Entry regulation and intersectoral reallocation

We study how restrictions on firm entry affect intersectoral factor reallocation when openeconomies experience global economic shocks. In our theoretical framework, countries trade freelyin a range of differentiated sectors that are subject to country-specific and global shocks. Entryrestrictions are modeled as an upper bound on the introduction of new differentiated goods followingshocks. Prices and quantities adjust to clear international goods markets, and wages adjustto clear national labor markets. We show that in general equilibrium, countries with tighter entryrestrictions see less factor reallocation compared to the frictionless benchmark. In our empiricalwork, we compare sectoral employment reallocation across countries in the 1980s and 1990s withproxies for frictionless benchmark reallocation. Our results indicate that the gap between actualand frictionless reallocation is greater in countries where it takes longer to start a firm.

Spinning welfare: The gains from process innovation in cotton and car production

Economists and economic historians want to know how much better life is today than in the past.Fifty years ago economic historians found surprisingly small gains from 19th century US railroads,while more recently economists have found relatively large gains from electricity, computers and cellphones. In each case the implicit or explicit assumption is that researchers were measuring the valueof a new good to society. In this paper we use the same techniques to find the value to society ofmaking existing goods cheaper. Henry Ford did not invent the car, and the inventors of mechanisedcotton spinning in the industrial revolution invented no new product. But both made existing productsdramatically cheaper, bringing them into the reach of many more consumers. That in turn haspotentially large welfare effects. We find that the consumer surplus of Henry Ford s production linewas around 2% by 1923, 15 years after Ford began to implement the moving assembly line, while themechanisation of cotton spinning was worth around 6% by 1820, 34 years after its initial invention.Both are large: of the same order of magnitude as consumer expenditure on these items, and as largeor larger than the value of the internet to consumers. On the social savings measure traditionally usedby economic historians, these process innovations were worth 15% and 18% respectively, makingthem more important than railroads. Our results remind us that process innovations can be at least asimportant for welfare and productivity as the invention of new products.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

Globalization, technology and inequality

What are the effects of international integration on inequality, both between and within countries? The growing evidence that technology is the main determinant of wage and income differences may seem to imply that the forces of globalization only play a secondary role. Such a conclusion is however premature, in that it neglects the effect of international integration on technology itself. This opuscle summarizes recent and ongoing research studying how two important aspects of globalization, trade in goods and offshoring of production, shape the distribution of income when technological progress is endogenous. It discusses the theoretical foundations and the empirical support for various mechanisms through which international integration may change the incentive to develop and adopt new technologies and how this affects wages and the return to skill around the world.

Transfers, social safety nets and economic growth

The role of social safety nets in the form of redistributional transfersand wage subsidies is analyzed using a simple model of criminal behavior. Itis argued that public welfare programs act as a crime--preventing ordisruption--preventing devices because they tend to increase the opportunitycost of engaging in crime or disruptive activities. It is shown that, in thepresence of a leisure choice, wage subsidies may be better than pure transfers. Using a simple growth model, it is shown that it is not optimal for the governmentto try to fully eliminate crime. The optimal size of the public welfare programis found and it is argued that public welfare should be financed with income(not lump--sum) taxes, despite the fact that income taxes are distortionary.The intuition for this result is that income taxes act as a user fee oncongested public goods and transfers can be thought of as {\it productive}public goods {\it subject to congestion}. Finally, using a cross-section of 75 countries, the partial correlation betweentransfers and growth is shown to be significantly positive.

Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.

Regulation and opportunism: How much activism do we need?

This paper analyzes the current trend towards firms self-regulation as opposed to the formal regulation of a negative externality. Firms respond to increasing activism in the market(conscious consumers that take into account the external effects of their purchase) by providing more socially responsible goods. However, because regulation is the outcome of a political process, an increase in activism might imply an inefficiently higher externality level. This may happen when a majority of non-activist consumers collectively free-ride on conscious consumers. By determining a softer than optimal regulation, they benefit from the behavior of firms, yet they have access to cheaper (although less efficient) goods.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.

Logistics-production, logistics-marketing and external integration: Their impact on performance

Highly competitive environments are leading companies to implement SupplyChain Management (SCM) to improve performance and gain a competitiveadvantage. SCM involves integration, co-ordination and collaborationacross organisations and throughout the supply chain. It means that SCMrequires internal (intraorganisational) and external (interorganisational)integration. This paper examines the Logistics-Production and Logistics-Marketing interfaces and their relation with the external integrationprocess. The study also investigates the causal impact of these internaland external relationships on the company s logistical service performance.To analyse this, an empirical study was conducted in the Spanish Fast MovingConsumer Goods (FMCG) sector.

