Multidrug resistance protein 1 localization in lipid raft domains and prostasomes in prostate cancer cell lines

Background: One of the problems in prostate cancer (CaP) treatment is the appearance of the multidrug resistance phenotype, in which ATP-binding cassette transporters such as multidrug resistance protein 1 (MRP1) play a role. Different localizations of the transporter have been reported, some of them related to the chemoresistant phenotype. Aim: This study aimed to compare the localization of MRP1 in three prostate cell lines (normal, androgen-sensitive, and androgen-independent) in order to understand its possible role in CaP chemoresistance. Methods: MRP1 and caveolae protein markers were detected using confocal microscopy, performing colocalization techniques. Lipid raft isolation made it possible to detect these proteins by Western blot analysis. Caveolae and prostasomes were identified by electron microscopy. Results: We show that MRP1 is found in lipid raft fractions of tumor cells and that the number of caveolae increases with malignancy acquisition. MRP1 is found not only in the plasma membrane associated with lipid rafts but also in cytoplasmic accumulations colocalizing with the prostasome markers Caveolin-1 and CD59, suggesting that in CaP cells, MRP1 is localized in prostasomes. Conclusion: We hypothesize that the presence of MRP1 in prostasomes could serve as a reservoir of MRP1; thus, taking advantage of the release of their content, MRP1 could be translocated to the plasma membrane contributing to the chemoresistant phenotype. The presence of MRP1 in prostasomes could serve as a predictor of malignancy in CaP

Effects of punishment in a mobile population playing the prisoner’s dilemma game

We deal with a system of prisoner’s dilemma players undergoing continuous motion in a two-dimensional plane. In contrast to previous work, we introduce altruistic punishment after the game. We find punishing only a few of the cooperator-defector interactions is enough to lead the system to a cooperative state in environments where otherwise defection would take over the population. This happens even with soft nonsocial punishment (where both cooperators and defectors punish other players, a behavior observed in many human populations). For high enough mobilities or temptations to defect, low rates of social punishment can no longer avoid the breakdown of cooperation

On the structure of cooperative and competitive solutions for a generalized assignment game

We study cooperative and competitive solutions for a many- to-many generalization of Shapley and Shubik (1972)'s assignment game. We consider the Core, three other notions of group stability and two al- ternative definitions of competitive equilibrium. We show that (i) each group stable set is closely related with the Core of certain games defined using a proper notion of blocking and (ii) each group stable set contains the set of payoff vectors associated to the two definitions of competitive equilibrium. We also show that all six solutions maintain a strictly nested structure. Moreover, each solution can be identified with a set of ma- trices of (discriminated) prices which indicate how gains from trade are distributed among buyers and sellers. In all cases such matrices arise as solutions of a system of linear inequalities. Hence, all six solutions have the same properties from a structural and computational point of view.