Estimating extreme value cumulative distribution functions using bias-corrected kernel approaches

We propose a new kernel estimation of the cumulative distribution function based on transformation and on bias reducing techniques. We derive the optimal bandwidth that minimises the asymptotic integrated mean squared error. The simulation results show that our proposed kernel estimation improves alternative approaches when the variable has an extreme value distribution with heavy tail and the sample size is small.

Banks, Lies and Bricks: The Determinants of Home Value Inflation in Spain during the Housing Boom

During the first decade of this century, Spain experienced the most important economic and housing boom in its recent history. This situation led the lending industry to dramatically expand through the mortgage market. The high competition among lenders caused a dramatic lowering of credit standards. During this period, lenders operating in the Spanish mortgage market artificially inflated appraised home values in order to draw larger mortgages. By doing this, lenders gave financially constrained households access to mortgage credit. In this paper, we analyze this phenomenon for this first time. To do so, we resort to a unique dataset of matched mortgage-dwelling-borrower characteristics covering the period 2004–2010. Our data allow us to construct an unbiased measure of property’s over-appraisal, since transaction prices in our data also includes any potential side payment in the transactions. Our findings indicate that i) in Spain, appraised home values were inflated on average by around 30% with respect to transaction prices; ii) creditconstrained households were more likely to be involved in mortgages with inflated house values; and iii) a regional indicator of competition in the lending market suggests that inflated appraisal values were also more likely to appear in more competitive regional mortgage markets. Keywords: Housing demand, appraisal values, house prices, housing bubble, credit constraints, mortgage market. JEL Classification: R21, R31

Parallel characterizations of a generalized shapley value and a generalized banzhaf value for cooperative games with level structure of cooperation

We present parallel characterizations of two different values in the framework of restricted cooperation games. The restrictions are introduced as a finite sequence of partitions defined on the player set, each of them being coarser than the previous one, hence forming a structure of different levels of a priori unions. On the one hand, we consider a value first introduced in Ref. [18], which extends the Shapley value to games with different levels of a priori unions. On the other hand, we introduce another solution for the same type of games, which extends the Banzhaf value in the same manner. We characterize these two values using logically comparable properties.

The economic value of reciprocal bilingualism

Some bilingual societies exhibit a distribution of language skills that can- not be explained by economic theories that portray languages as pure commu- nication devices. Such distribution of skills are typically the result of public policies that promote bilingualism among members of both speech commu- nities (reciprocal bilingualism). In this paper I argue that these policies are likely to increase social welfare by diminishing economic and social segmenta- tion between the two communities. However, these gains tend to be unequally distributed over the two communities. As a result, in a large range of circum- stances these policies might not draw su¢ cient support. The model is built upon the communicative value of languages, but also emphasizes the role of linguistic preferences in the behavior of bilingual individuals.

A Fair and Secure Cluster Formation Process for Ad Hoc Networks

An efficient approach for organizing large ad hoc networks is to divide the nodesinto multiple clusters and designate, for each cluster, a clusterhead which is responsible forholding intercluster control information. The role of a clusterhead entails rights and duties.On the one hand, it has a dominant position in front of the others because it manages theconnectivity and has access to other node¿s sensitive information. But on the other hand, theclusterhead role also has some associated costs. Hence, in order to prevent malicious nodesfrom taking control of the group in a fraudulent way and avoid selfish attacks from suitablenodes, the clusterhead needs to be elected in a secure way. In this paper we present a novelsolution that guarantees the clusterhead is elected in a cheat-proof manner.