Some Considerations Concerning Regulation and Competition in the Port Sector

The aim of this paper is to discuss the circumstances in which the process of competition between ports takes place in Spain − circumstances arising from the way the port system is currently set up and from the regulations governing it. The importance of this matter lies both in the fact that intensified competition between ports is the way to set about boosting the efficiency of the Spanish port sector and in the relevance of this business to the economies of the regions in which the ports are located. It is precisely for this reason that the reform instituted in 1992 aimed to combine balanced development of the national port system with the defence of the interests of autonomous regions. To this end the current regulatory framework provides for the possibility of port authorities drawing up their own competitive strategies, but makes their implementation conditional upon approval of their business plan by the Spanish state port authority. The latter body coordinates the national port system to ensure the guidelines set by the central government authorities are followed in the field of transport. However, the scale of the differences which exist among both the size of facilities and their relevant markets on the one hand, and the financial and economic circumstances of each of them on the other, suggest that each port authority's needs must be very different. Consequently, their competitive strategies must also be very different. It is therefore valid to ask whether coping with this diversity calls for different guidelines to regulate their freedom of action. Key words: Competition, regulation, port sector JEL classification numbers: L1, L5, L9

Iceberg transport technologies in spatial competition. Hotelling reborn

Transport costs in address models of differentiation are usually modeled as separable of the consumption commodity and with a parametric price. However, there are many sectors in an economy where such modeling is not satisfactory either because transportation is supplied under oligopolistic conditions or because there is a difference (loss) between the amount delivered at the point of production and the amount received at the point of consumption. This paper is a first attempt to tackle these issues proposing to study competition in spatial models using an iceberg-like transport cost technology allowing for concave and convex melting functions.

Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

Trade liberalization, competition and growth

Increasing evidence support the claim that international trade enhances innovation and productivity growth through an increase in competition. This paper develops a two-country endogenous growth model, with firm specific R&D and a continuum of oligopolistic sectors under Cournot competition to provide a theoretical support to this claim. Since countries are assumed to produce the same set of varieties, trade openness makes markets more competitive, reducing prices and increasing quantities. Under Cournot competition, trade is pro-competitive. Since firms undertake cost reducing innovations, the increase in production induced by a more competitive market push firms to innovate more. Consequently, a reduction on trade barriers enhances growth by reducing domestic firm's market power.

Monopolistic competition and different wage setting systems

In this paper we match the static disequilibrium unemployment model without frictions in the labor market and monopolistic competition with an infinite horizon model of growth. We compare the wages set at the firm, sector and national (centralized) levels, their unemployment rates and growth of the economic variables, for the Cobb-Douglas production function, in order to see under wich conditions the inverse U hypothesis between unemployment and centralization of wage bargain is confirmed. We also analyze, in the three wage setting systems, the effect of an increase in the monopoly power on employment and growth.

Trade, firm selection, and innovation: the competition channel

The availability of rich firm-level data sets has recently led researchers to uncover new evidence on the effects of trade liberalization. First, trade openness forces the least productive firms to exit the market. Secondly, it induces surviving firms to increase their innovation efforts and thirdly, it increases the degree of product market competition. In this paper we propose a model aimed at providing a coherent interpretation of these findings. We introducing firm heterogeneity into an innovation-driven growth model, where incumbent firms operating in oligopolistic industries perform cost-reducing innovations. In this framework, trade liberalization leads to higher product market competition, lower markups and higher quantity produced. These changes in markups and quantities, in turn, promote innovation and productivity growth through a direct competition effect, based on the increase in the size of the market, and a selection effect, produced by the reallocation of resources towards more productive firms. Calibrated to match US aggregate and firm-level statistics, the model predicts that a 10 percent reduction in variable trade costs reduces markups by 1:15 percent, firm surviving probabilities by 1 percent, and induces an increase in productivity growth of about 13 percent. More than 90 percent of the trade-induced growth increase can be attributed to the selection effect.

The New Institutions of Transatlantic Aviation

This article focuses on the institutions of transatlantic aviation since 1945, and aims at extracting from this historical process topical policy implications. Using the methodology of an analytic narrative, we describe and explain the creation of the international cartel institutions in the 1940s, their operation throughout the 1950s and 60s, their increasing vulnerability in the 1970s, and then the progressive liberalization of the whole system. Our analytic narrative has a natural end, marked by the signing of an Open Skies Agreement between the US and the EU in 2007. We place particular explanatory power on (a) the progressive liberalization of the US domestic market, and (b) the active role of the European Commission in Europe. More specifically, we explain these developments using two frameworks. First, a “political limit pricing” model, which seemed promising, then failed, and then seemed promising again because it failed. Second, a strategic bargaining model inspired by Susanne Schmidt’s analysis of how the European Commission uses the threat of infringement proceedings to force member governments into line and obtain the sole negotiating power in transatlantic aviation.

