Satisfaction in choice as a function of the number of alternatives: When "goods satiate" but "bads escalate"

Whereas people are typically thought to be better off with more choices, studiesshow that they often prefer to choose from small as opposed to large sets of alternatives.We propose that satisfaction from choice is an inverted U-shaped function of thenumber of alternatives. This proposition is derived theoretically by considering thebenefits and costs of different numbers of alternatives and is supported by fourexperimental studies. We also manipulate the perceptual costs of information processingand demonstrate how this affects the resulting satisfaction function. We furtherindicate that satisfaction when choosing from a given set is diminished if people aremade aware of the existence of other choice sets. The role of individual differences insatisfaction from choice is documented by noting effects due to gender and culture. Weconclude by emphasizing the need to have an explicit rationale for knowing how muchchoice is enough.

Economic rationality and ethical behavior

This paper argues that economic rationality and ethical behavior cannotbe reduced one to the other, casting doubts on the validity of formulaslike 'profit is ethical' or 'ethics pays'. In order to express ethicaldilemmas as opposing economic interest with ethical concerns, we proposea model of rational behavior that combines these two irreducible dimensions in an open but not arbitrary manner. Behaviors that are neither ethicalnor profitable are considered irrational (non-arbitrariness). However,behaviors that are profitable but unethical, and behaviors that are ethicalbut not profitable, are all treated as rational (openness). Combiningethical concerns with economic interest, ethical business is in turn anoptimal form of rationality between venality and sacrifice.Because every one prefers to communicate that he acts ethically, ethicalbusiness remains ambiguous until some economic interest is actuallysacrificed. We argue however that ethical business has an interest indemonstrating its consistency between communication and behavior by atransparent attitude. On the other hand, venal behaviors must remainconfidential to hide the corresponding lack of consistency. Thisdiscursive approach based on transparency and confidentiality helpsto further distinguish between ethical and unethical business behaviors.

Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

An evaluation of the life-cycle effects of minimum pensions on retirement behavior

In this paper we explore the effects of the minimum pension program on welfare andretirement in Spain. This is done with a stylized life-cycle model which provides a convenient analytical characterization of optimal behavior. We use data from the Spanish Social Security to estimate the behavioral parameters of the model and then simulate the changes induced by the minimum pension in aggregate retirement patterns. The impact is substantial: there is threefold increase in retirement at 60 (the age of first entitlement) with respect to the economy without minimum pensions, and total early retirement (before or at 60) is almost 50% larger.

Salience and consumer choice

We present a theory of context-dependent choice in which a consumer's attention is drawnto salient attributes of goods, such as quality or price. An attribute is salient for a good when itstands out among the good's attributes, relative to that attribute's average level in the choice set (orgenerally, the evoked set). Consumers attach disproportionately high weight to salient attributesand their choices are tilted toward goods with higher quality/price ratios. The model accounts fora variety of disparate evidence, including decoy effects, context-dependent willingness to pay, andlarge shifts in demand in response to price shocks.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

A measure of rationality and welfare

There is evidence showing that individual behavior often deviates fromthe classical principle of maximization. This evidence raises at least two importantquestions: (i) how severe the deviations are and (ii) which method is the best forextracting relevant information from choice behavior for the purposes of welfare analysis.In this paper we address these two questions by identifying from a foundationalanalysis a new measure of the rationality of individuals that enables the analysis ofindividual welfare in potentially inconsistent subjects, all based on standard revealedpreference data. We call such measure minimal index.

Interactive local bandwidth choice

A tool for user choice of the local bandwidth function for a kernel density estimate is developed using KDE, a graphical object-oriented package for interactive kernel density estimation written in LISP-STAT. The bandwidth function is a cubic spline, whose knots are manipulated by the user in one window, while the resulting estimate appears in another window. A real data illustration of this method raises concerns, because an extremely large family of estimates is available.

A Hull and White formula for a general stochastic volatility jump-diffusion model with applications to the study of the short-time behavior of the implied volatility

In this paper, generalizing results in Alòs, León and Vives (2007b), we see that the dependence of jumps in the volatility under a jump-diffusion stochastic volatility model, has no effect on the short-time behaviour of the at-the-money implied volatility skew, although the corresponding Hull and White formula depends on the jumps. Towards this end, we use Malliavin calculus techniques for Lévy processes based on Løkka (2004), Petrou (2006), and Solé, Utzet and Vives (2007).

