Tendències geopolítiques de l'extrema dreta a Europa: capacitat de transformació i adaptació al context de crisi econòmica i política actual

De fet tot va començar al principi dels anys 80, amb l’aparició electoral del Front Nacional (FN) francès, creat el 1972, i que va ferde França una excepció a Europa en aquell moment. Ara ja sabem que aquest no es el cas i tenim nombrosos països europeus on, els partits d’extrema dreta no solament obtenen resultats comparables o superiors als del Front National francès, sinó que, d’acordamb sistema electoral, formen part de coalicions governamentals per constituir majories de dretes. En aquest sentit, cal recordar que Àustria va ser el primer Estat europeu en tenir una coalició governamental en la que hi havien electes del partit d’extrema dreta FPÖ (Partit de la Llibertat). Era la primera vegada que això passava després de la Segona Guerra Mundial, i la inquietudpolítica va ser gran en els països de la Unió Europea (UE) doncs tothom recordava que el poble austríac, en la seva gran majoria, va ser favorable al “Anchluss” (annexió amb Alemanya) i els hi semblava que els responsables políticsactuals, eren tallats ala imatge de Kurt Waldheim i altres representantsd’aquell tristperíode. A partir d’aqui, la presencia de ministres d’extrema dreta en determinats governs europeus ja no provoca reaccions tan fortes, sens dubte perquè la seva historia no es idèntica a la de Àustria, i també perquèl’advertència als austríacs no ha tingut cap efecte i el FPÖ (Partit de la Llibertat) ha continuat prosperant inclous desprès de la mort accidental del seu líder,Jörg Haider, en 2008. En 2011, hem vist com els dirigents de la Unió Europea i la Secretaria d’Estat americana, Hillary Clinton, es mostraveninquiets davant de la deriva autoritària nacionalista del governhongarès dirigit pel“Fidesz” i el seu líder Viktor Orban, però sense cap mena de mitja per oposar-se a excepciód’una carta oficial de prevenció.

Immigració i desafecció política a l'espai local: la instrumentalització política de la immigració a Catalunya i Gran Bretanya

El projecte ha tingut com a objectiu principal abordar la instrumentalització política de la immigració per part de partits polítics de nova extrema dreta. Aquest fenomen, que ha adquirit una gran rellevància a gran part dels països europeus, està adquirint una creixent rellevància en els casos britànic i català a partir de, entre altres coses, l'emergència electoral dels partits Plataforma per Catalunya i British National Party. En aquest sentit, el projecte ha tractat de desenvolupar una recerca que produís un conjunt de dades i coneixements que permetessin abordar de forma fonamentada un fenomen “nou” en el context català i que, fins al moment, ha rebut escassa atenció per part del món acadèmic. Dins d’aquest objectiu cal destacar el fet que la àmplia experiència de l’equip investigador britànic en l’anàlisi de la nova extrema dreta ha permès que els investigadors catalans poguessin desenvolupar la seva recerca recolzant-se i dialogant en la seva contrapart britànica. Els resultats de la recerca són certament novedosos i representaran una important contribució al coneixement d’aquest fenomen. Així, en el marc de la recerca s’han desenvolupat una sèrie d’entrevistes a membres i a votants de PxC, així com una enquesta a votants i una anàlisi agregada sobre el vot al partit. En aquest sentit, cal destacar que és la primera vegada que s’aconsegueixen aquest tipus de dades. Un fet que està fent, i farà, que la seva explotació i divulgació adquireixi una gran rellevància tant en el món acadèmic com en el de les administracions públiques. Finalment, convé ressaltar que el projecte també ha servit per consolidar la relació entre els equips d’investigació britànic i català i per impulsar la inserció de l’equip català en les xarxes europees d’investigació sobre aquesta matèria.

La Utilització d'internet en les campanyes electorals als Estats Units i a Espanya : comparació de la campanya de Barack Obama (2008) i dels principals candidats de l'Estat (2011)

La campanya electoral de Barack Obama per guanyar les eleccions nord-americanes l'any 2008 s'ha convertit en el referent de les e-campanyes. En aquesta investigació es fa una anàlisi de l'estratègia que va plantejar el candidat demòcrata a internet enfront les que van plantejar els principls candidats a les Eleccions Generals espanyoles el 2011: Mariano Rajoy (PP), Alfredo Pérez Rubalcaba (PSOE) i Josep Antoni Duran i Lleida (CiU). La investigació es planteja des de l'àmbit de la comunicació política a través d'una perspectiva comparativa i pren, fonamentalment, caràcter qualitatiu.