Party competition in regional elections: a framework for analysis

Whilst scholars have long recognised that processes of decentralisation create new regional arenas where distinct patterns of party competition are likely to emerge, there has been little systematic analysis of the dynamics of such competition. This working paper thus proposes a framework for analysing party competition between regional branches of state-wide parties, and autonomist parties, in regional arenas. Firstly, the different strategies political parties may adopt in response to their perceptions of voter preferences and to the strategies pursued by their competitors are identified. Secondly, different factors that impact on parties' strategic choices, and which may constrain a party's ability to select electorally optimal strategies in a given political context, are proposed.

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

What if there was a stronger pharmaceutical price competition in Spain? When regulation has a similar effect to collusion

This paper examines statins competition in the Spanish pharmaceutical market, where prices are highly regulated, and simulates a situation in which there is unrestricted price competition. A nested logit demand model is estimated with a panel of monthly data for pharmaceuticals prescribed from 1997 to 2005. The simulation indicates that the regulation of prices is similar in its effects to cooperation among producers, since the regulated prices are close to those that would be observed in a scenario of perfect collusion. Freedom to set prices and a regulatory framework with appropriate incentives would result in a general reduction in prices and may make the current veiled competition in the form of discounts to pharmacists become more visible. The decrease in prices would be partially offset by an increase in consumption but the net effect would be an overall decrease in expenditure. The counterfactual set-up would also lead to important changes in the market shares of both manufacturers and active ingredients, and a reversal of generic drugs. Therefore, pro-competitive regulation would be welfare-enhancing but would imply winners and losers.

Generic drugs in Spain: price competition vs. moral hazard

This paper examines competition between generic and brand-name drugs in the regulated Spanish pharmaceutical market. A nested logit demand model is specified for the three most consumed therapeutic subgroups in Spain: statins (anticholesterol), selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (antidepressants) and proton pump inhibitors (antiulcers). The model is estimated with instrumental variables from a panel of monthly prescription data from 1999 to 2005. The dataset distinguishes between three different levels of patients’ copayments within the prescriptions and the results show that the greater the level of insurance that the patient has (and therefore the lower the patient’s copayment), the lower the proportion of generic prescriptions made by physicians. It seems that the low level of copayment has delayed the penetration of generics into the Spanish market. Additionally, the estimation of the demand model suggests that the substitution rules and promotional efforts associated with the reference pricing system have increased generic market share, and that being among the first generic entrants has an additional positive effect.

Primaries the unifying force

We present a formal model of intra-party politics to explain candidate selection within parties. We think of parties as heterogeneous groups of individuals who aim to implement a set of policies but who differ in their priorities. When party heterogeneity is too large, parties are in danger of splitting into smaller yet more homogeneous groups. In this context we argue that primaries can have a unifying role if the party elite cannot commit to policy concessions. Our model shows how alignment in the preferred policies of various factions within a party, the relative weight of each of these factions and the electoral system interact to create incentives for the adoption of primary elections. We discuss the existing empirical literature in the light of our theoretical predictions to provide a new, structured perspective on the adoption of primary elections.

Competition for Procurement Shares

We propose a new procurement procedure which allocates shares of the total amount to be procured depending on the bids of suppliers. Among the properties of the mechanism are: (i) Bidders have an incentive to par- ticipate in the procurement procedure, as equilibrium payoffs are strictly positive. (ii) The mechanism allows to vary the extent to which affirma- tive action objectives, like promoting local industries, are pursued. (iii) Surprisingly, even accomplishing affirmative action goals, procurement ex- penditures might be lower than under a classical auction format. Keywords: Procurement Auction, Affirmative Action. JEL: C72, D44, H57

El largo ciclo electoral de Plataforma per Catalunya: del ámbito local a la implantación nacional (2003-2011)

El partido anti-inmigración Plataforma per Catalunya (PxC) ha experimentado un progresivo crecimiento en la franja temporal que va desde su primera participación electoral en 2003 hasta las municipales de 2011. En dicho periodo temporal ha pasado de ser una formación presente exclusivamente en el ámbito local, y con un apoyo fuertemente concentrado en ciertos municipios de Cataluña, a recibir votos y tener secciones locales consolidadas en gran parte del territorio catalán. El texto trata de ofrecer claves interpretativas para entender tanto los éxitos como las debilidades de PxC a lo largo del ciclo electoral 2003-2011. Partiendo de la base de que actualmente existe en España una demanda electoral suficiente para el éxito de una formación como PxC, este trabajo se centra en el análisis de la estrategia política y electoral desarrollada por el partido para aprovechar dicha demanda, y en su interacción con el contexto social y político de la Cataluña de la primera década del siglo XXI.

Driving competition in local gasoline markets

Relevant market definition is still a key element of economic analysis of competition in the gasoline market. It is particularly difficult to handle when competition is local and market power is geographically constrained like is the case in the gasoline market. We analyse how the application of the hypothetical monopolist or Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Prices (SSNIP) test performs for defining isochrones using only information on prices and distance among competitors. We conclude that geographic information systems can be very successfully used to define more precisely relevant geographic market in the gasoline retailing. The application to the Spanish gasoline market concludes that geographic relevant market is composed by 5-6 minutes of travel time. Localised market power should be taken into account when analysing the adverse effects of mergers and entry regulations in gasoline retailing. Only drawing small enough isochrones will drive competition in local markets because it is just close rivals that compete effectively with each other.