A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism (Long version)

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of "the historical tendencies": a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin's method, to prove the result.

Do market conditions affect gift exchange? Evidence from experimental markets with excess supply and excess demand

We study whether people's behavior in unbalanced gift exchange markets with repeated interaction are affected by whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market. Our analysis is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets, which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market. The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects' behavior, as second movers (workers) might react differently to favorable actions by first movers (firms) in the two cases. While our data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction, we find mainly secondary treatment effects. Wage offers are not higher when there is an excess supply of firms, and workers do not respond more favorably to a given wage when there is an excess supply of labor. The state of competition does not appear to have strong effects in our data. We also present data from single-period sessions that show substantial gift exchange even without repeated interactions.

A foundation model for marxian breakdown theories based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism.

The paper presents a foundation model for Marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism based on a new falling rate of profit mechanism. All of these theories are based on one or more of ?the historical tendencies?: a rising capital-wage bill ratio, a rising capitalist share and a falling rate of profit. The model is a foundation in the sense that it generates these tendencies in the context of a model with a constant subsistence wage. The newly discovered generating mechanism is based on neo-classical reasoning for a model with land. It is non-Ricardian in that land augmenting technical progress can be unboundedly rapid. Finally, since the model has no steady state, it is necessary to use a new technique, Chaplygin?s method, to prove the result.

A foundation model for marxian theories of the breakdown of capitalism

Marx and the writers that followed him have produced a number of theories of the breakdown of capitalism. The majority of these theories were based on the historical tendencies: the rise in the composition of capital and the share of capital and the fall in the rate of profit. However these theories were never modeled with main stream rigour. This paper presents a constant wage model, with capital, labour and land as factors of production, which reproduces the historical tendencies and so can be used as a foundation for the various theories. The use of Chaplygins theorem in the proof of the main result also gives the paper a technical interest.

Employment and public capital in spain

This paper analyses the e¤ects on employment of increasing the stock of public capital. To this end, we derive a wage equation so that wages are endogenized. This allows us to show that, by means of a higher elasticity of labour demand with respect to wages, a rise in public capital increases employment. The estimation of a structural model for the Spanish private sector tests and con…rms empirically this relationship. The results show that an increase in public capital has a significant and positive direct influence on employment, and indirect e¤ects derived from lower wages and higher economic growth. Finally, we undertake a simulation exercise to assess the long run efects on employment and economic growth of increasing public capital.

Unemployment, growth and fiscal policy: new insights on the hysteresis hypothesis

We develop a growth model with unemployment due to imperfections in the labor market. In this model, wage inertia and balanced budget rules cause a complementarity between capital and employment capable of explaining the existence of multiple equilibrium paths. Hysteresis is viewed as the result of a selection between these diferent equilibrium paths. We use this model to argue that, in contrast to the US, those fiscal policies followed by most of the European countries after the shocks of the 1970’s may have played a central role in generating hysteresis.

Land, technical progress and the falling rate of profit

The paper sets out a one sector growth model with a neoclassical production function in land and a capital-labour aggregate. Capital accumulates through capitalist saving, the labour supply is infinitely elastic at a subsistence wage and all factors may experience factor augmenting technical progress. The main result is that, if the elasticity of substitution between land and the capital-labour aggregate is less than one and if the rate of caital augmenting technical progress is strictly positive, then the rate of profit will fall to zero. The surprise is that this result holds regardless of the rate of land augmenting technical progress; that is, no amount of technical advance in agriculture can stop the fall in the rate of profit. The paper also discusses the relation of this result to the classical and Marxist literature and sets out the path of the relative price of land.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analysed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. JEL classification numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot competition, Contract delegation, Moral hazard, Entry, Market size, Wage cost.

North-South trade and directed technical change

In a world where poor countries provide weak protection for intellectual property rights (IPRs), market integration shifts technical change in favor of rich nations. Through this channel, free trade may amplify international income differences. At the same time, integration with countries where IPRs are weakly protected can slow down the world growth rate. An important implication of these results is that protection of intellectual property is most beneficial in open countries. This prediction, which is novel in the literature, is consistent with evidence from a panel of 53 countries observed in the years 1965-1990. The paper also provides empirical support for the mechanism linking North-South trade to the direction of technical change: an increase in import penetration from low-wage, low-IPRs, countries is followed by a sharp fall in R&D investment in a panel of US manufacturing sectors.

