The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.

Negativity effect and the emergence of ideologies

``Negativity effect'' refers to the psychological phenomenon that peopletend to attach greater weight to negative information than to equallyextreme and equally likely positive information in a variety of informationprocessing tasks. Numerous studies of impression formation have found thatnegative information is weighted more heavily than positive information asimpressions of others are formed. There is empirical evidence in politicalscience that shows the importance of the negativity effect in the informationprocessing of the voters. This effect can explain the observed decreaseof popularity for a president the longer he is in office. \\We construct a dynamic model of political competition, incorporating thenegativity effect in the decision rule of the voters and allowing their preferencesto change over time, according to the past performance of the candidateswhile in office. Our model may explain the emergence of ideologies out ofthe competition for votes of myopic candidates freely choosing policypositions. This result gives rise to the formation of political parties,as infinitely--lived agents with a certain ideology. Furthermore, in thismodel some voters may start out by switching among parties associated withdifferent policies, but find themselves supporting one of the parties fromsome point on. Thus, the model describes a process by which some votersbecome identified with a ``right'' or ``left'' bloc, while others ``swing''between the two parties.

Putting health in all policies: The National Institute for Welfare Enhancement

Welfare is a rather vague term whose meaning depends on ideology, values andjudgments. Material resources are just means to enhance people s well-being, butgrowth of the Gross Domestic Production is still the standard measure of thesuccess of a society. Fortunately, recent advances in measuring social performanceinclude health, education and other social outcomes. Because what we measureaffects what we do it is hoped that social policies will change. The movementHealth in all policies and its associated Health Impact Assessment methodologywill contribute to it. The task consists of designing transversal policies thatconsider health and other welfare goals, the short term and long-term implicationsand intergenerational redistributions of resources. As long as marginalproductivity on health outside the healthcare system is higher than inside it,efficiency needs cross-sectoral policies. And fairness needs them even more,because in order to reduce social inequalities in health, a wide social and politicalresponse is needed.Unless we reduce the well-documented inefficiencies in our current health caresystems the welfare states will fail to consolidate and the overall economic wellbeingcould be in serious trouble. In this article we sketched some policy solutionssuch as pricing according to net benefits of innovation and public encouragementof radical innovation besides the small type incremental and market-ledinnovation. We proposed an independent agency, the National Institute forWelfare Enhancement to guarantee long term fair and efficient social policies inwhich health plays a central role.

Productividad, competencia e innovación en la banca privada española (1900-1914)

This study investigates the productivity differences and its sourcesacross a set of banks during the last years of the liberal era of theSpanish banking system (1900-1914). These years were characterised bymajor qualitative and quantitative changes in the banking industry includinga sharp increase in the size of the system, in the number of firms, andin its regional distribution. Employing DEA productivity analysis andthe Malmquist index, we discover that these changes were accompanied bya generalised increase in the efficiency of least productive banks. Also,we observe that the crisis of some regional banking groups, like theCatalan, can be linked with its low productivity levels. In consequence,in the light of our productivity evidence, we conclude that the increasein competition was beneficial for the system because helped to the successof the most efficient banks.

The informational value of incumbency

This paper proposes an argument that explains incumbency advantage without recurring to the collective irresponsibility of legislatures. For that purpose, we exploit the informational value of incumbency: incumbency confers voters information about governing politicians not available from challengers. Because there are many reasons for high reelection rates different from incumbency status, we propose a measure of incumbency advantage that improves the use of pure reelection success. We also study the relationship between incumbency advantage and ideological and selection biases. An important implication of our analysis is that the literature linking incumbency and legislature irresponsibility most likely provides an overestimation of the latter.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

The left-right dimension in Latin America

We present voters' self-placement and 68 political party locations on the left-right dimension in 17 Latin American countries. Innovative calculations are based on data from Latinobarometer annual surveys from 1995 to 2002. Our preliminary analysis of the results suggests that most Latin American voters are relatively highly ideological and rather consistently located on the left-right dimension, but they have very high levels of political alienation regarding the party system. Both voters' self-placement and the corresponding party locations are presently highly polarized between the center and the right, with a significant weakness of leftist or broadly appealing 'populist' positions.

Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

Immigration policy with partisan parties

This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoralissue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditurein immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters? welfarethrough economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a laWittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. Atequilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and tothe right of the median voter?s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workersamong their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigrationproposed by the two parties and the composition of parties? constituencies as we varythe efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.