Contextual effects on political behavior

In her post-doctoral research stay, Aina Gallego has conducted several research projects with the overarching theme of identifying the effects of contexts on political behavior. She has examined the effects of institutions, the economic situation, or local contexts on outcomes such as voter turnout, vote choice, and positions on salient issues. As detailed below, this work has been published in several journal articles in leading Political Science journals such as Comparative Political Studies, Political Behavior, and Electoral Studies (see attached documents). She has a forthcoming book with Cambridge University Press, the most prestigious book press in Political Science.She has also published book chapters and has several working papers. In addition to conducting her research, Aina has received extensive training in both substantive areas and research methods. She has participated fully in the Department’s academic life by attending seminars and engaging in research projects with other members of the Department.

Rules vs. political discretion: evidence from constitutionally guaranteed transfers to local governments in Brazil

Can rules be used to shield public resources from political interference? The Brazilian constitution and national tax code stipulate that revenue sharing transfers to municipal governments be determined by the size of counties in terms of estimated population. In this paper I document that the population estimates which went into the transfer allocation formula for the year 1991 were manipulated, resulting in significant transfer differentials over the entire 1990's. I test whether conditional on county characteristics that might account for the manipulation, center-local party alignment, party popularity and the extent of interparty fragmentation at the county level are correlated with estimated populations in 1991. Results suggest that revenue sharing transfers were targeted at right-wing national deputies in electorally fragmented counties as well as aligned local executives.

Government Spending and Re-election

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent political parties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our research design exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around several population cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We find that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a 20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentage points in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. We also find positive effects of the government spending on education outcomes and earnings, which we interpret as indirect evidence of public service improvements. Together, our results provide evidence that electoral rewards encourage incumbents to spend part of additional revenues on public services valued by voters, a finding in line with agency models of electoral accountability.

En busca del ciudadano Kane : los dueños de medios de comunicación y su utilización política

Aquesta recerca té com a objecte d'estudi la utilització dels mitjans de comunicació per a finalitats polítiques i intenta analitzar la relació que els polítics professionals mantenen amb els mitjans i com aquests poden ser importants dins d'un procés polític-electoral i per a la formació de l'opinió pública. El nostre objectiu general és, entre d’altres, analitzar l'estructura d’aquests mitjans i grups polítics i descriure com estan situats, utilitzant com a exemple l'estat del Rio Grande do Norte (RN), al Nord-est de Brasil. Partint de les preguntes, ¿a qui pertanyen els mitjans de comunicació i qui té el poder d'informar en l'aquest Estat? anem construïm el marc teòric, analitzant el monopoli i oligopoli en la comunicació a Brasil, especialment a la radiodifusió, en la qual hi ha una gran concentració de concessions públiques en propietat dels polítics professionals amb mandats electius i/o de grups partidaris, què pot ser anomenat de ‘coronelismo electrònic’

Are rules-based government programs shielded from special-interest politics? Evidence from revenue-sharing transfers in Brazil

Manipulation of government finances for the benefit of narrowly defined groups is usuallythought to be limited to the part of the budget over which politicians exercise discretion inthe short run, such as earmarks. Analyzing a revenue-sharing program between the centraland local governments in Brazil that uses an allocation formula based on local population estimates,I document two main results: first, that the population estimates entering the formulawere manipulated and second, that this manipulation was political in nature. Consistent withswing-voter targeting by the right-wing central government, I find that municipalities withroughly equal right-wing and non-right-wing vote shares benefited relative to opposition orconservative core support municipalities. These findings suggest that the exclusive focus ondiscretionary transfers in the extant empirical literature on special-interest politics may understatethe true scope of tactical redistribution that is going on under programmatic disguise.

Social capital, government expenditures, and growth

Countries with greater social capital have higher economic growth. We show that socialcapital is also highly positively correlated across countries with government expenditureon education. We develop an infinite-horizon model of public spending and endogenousstochastic growth that explains both facts through frictions in political agency whenvoters have imperfect information. In our model, the government provides servicesthat yield immediate utility, and investment that raises future productivity. Voters aremore likely to observe public services, so politicians have electoral incentives to underprovidepublic investment. Social capital increases voters' awareness of all governmentactivity. As a consequence, both politicians' incentives and their selection improve.In the dynamic equilibrium, both the amount and the efficiency of public investmentincrease, permanently raising the growth rate.