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.

Product market deregulation and labor market outcomes

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulationand equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combininga Mortensen-Pissarides model with monopolistic competition in the goods marketand individual wage bargaining. Product market competition affects unemploymentvia two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect dueto a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. Acalibrated model compares a high-regulation European regime to a low-regulationAnglo-American one. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individualbargaining, no more than half a percentage point of European unemployment ratescan be attributed to entry regulation.

Relying on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation

I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the production cost under each project but also about the signal regarding the profitability of the risky project. If the signal favoring the adoption of the risky project is goods news to the agent, integrating production and project evaluation tasks does not generate any loss compared to the benchmark in which the principal herself receives the signal. By contrast, if it is bad news, task integration creates an endogenous reservation utility which is type-dependent and thereby generates countervailing incentives, which can make a bias toward either project optimal. Our results can offer an explanation for why good firms can go bad and a rationale for the separation of day-to-day operating decisions from long-term strategic decisions stressed by Williamson.

Costly search and design

Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs thatcan be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential searchamong firms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new offering. Anoffering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extentto which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two design-styles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathethe product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. Inequilibrium, different firms may simultaneously offer both design-styles. We performcomparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead tohigher industry prices and profits and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is relatedto discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the"long tail" phenomenon.

Why England? Demand, growth and inequality during the Industrial Revolution

Why was England first? And why Europe? We present a probabilistic model that builds on big-push models by Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), combined with hierarchical preferences. The interaction of exogenous demographic factors (in particular the English low-pressure variant of the European marriage pattern)and redistributive institutions such as the old Poor Law combined to make an Industrial Revolution more likely. Essentially, industrialization is the result of having a critical mass of consumers that is rich enough to afford (potentially) mass-produced goods. Our model is then calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1750 and the observed transition until 1850.This allows us to address explicitly one of the key features of the British IndustrialRevolution unearthed by economic historians over the last three decades the slowness of productivity and output change. In our calibration, we find that the probability of Britain industrializing is 5 times larger than France s. Contrary to the recent argument by Pomeranz, China in the 18th century had essentially no chance to industrialize at all. This difference is decomposed into a demographic and a policy component, with the former being far more important than the latter.

Driver scheduling problem modelling

The Drivers Scheduling Problem (DSP) consists of selecting a set of duties for vehicle drivers, for example buses, trains, plane or boat drivers or pilots, for the transportation of passengers or goods. This is a complex problem because it involves several constraints related to labour and company rules and can also present different evaluation criteria and objectives. Being able to develop an adequate model for this problem that can represent the real problem as close as possible is an important research area.The main objective of this research work is to present new mathematical models to the DSP problem that represent all the complexity of the drivers scheduling problem, and also demonstrate that the solutions of these models can be easily implemented in real situations. This issue has been recognized by several authors and as important problem in Public Transportation. The most well-known and general formulation for the DSP is a Set Partition/Set Covering Model (SPP/SCP). However, to a large extend these models simplify some of the specific business aspects and issues of real problems. This makes it difficult to use these models as automatic planning systems because the schedules obtained must be modified manually to be implemented in real situations. Based on extensive passenger transportation experience in bus companies in Portugal, we propose new alternative models to formulate the DSP problem. These models are also based on Set Partitioning/Covering Models; however, they take into account the bus operator issues and the perspective opinions and environment of the user.We follow the steps of the Operations Research Methodology which consist of: Identify the Problem; Understand the System; Formulate a Mathematical Model; Verify the Model; Select the Best Alternative; Present the Results of theAnalysis and Implement and Evaluate. All the processes are done with close participation and involvement of the final users from different transportation companies. The planner s opinion and main criticisms are used to improve the proposed model in a continuous enrichment process. The final objective is to have a model that can be incorporated into an information system to be used as an automatic tool to produce driver schedules. Therefore, the criteria for evaluating the models is the capacity to generate real and useful schedules that can be implemented without many manual adjustments or modifications. We have considered the following as measures of the quality of the model: simplicity, solution quality and applicability. We tested the alternative models with a set of real data obtained from several different transportation companies and analyzed the optimal schedules obtained with respect to the applicability of the solution to the real situation. To do this, the schedules were analyzed by the planners to determine their quality and applicability. The main result of this work is the proposition of new mathematical models for the DSP that better represent the realities of the passenger transportation operators and lead to better schedules that can be implemented directly in real situations.