Investor protection and income inequality: risk sharing vs risk taking

This paper studies the relationship between investor protection, entrepreneurial risk taking and income inequality. In the presence of market frictions, better protection makes investors more willing to take on entrepreneurial risk when lending to firms, thereby improving the degree of risk sharing between financiers and entrepreneurs. On the other hand, by increasing risk sharing, investor protection also induces more firms to undertake risky projects. By increasing entrepreneurial risk taking, it raises income dispersion. By reducing the risk faced by entrepreneurs, it reduces income volatility. As a result, investor protection raises income inequality to the extent that it fosters risk taking, while it reduces it for a given level of risk taking. Empirical evidence from a panel of forty-five countries spanning the period 1976-2000 supports the predictions of the model.

School composition effects in Spain

Drawing on PISA data of 2006, this study examines the impact of socio-economic school composition on science test score achievement for Spanish students in compulsory secondary schools. We define school composition in terms of the average parental human capital of students in the same school. These contextual peer effects are estimated using a semi-parametric methodology, which enables the spillovers to affect all the parameters of the educational production function. We also deal with the potential problem of self-selection of student into schools, using an artificial sorting that we argue to be independent from unobserved student’s abilities. The results indicate that the association between socio-economic school composition and test score results is clearly positive and significantly higher when computed with the semi-parametric approach. However, we find that the endogenous sorting of students into schools plays a fundamental role, given that the spillovers are significantly reduced when this selection process is ruled out from our measure of school composition effects. Specifically, the estimations suggest that the contextual peer effects are moderately positive only in those schools where the socio-economic composition is considerably elevated. In addition, we find some evidence of asymmetry of how the external effects and the sorting process actually operate, which seem affect in a different way males and females as well as high and low performance students.

Mechanisms of agglomeration: Evidence from the location of new manufacturing firms in Spain

El objetivo de esta investigación es aportar evidencia sobre las fuentes de las economías de aglomeración para el caso español. De todas las maneras posibles que se han tomado en la literatura para medir las economías de aglomeración, nosotros lo analizamos a partir de las decisiones de localización de las empresas manufactureras. La literatura reciente ha puesto de relieve que el análisis basado en la disyuntiva localización / urbanización (relaciones dentro de un mismo sector) no es suficiente para entender las economías de aglomeración. Sin embargo, las relaciones entre los diferentes sectores sí resultan significativas al examinar por qué las empresas que pertenecen a diferentes sectores se localizan unas al lado de las otras. Con esto en mente, intentamos explicar que relaciones entre diferentes sectores pueden explicar coaglomeración. Para ello, nos centramos en aquellas relaciones entre sectores definidos a partir de los mecanismos de aglomeración de Marshall, es decir, labor market, input sharing y knowledge spillovers. Trabajamos con el labor market pooling en la medida en que los dos sectores utilizan los mismos trabajadores (clasificación de ocupaciones). Con el segundo mecanismo de Marshall, input sharing, introducimos cómo dos sectores tienen una relación de comprador / vendedor. Por último, nos referimos a dos sectores que utilizan las mismas tecnologías en cuanto a los knowledge spillovers. Con el fin de capturar todos los efectos de los mecanismos de aglomeracion en España, en esta investigación trabajamos con dos ámbitos geográficos, los municipios y los mercados de trabajo locales. La literatura existente nunca se ha puesto de acuerdo en cual es el ámbito geográfico en el que mejor trabajan los mecanismos Marshall, por lo que hemos cubierto todas las unidades geográficas potenciales.

