L'aplicació del dret anglès per part dels tribunals de Catalunya

Mitjançant aquest projecte s’ha pogut: a) constatar l’escassa aplicació pràctica en els tribunals catalans del dret anglès; b) discutir els motius d’aquesta realitat judicial que s’aparta de les disposicions normatives previstes a la Llei d’Enjudiciament Civil 1/2000; c) plantejar solucions als problemes detectats, formulant una proposta de modificació normativa. Tot això s’ha materialitzat en 4 Ponències Internacionals presentades al “Congreso Internacional sobre Prueba Judicial” organitzat per les Facultats Jurídiques de les Universitats de Deusto, Comillas i Esade els 19 a 21 de juliol de 2010; 3 Comunicacions presentades a la Universidad de Salamanca en la “Jornada en Homenaje a la Profra. Mª. Carmen Calvo Sánchez”, el 25 de novembre de 2010; i un llibre col•lectiu de tots els membres integrants d’aquest projecte de recerca titulat “La prova del dret estranger: teoria i pràctica. Estudi de 30 casos reals”, publicat per l’editorial J.Mª. Bosch, la més antiga a Espanya i de reconegut prestigi i àmplia difusió en l’àrea del Dret Processal: es va crear l’any 1889 i ha publicat més de 300 llibres en aquesta àrea de coneixement.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

The role of institutions in the contractual process

Human beings increase their productivity by specializingtheir resources and exchanging their products. Theorganization of exchange is costly, however, becausespecialized activities need coordination and incentiveshave to be aligned. This work first describes how theseexchanges are organized in an institutional environment.It then focuses on the dual effect of this environment-as with any other specialized resource, institutions maybe used for expropriation purposes. They enjoyspecialization advantages in safeguarding exchange butthey also make possible new forms of opportunism,causing new costs of exchange. Three perverse tendenciesare identified:In the legal field, there is a surplus ofmandatory rules and, at the same time, a deficit in default rules. Second, courts activity is biased againstthe quasi-judicial role of the parties and the market. Third, Market enforcement is based on reputationalassets that are badly exposed to opportunism.

Judges' cognition and market order

We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the optimal degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion adopted in both legal traditions were thus optimally adapted to different circumstances, mainly rooted in the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The ongoing debasement of pro-market fundamentals in both branches of the Western legal system is explained from this perspective as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system, which favored the adoption of sharing solutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.