If you want me to stay, pay

Devolution of political power is constantly on the political agenda in both Italy and Spain. Fiscal policy in these countries has granted specific privileges to some regions. Valle d’Aosta/Vallée d’Aoste,(VdA) and País Vasco-Euskadi (PV) have an extensive say over spending decisions, and receive nearly all regional tax revenues. Although both VdA and PV are among the richest regions in each country, both are net beneficiaries of the fiscal equalisation system. This preferential treatment is the outcome of a fiscal system with limits on taxing power and debt issuance, and is meant as a compensation for the lack of autonomy. It so prevents calls for more fiscal autonomy, or even outright secession. The economic effects of this asymmetric federalism are negative Although partial equalisation reduces excessive redistribution built in the fiscal equalisation system, more autonomy could pay off with more efficient government. Asymmetric federalism moreover creates a political impasse in the negotiation of a more efficient tax system and financing arrangement.

Institutional Determinants of Military Spending

Drawing on a database for 1988-2006 containing information on 157 countries, we investigate the effects on military spending of government form, electoral rules, concentration of parliamentary parties, and ideology. From an OLS regression on pooled data, our results show that presidential democracies spend more than parliamentary systems on defense, whereas the presence of a plurality voting system will reduce the defense burden. Our findings suggest that, in contrast to theoretical predictions in the literature, institutions do not have the same impact on the provision of all public goods. We present as well evidence regarding the effect of ideology on defense spending.

La cláusula de intercambio de información tributaria según el Convenio bilateral Hispano-Brasileño para evitar la doble imposición y prevenir la evasión fiscal en materia de impuestos sobre la renta

El presente artículo tiene por objeto analizar el contenido, alcance, evolución y límites de la cláusula de intercambio de información incorporada en el Convenio Hispano-Brasileño para evitar la doble imposición y prevenir la evasión fiscal en materia de impuestos sobre la renta (1974), fin a cuyo logro se toma como punto de partida el marco jurídico instrumentalizador del intercambio de información tributaria y asistencia mutua entre Estados. Tendrá cabida en estas páginas un análisis en detalle de aspectos tan importantes y poco manidos como los problemas de interpretación de los convenios de doble imposición en materia de intercambio de información tributaria consecuencia de las modificaciones sustanciales tras la aprobación de las sucesivas versiones del Modelo de Convenio de la OCDE y sus Comentarios, interpretación que afecta de manera directa a cuestiones de primer orden como el ámbito subjetivo y objetivo de aplicación, límites y restricciones de la cláusula de intercambio de información sellada y ratificada por el Estado Español y la República Federativa del Brasil en 1974. Igualmente se da noticia de otros significados extremos tales como el destino del intercambio de información tributaria y el deber de confidencialidad de los Estados, con especial alusión al alcance de las restricciones específicas previstas para el intercambio de información tributaria no sólo desde la óptica de la legislación española sino también desde la visión de la normativa reguladora de la materia en Brasil.

Fiscal Regime Shifts in Portugal

We estimate changes in fiscal policy regimes in Portugal with a Markov Switching regression of fiscal policy rules for the period 1978-2007, using a new dataset of fiscal quarterly series. We find evidence of a deficit bias, while repeated reversals of taxes making the budget procyclical. Economic booms have typically been used to relax tax pressure, especially during elections. One-off measures have been preferred over structural ones to contain the deficit during economic crises. The EU fiscal rules prompted temporary consolidation, but did not permanently change the budgeting process.

Fiscal policy and interest rates: the role of financial and economic integration

It is commonly believed that a fiscal expansion raises interest rates. However, these crowding out effects of deficits have been found to be small or non-existent. One explanation is that financial integration offsets interest rate differentials on globalised bond markets. This paper measures the degree of integration of government bond markets, using spatial modelling techniques to take this spillover on financial markets into account. Our main finding is that the crowding out effect on domestic interest rates is significant, but is reduced by spillover across borders. This spillover is important in major crises or in periods of coordinated policy actions. This result is generally robust to various measures of cross-country linkages. We find spillover to be much stronger among EU countries.

Sustainability of EU fiscal policies. A panel test

The fiscal policy rule implicit in the Stability and Growth Pact, has been rationalised as a way to ensure that national fiscal policies remain sustainable within the EU, thereby endorsing the independence of the ECB. We empirically examine the sustainability of European fiscal policies over the period 1970-2001. The intertemporal government budget constraint provides a test based on the cointegration relation between government revenues, expenditures and interest payments. Sustainability is analysed at both the national level and for a European panel. Results show that European fiscal policy has been sustainable overall, yet national experiences differ considerably.

Fiscal sustainability across government tiers: an assessment of soft budget constraints

This paper analyses how fiscal adjustment comes about when both central and sub-national governments are involved in consolidation. We test sustainability of public debt with a fiscal rule for both the federal and regional government. Results for the German Länder show that lower tier governments bear a relatively smaller part of the burden of debt consolidation, if they consolidate at all. Most of the fiscal adjustment occurs via central government debt. In contrast, both the US federal and state levels contribute to consolidation of public finances.

Combine to compete: improving fiscal forecast accuracy over time

Budget forecasts have become increasingly important as a tool of fiscal management to influence expectations of bond markets and the public at large. The inherent difficulty in projecting macroeconomic variables – together with political bias – thwart the accuracy of budget forecasts. We improve accuracy by combining the forecasts of both private and public agencies for Italy over the period 1993-2012. A weighted combined forecast of the deficit/ ratio is superior to any single forecast. Deficits are hard to predict due to shifting economic conditions and political events. We test and compare predictive accuracy over time and although a weighted combined forecast is robust to breaks, there is no significant improvement over a simple RW model.

Combine to compete: improving fiscal forecast accuracy over time

Budget forecasts have become increasingly important as a tool of fiscal management to influence expectations of bond markets and the public at large. The inherent difficulty in projecting macroeconomic variables – together with political bias – thwart the accuracy of budget forecasts. We improve accuracy by combining the forecasts of both private and public agencies for Italy over the period 1993-2012. A weighted combined forecast of the deficit/ ratio is superior to any single forecast. Deficits are hard to predict due to shifting economic conditions and political events. We test and compare predictive accuracy over time and although a weighted combined forecast is robust to breaks, there is no significant improvement over a simple RW model.

La reforma fiscal 2014 y la opinión de los asesores fiscales

La reforma fiscal en España ha sido una demanda recurrente en los últimos tiempos, posiblemente reforzada por la crisis económica. Esta fue aprobada a finales de 2014, entrando en vigor en 2015 y 2016. No se trata de una reforma global, habiéndose centrado en el IRPF y en el impuesto sobre sociedades. Este artículo repasa sus, a nuestro entender, aspectos más relevantes y, de manera novedosa, para identificar sus disfunciones, los contrasta con la opinión de los asesores fiscales, actores clave en nuestro sistema fiscal, dado el alcance mayoritario del mecanismo de autoliquidación. En general, se puede concluir que los trade-offs resueltos en esta reforma van en la dirección de elimi­nar, cuanto menos parcialmente, disfunciones previas, aunque, como se ha sugerido, hay aspectos todavía sin tratar (IVA o imposición sobre la riqueza).