policies. And fairness needs them even more,because in order to reduce social inequalities in health, a wide social and politicalresponse is needed.Unless we reduce the well-documented inefficiencies in our current health caresystems the welfare states will fail to consolidate and the overall economic wellbeingcould be in serious trouble. In this article we sketched some policy solutionssuch as pricing according to net benefits of innovation and public encouragementof radical innovation besides the small type incremental and market-ledinnovation. We proposed an independent agency, the National Institute forWelfare Enhancement to guarantee long term fair and efficient social policies inwhich health plays a central role.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicalparties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our researchdesign exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around severalpopulation cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentagepoints in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency modelof electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studiedhere had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expectedelectoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued byvoters.

Asessing public policies. The case of education in Europe and the interaction between personal and institutional factors

The paper deals with the comparative study of European citizens satisfaction with thestate of education in their respective countries. Individual and contextual effects aretested applying multilevel analysis. The results show that educational public policies(level of decentralization, degree of comprehensiveness and public spending) as well asthe students social environment (socioeconomic and cultural status) have a soundimpact on the opinions about the state of education.

Credible redistributive policies and migration across US States

Does worker mobility undermine governments ability to redistribute income? Thispaper analyzes the experience of US states in the recent decades. We build a tractablemodel where both migration decisions and redistribution policies are endogenous. Wecalibrate the model to match skill premium and worker productivity at the state level,as well as the size and skill composition of migration flows. The calibrated modelis able to reproduce the large changes in skill composition as well as key qualitativerelationships of labor flows and redistribution policies observed in the data. Our resultssuggest that regional di¤erences in labor productivity are an important determinantof interstate migration. We use the calibrated model to compare the cross-section ofredistributive policies with and without worker mobility. The main result of the paperis that interstate migration has induced substantial convergence in tax rates acrossUS states, but no race to the bottom. Skill-biased in-migration has reduced the skillpremium and the need for tax-based redistribution in the states that would have hadthe highest tax rates in the absence of mobility.