Quantiles of the Realized Stock-Bond Correlation

Abstract: We scrutinize the realized stock-bond correlation based upon high frequency returns. We use quantile regressions to pin down the systematic variation of the extreme tails over their economic determinants. The correlation dependence behaves differently when the correlation is large negative and large positive. The important explanatory variables at the extreme low quantile are the short rate, the yield spread, and the volatility index. At the extreme high quantile the bond market liquidity is also important. The empirical fi…ndings are only partially robust to using less precise measures of the stock-bond correlation. The results are not caused by the recent …financial crisis. Keywords: Extreme returns; Financial crisis; Realized stock-bond correlation; Quantile regressions; VIX. JEL Classifi…cations: C22; G01; G11; G12

Smooth Transition Patterns in the Realized Stock- Bond Correlation

Abstract: We analyze the realized stock-bond correlation. Gradual transitions between negative and positive stock-bond correlation is accommodated by the smooth transition regression (STR) model. The changes in regime are de…ned by economic and …financial transition variables. Both in sample and out-of- sample results document that STR models with multiple transition variables outperform STR models with a single transition variable. The most important transition variables are the short rate, the yield spread, and the VIX volatility index. Keywords: realized correlation; smooth transition regressions; stock-bond correlation; VIX index JEL Classifi…cations: C22; G11; G12; G17

The effects of uncertainty about countries' compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact

The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was established to govern discretionary fiscal policy in the European Monetary Union. This article studies the effects created when there is uncertainty about the members’ commitment to respecting the established deficit limits in the SGP. We will show that, even if countries respect the SGP deficit ceiling, the presence of uncertainty about their compliance will bring about higher volatility in key economic variables, which could, in turn, affect unemployment and growth negatively. This finding shows that it is important to reduce uncertainty about the members’ commitment towards the SGP. Keywords: fiscal policy rules, monetary union, Stability and Growth Pact, uncertainty, commitment. JEL No.: E63, F55, H62, H87

Regulatory federalism in network industries

Report for the scientific sojourn at the UC Berkeley, USA, from march until july 2008. This document starts by surveying the literature on economic federalism and relating it to network industries. The insights and some new developments (which focus on the role of interjurisdictional externalities, multiple objectives and investment incentives) are used to analyze regulatory arrangements in telecommunications and energy in the EU and the US. In the long history of vertically integrated monopolies in telecommunications and energy, there was a historical trend to move regulation up in the vertical structure of government, at least form the local level to the state or nation-state level. This move alleviated the pressure on regulators to renege on the commitment not to expropriate sunk investments, although it did not eliminate the practice of taxation by regulation that was the result of multiple interest group action. Although central or federal policy making is more focused and especialized and makes it difficult for more interest groups to organize, it is not clear that under all conditions central powers will not be associated with underinvestment. When technology makes the introduction of competition in some segments possible, the possibilities for organizing the institutional architechture of regulation expand. The central level may focus on structural regulation and the location of behavioral regulation of the remaining monopolists may be resolved in a cooperative way or concentrated at the level where the relevant spillovers are internalized.

What underlies localization and urbanization economies? Evidence from the location of new firms

The objective of this paper is to analyze why firms in some industries locate in specialized economic environments (localization economies) while those in other industries prefer large city locations (urbanization economies). To this end, we examine the location decisions of new manufacturing firms in Spain at the city level and for narrowly defined industries (three-digit level). First, we estimate firm location models to obtain estimates that reflect the importance of localization and urbanization economies in each industry. In a second step, we regress these estimates on industry characteristics that are related to the potential importance of three agglomeration theories, namely, labor market pooling, input sharing and knowledge spillovers. Localization effects are low and urbanization effects are high in knowledge-intensive industries, suggesting that firms (partly) locate in large cities to reap the benefits of inter-industry knowledge spillovers. We also find that localization effects are high in industries that employ workers whose skills are more industry-specific, suggesting that industries (partly) locate in specialized economic environments to share a common pool of specialized workers.

An anonymous reputation mechanism for cloud computing networks using volunteer resources

One of the major problems when using non-dedicated volunteer resources in adistributed network is the high volatility of these hosts since they can go offlineor become unavailable at any time without control. Furthermore, the use ofvolunteer resources implies some security issues due to the fact that they aregenerally anonymous entities which we know nothing about. So, how to trustin someone we do not know?.Over the last years an important number of reputation-based trust solutionshave been designed to evaluate the participants' behavior in a system.However, most of these solutions are addressed to P2P and ad-hoc mobilenetworks that may not fit well with other kinds of distributed systems thatcould take advantage of volunteer resources as recent cloud computinginfrastructures.In this paper we propose a first approach to design an anonymous reputationmechanism for CoDeS [1], a middleware for building fogs where deployingservices using volunteer resources. The participants are reputation clients(RC), a reputation authority (RA) and a certification authority (CA). Users needa valid public key certificate from the CA to register to the RA and obtain thedata needed to participate into the system, as now an opaque identifier thatwe call here pseudonym and an initial reputation value that users provide toother users when interacting together. The mechanism prevents not only themanipulation of the provided reputation values but also any disclosure of theusers' identities to any other users or authorities so the anonymity isguaranteed.