Estudi i implantació de programari lliure

RESUM Actualment la majoria de nosaltres sabem de l’existència de molts programes lliures, però hem tenir clar que lliure no vol dir sempre programa gratuït. Tot i que a vegades sí que pot ser-ho, es té en compte molt més que això: és una manera de pensar i entendre el programari i al llarg dels anys ha generat tot un moviment social. Considerem que un programa lliure és aquell que garanteix als usuaris la llibertat per executar, copiar, distribuir, estudiar, canviar i millorar el codi programat, com molt bé defineixen les seves llibertats bàsiques. El programari lliure el podem trobar funcionant en ordinadors personals, escoles, empreses diverses, administracions, etc. ja que la majoria de programes que utilitzen actualment, com hem vist, tenen el seu equivalent en lliure. El fet de si és viable que una empresa es passi a programari lliure, depèn ben bé del seu entorn, ja que en funció d’aquest li serà més o menys fàcil la migració. La finalitat d’aquest projecte és, primer de tot, fer un ampli estudi del món del programari lliure i del seu moviment social. S’ha fet una recerca de diferents aspectes dins del programari lliure per conèixer-lo a fons i després s’ha proposat una possible implantació d’aquest en un usuari domèstic i en una administració pública, tenint en compte tots els aspectes vistos en l’estudi, valorant si totes les idees que defensa i els beneficis que aporta són aplicables i viables en qualsevol persona i àmbit i el perquè. Com a conclusió principal en destacaria que tot i que el programa lliure disposa d’una ideologia que agrada i té uns programes tècnicament perfectes (sense que això sigui el seu objectiu principal), penso que encara hi ha molt camí per recórrer quant a una migració en grans entorns, ja que per exemple en un ajuntament una migració total és encara difícil (tot i que no impossible perquè n’hi ha que s’hi han migrat). A l’apartat d’annexos s’hi inclou un glossari amb un seguit de terminologies amb paraules que no tothom pot saber i s’ha cregut oportú incloure-les en aquest apartat. La primera vegada que apareix alguna d’aquestes paraules la podem trobar senyalitzada amb un *.

Public health expenditure and spatial interactions in a decentralized national health system

One of the limitations of cross-country health expenditure analysis refers to the fact that the financing, the internal organization and political restraints of health care decision-making are country-specific and heterogeneous. Yet, a potential solution is to examine the influence of such effects in those countries that have undertaken decentralization processes. In such a setting, it is possible to examine potential expenditure spillovers across the geography of a country as well as the influence of the political ideology of regional incumbents on public health expenditure. This paper examines the determinants of public health expenditure within Spanish region-states (Autonomous Communities, ACs), most of them subject to similar financing structures although exhibiting significant heterogeneity as a result of the increasing decentralization, region-specific political factors along with different use of health care inputs, economic dimension and spatial interactions

Public health expenditure and spatial interactions in a decentralized national health system

One of the limitations of cross-country health expenditure analysis refers to the fact that the financing, the internal organization and political restraints of health care decision-making are country-specific and heterogeneous. Yet, a potential solution is to examine the influence of such effects in those countries that have undertaken decentralization processes. In such a setting, it is possible to examine potential expenditure spillovers across the geography of a country as well as the influence of the political ideology of regional incumbents on public health expenditure. This paper examines the determinants of public health expenditure within Spanish region-states (Autonomous Communities, ACs), most of them subject to similar financing structures although exhibiting significant heterogeneity as a result of the increasing decentralization, region-specific political factors along with different use of health care inputs, economic dimension and spatial interactions

Public health expenditure and spatial interactions in a decentralized national health system

One of the limitations of cross-country health expenditure analysis refers to the fact that the financing, the internal organization and political restraints of health care decision-making are country-specific and heterogeneous. Yet, a potential solution is to examine the influence of such effects in those countries that have undertaken decentralization processes. In such a setting, it is possible to examine potential expenditure spillovers across the geography of a country as well as the influence of the political ideology of regional incumbents on public health expenditure. This paper examines the determinants of public health expenditure within Spanish region-states (Autonomous Communities, ACs), most of them subject to similar financing structures although exhibiting significant heterogeneity as a result of the increasing decentralization, region-specific political factors along with different use of health care inputs, economic dimension and spatial interactions

Republicanismo: el lugar de la virtud

No hay caracterización del republicanismo que no mencione la virtud cívica. Sin embargo, no siempre es clara la ubicación de la virtud en el entramado de la filosofía política republicana. Tomaré como punto de partida la reflexión de Rawls. Su temor es que la defensa de lo que la democracia necesita, la virtud cívica, ponga en peligro la libertad. Es lo que llamaré el «problema (de Rawls) con la virtud». Un problema que, a su parecer, compromete seriamente al republicanismo. Por mi parte, intentaré mostrar que, en realidad, se trata de un problema del liberalismo que apunta directamente a una bien conocida tensión entre los derechos y la democracia, cuya única «solución liberal» pasa por atrincherar los derechos «frente a la democracia», excluyendo el compromiso ciudadano. En la segunda parte mostraré que el problema es real, pero que no afecta a todos los republicanismos y argumentaré que «el problema de Rawls» afecta, fundamentalmente, a aquel republicanismo que hace de la «realización ciudadana» su objetivo, que busca, por así decir, maximizar la virtud. No sucede lo mismo con aquel otro que otorga a la virtud un carácter instrumental. En la parte final precisaré esa idea de republicanismo que otorga tanto a la virtud como a la democracia un papel instrumental en lo que realmente importa: la libertad.

Vicente Cacho Viu (1929-1997), in memoriam

On the occasion of the recent death of the madrilenian culture historian Vicente Cacho Viu, the authors expose the main lines of his historical work. They point out the importance of Cacho's research on the periord of the Restauración, mainly his studies on the liberal education institution Institución Libre de Enseñanza. They also consider Cacho's interest in Catalonia, remembering the time he spent teaching at Barcelona University, paying attention to his works on catalan modernisme. The article includes a systematic bibliography of Cacho's works.