The political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politiciansperceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters.To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknownand investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politiciansmake too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannotbe fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary tothe conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may,under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study howpolitical rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistentwith a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection.They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economicuncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Heterogeneous information and trade policy

Protectionism enjoys surprising popular support, in spite of deadweight losses. At thesame time, trade barriers appear to decline with public information about protection.This paper develops an electoral model with heterogeneously informed voters whichexplains both facts and predicts the pattern of trade policy across industries. In themodel, each agent endogenously acquires more information about his sector of employment. As a result, voters support protectionism, because they learn more about thetrade barriers that help them as producers than those that hurt them as consumers.In equilibrium, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. Thestructure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to existing models. The modelpredicts a Dracula effect: trade policy for a sector is less protectionist when there ismore public information about it. Using a measure of newspaper coverage across industries, I find that cross-sector evidence from the United States bears out my theoreticalpredictions.

Turnout, political preferences and information: Experimental evidence from Perú

Electoral institutions that encourage citizens to vote are widely used around the world. Yet littleis known about the effects of such institutions on voter participation and the composition of the electorate.In this paper, I combine a field experiment with a change in Peruvian voting laws to identify theeffect of monetary (dis-)incentives on voting. Using the random variation in the fine for abstention andan objective measure of turnout at the individual level, I estimate the elasticity of voting with respectto cost to be -0.21. Consistent with the theoretical model presented, the reduction in turnout inducedby the reduction in the fine is driven by voters who (i) are in the center of the political spectrum, (ii)are less interested in politics, and (iii) hold less political information. However, voters who respondto changes in the cost of abstention do not have different preferences for policies than those who voteregardless of the cost. Further, involvement in politics, as measured by the decision to acquire politicalinformation, seems to be independent of the level of the fine. Additional results indicate that thereduction in the fine does not affect the incidence of vote buying, but increases the price paid for avote.

Voting after the bombing: Can terrorist attacks change the outcome of democratic elections?

Economists have recently turned their attention to the effects of terrorism. One much debated effect of terrorist attacks is its impact on the results of democratic elections. We use the electoral consequences of the terrorist attacks of the 11-M in Madrid to analyze this issue. We consider this particular experiment since the attack took place only three days before the 2004 Congressional Election, which allows the use of credible identification criteria. In particular, we use the advance voting by Spanish residents abroad, who cast their vote before the terrorist attack, to identify the effect of the bombing. We exploit this macabre natural experiment to run a difference-in-differences estimation using data on three consecutive Congressional elections. Our empirical results indicate that a terrorist attack can have a large impact on the outcome of democratic elections.

Campaign rhetoric: A model of reputation

We analyze conditions under which a candidate's campaignrhetoric may affect the beliefs of the voters over whatpolicy the candidate will implement in case he wins theelection. We develop a model of repeated elections withcomplete information in which candidates are purely ideological. Voter's strategies involve a credible threat to punish candidates that renege of their campaignpromises, and in equilibrium all campaign promises arebelieved by voters, and honored by candidates. We obtainthat the degree to which promises are credible in equilibriumis an increasing function of the value of a candidate'sreputation.

How political parties, rather than member-states, are building the European Union

Political party formation and coalition building in the European Parliament is being a driving force for making governance of the highly pluralistic European Union relatively effective and consensual. In spite of successive enlargements and the very high number of electoral partiesobtaining representation in the European Union institutions, the number of effective European Political Groups in the European Parliament has decreased from the first direct election in 1979 to the fifth in 1999. The formal analysis of national party¹s voting power in different Europeanparty configurations can explain the incentives for national parties to join large European Political Groups instead of forming smaller nationalistic groupings. Empirical evidence shows increasing cohesion of European Political Groups and an increasing role of the European Parliament in EU inter-institutional decision making. As a consequence of this evolution, intergovernmentalism is being replaced with federalizing relations. The analysis can support positive expectations regarding the governability of the European Union after further enlargements provided that new member states have party systems fitting the European PoliticalGroups.