New evidence on emigrant selection

This paper examines the extent to which Mexican emigrants to the United States are negatively selected, that is, have lower skills than individuals who remain in Mexico. Previous studies have been limited by the lack of nationally representative longitudinal data. This one uses a newly available household survey, which identifies emigrants before they leave and allows a direct comparison to non-migrants. I find that, on average, US bound Mexican emigrants from 2000 to 2004 earn a lower wage and have less schooling years than individuals who remain in Mexico, evidence of negative selection. This supports the original hypothesis of Borjas (AER, 1987) and argues against recent findings, notably those of Chiquiar and Hanson (JPE, 2005). The discrepancy with the latter is primarily due to an under-count of unskilled migrants in US sources and secondarily to the omission of unobservables in their methodology.

Gestió d'espais i control d'accés en edificis públics

El present projecte desenvolupa una aplicació de gestió d’espais i control d’accés per a la l’Edifici d’Estudiants-ETC de la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Aquest edifici ofereix serveis a la comunitat universitària i compta amb un conjunt d’espais i equipaments ben divers: despatxos, sales de reunió, sales d’assaig, sala d’ordinadors, cinema i teatre. Els usuaris d’aquestes instal·lacions són els propis treballadors de l’edifici, alumnes dels cursos i tallers, estudiants beneficiaris d’algun servei i col·lectius d’estudiants. La gestió i l’assignació d’aquests espais, així com el control d’accés són realitzats manualment per part del personal de l’ETC a la recepció de l’edifici (anomenat Punt de Serveis). L’aplicació desenvolupada implementa els processos existents, tals com la gestió i reserva d’espais, l’inventari de claus o el control d’accés a les sales. Tanmateix introdueix nous processos i funcionalitats, com la gestió, reserva i cessió de material propietat de l’edifici.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

Women at home, at school and in the factory. The particular discourse of domesticity done by the Spanish Escuela Economista (1861-1909)

The texts by the Spanish Economist School (second half of the 19th century) contain an assessment of the role of women in the economy and society that is transgressor in front of the prevailing discourse that defended a unique and exclusive role for all women: being at home and a mother. Most members of that economic trend defended female work in the factories, basing themselves on wage arguments and even asked for a professional training for those who in many cases could not even write and read for the fact of being a woman. The texts of those economists give new ideas about the economic and social role of women in a Spain dominated by a discourse that denied the necessity of female work for the working families.

Heterogeneity across immigrants in the Spanish labour

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the diferences that immigrants have in the Spanish labour market. Immigrants in Spain come from a diversity of continents (Africa, South America, Eastern Europe, Asia, etc.), and there are substantial diferences in characteristics not only among continents but also among countries in each continent. Using a quantile regression method of decomposition we estimate these diferences that are reflected in the labour market and in particular are mirrored in the wage, so some immigrants are more discriminated or segregated that others because they have less advantage. For example Argentineans and Peruvians have the same origin and culture but we can find diferences in the wage that they receive in the Spanish labor market, or for example Moroccans have a advantage with respect to the Rest of Africans, due to the geographical proximity to Spain. So when we study the pay gap and the gender pay gap we need to take into consideration the origin of immigrants. We also want to study how the integration of immigrants evolved across years, whether the wage gap that we find in the first episode of work between immigrants and natives disappears or continues to be present in the Spain labour market.

Optimal coexistence of long-term and short-term contracts in labor Markets

We consider a market where firms hire workers to run their projects and such projects differ in profitability. At any period, each firm needs two workers to successfully run its project: a junior agent, with no specific skills, and a senior worker, whose effort is not verifiable. Senior workers differ in ability and their competence is revealed after they have worked as juniors in the market. We study the length of the contractual relationships between firms and workers in an environment where the matching between firms and workers is the result of market interaction. We show that, despite in a one-firm-one-worker set-up long-term contracts are the optimal choice for firms, market forces often induce firms to use short-term contracts. Unless the market only consists of firms with very profitable projects, firms operating highly profitable projects offer short-term contracts to ensure the service of high-ability workers and those with less lucrative projects also use short-term contracts to save on the junior workers' wage. Intermediate firms may (or may not) hire workers through long-term contracts.