When in peril, retrench: Testing the portfolio channel of contagion

One plausible mechanism through which financial market shocks may propagate across countriesis through the impact that past gains and losses may have on investors risk aversion and behavior. This paper presents a stylized model illustrating how heterogeneous changes in investors risk aversion affect portfolio allocation decisions and stock prices. Our empirical findings suggest that when funds returns are below average, they adjust their holdings toward the average (or benchmark) portfolio. In so doing, funds tend to sell the assets of countries in which they were overweight , increasing their exposure to countries in which they were underweight. Based on this insight, the paper constructs an index of financial interdependence which reflects the extent to which countries share overexposed funds. The index helps in explain the pattern of stock market comovement across countries. Moreover, a comparison of this interdependence measure to indices of trade or commercial bank linkages indicates that our index can improve predictions about which countries are more likely to be affected by contagion from crisis centers.

Imitation of succesful behavior in Cournot markets

In an experimental standard Cournot Oligopoly we test the importance ofmodels of behavior characterized by imitation of succesful behavior. Wefind that the players appear to the rather reluctant to imitate.

The risk of divorce and household saving behavior

We analyze the impact of an increase in the risk of divorce on the savingbehaviour of married couples. From a theoretical perspective, the expected sign of theeffect is ambiguous. We take advantage of the legalization of divorce in Ireland in 1996as an exogenous increase in the likelihood of marital dissolution. We analyze the savingbehaviour over time of couples who were married before the law was passed. We proposea difference-in-differences approach where we use as comparison groups either marriedcouples in other European countries (not affected by the law change), or Irish familieswho did not experience a significant increase in the expected risk of divorce (such as veryreligious families, or single individuals). Our results suggest that the increase in the riskof divorce brought about by the law was followed by an increase in the propensity to saveof married couples, consistent with a rise in precautionary savings interpretation. Anincrease in the risk of marital dissolution of about 40 percent led to a 7 to 13 percent risein the proportion of married couples reporting positive savings.

Revealed preference and indifferent selection

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.

A simple model of multiple equilibria based on risk

This paper shows how risk may aggravate fluctuations in economies with imperfect insurance and multiple assets. A two period job matching model is studied, in which risk averse agents act both as workers and as entrepreneurs. They choose between two types of investment: one type is riskless, while the other is a risky activity that creates jobs.Equilibrium is unique under full insurance. If investment is fully insured but unemployment risk is uninsured, then precautionary saving behavior dampens output fluctuations. However, if both investment and employment are uninsured, then an increase in unemployment gives agents an incentive to shift investment away from the risky asset, further increasing unemployment. This positive feedback may lead to multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. An overlapping generations version of the model may exhibit poverty traps or persistent multiplicity. Greater insurance is doubly beneficial in this context since it can both prevent multiplicity and promote risky investment.

An enhanced concave program relaxation for choice network revenue management

The network choice revenue management problem models customers as choosing from an offer-set, andthe firm decides the best subset to offer at any given moment to maximize expected revenue. The resultingdynamic program for the firm is intractable and approximated by a deterministic linear programcalled the CDLP which has an exponential number of columns. However, under the choice-set paradigmwhen the segment consideration sets overlap, the CDLP is difficult to solve. Column generation has beenproposed but finding an entering column has been shown to be NP-hard. In this paper, starting with aconcave program formulation based on segment-level consideration sets called SDCP, we add a class ofconstraints called product constraints, that project onto subsets of intersections. In addition we proposea natural direct tightening of the SDCP called ?SDCP, and compare the performance of both methodson the benchmark data sets in the literature. Both the product constraints and the ?SDCP method arevery simple and easy to implement and are applicable to the case of overlapping segment considerationsets. In our computational testing on the benchmark data sets in the literature, SDCP with productconstraints achieves the CDLP value at a fraction of the CPU time taken by column generation and webelieve is a very promising approach for quickly approximating CDLP when segment consideration setsoverlap and the consideration sets themselves are relatively small.