Openness and technology diffusion in payment

We study the relationship between openness and payment system development. In particular, we analyze how the existence of technology diffusion from a more developed country fosters a transformation of payment choice in a less developed country. We apply our analysis to Mexico. Economic growth in Mexico was not high enough to cause a transformation of payment choice observed in the data after 2001. We argue that the switch towards electronic payments can be attributed to openness and related payment technology spillovers from the US in the context of NAFTA.

Two-sided learning in new keynesian models: dynamics, (lack of) convergence and the value of information

This paper investigates the role of learning by private agents and the central bank (two-sided learning) in a New Keynesian framework in which both sides of the economy have asymmetric and imperfect knowledge about the true data generating process. We assume that all agents employ the data that they observe (which may be distinct for different sets of agents) to form beliefs about unknown aspects of the true model of the economy, use their beliefs to decide on actions, and revise these beliefs through a statistical learning algorithm as new information becomes available. We study the short-run dynamics of our model and derive its policy recommendations, particularly with respect to central bank communications. We demonstrate that two-sided learning can generate substantial increases in volatility and persistence, and alter the behavior of the variables in the model in a signifficant way. Our simulations do not converge to a symmetric rational expectations equilibrium and we highlight one source that invalidates the convergence results of Marcet and Sargent (1989). Finally, we identify a novel aspect of central bank communication in models of learning: communication can be harmful if the central bank's model is substantially mis-specified

Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Market Transparency, Market Quality and Sunshine Trading

This paper analyzes the implications of pre-trade transpareny on market performance. We find that transparency increases the precision held by agents, however we show that this increase in precision may not be due to prices themselves. In competitive markets, transparency increases market liquidity and reduces price volatility, whereas these results may not hold under imperfect competition. More importantly, market depth and volatility might be positively related with proper priors. Moreover, we study the incentives for liquidity traders to engage in sunshine trading. We obtain that the choice of sunshine/dark trading for a noise trader is independent of his order size, being the traders with higher liquidity needs more interested in sunshine trading, as long as this practice is desirable. Key words: Market Microstructure, Transparency, Prior Information, Market Quality, Sunshine Trading

How does ownership structure invfluence bank risk? Analyzing the role of managerial incentives

This paper analyzes how ownership concentration and managerial incentives influences bank risk for a large sample of US banks over the period 1997-2007. Using 2SLS simultaneous equations models, we show that ownership concentration has a positive total effect on bank risk. This is the result of a positive direct effect, which reflects monitoring and opportunistic behavior, and a negative indirect effect, which works through the design of managerial incentive contracts and reflects shareholder preferences toward risk. Large shareholders reduce bank risk by reducing the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility (Vega) and by increasing the CEO pay-performance sensitivity (Delta). In addition, we show that the direct and indirect effect of ownership concentration on bank risk depends on the type of the largest shareholder (a family, a bank, a corporation or an institutional investor), as well as, on the total shareholding held by each type as a group. Our results suggest that the positive relation between ownership concentration and risk is not the result of preferences towards more risk. Rather, they point at opportunistic behavior of large shareholders.

On the goodness of fit of Kirk's formula for spread option prices

In this paper we investigate the goodness of fit of the Kirk's approximation formula for spread option prices in the correlated lognormal framework. Towards this end, we use the Malliavin calculus techniques to find an expression for the short-time implied volatility skew of options with random strikes. In particular, we obtain that this skew is very pronounced in the case of spread options with extremely high correlations, which cannot be reproduced by a constant volatility approximation as in the Kirk's formula. This fact agrees with the empirical evidence. Numerical examples are given.