Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Economic growth and investment in the Arab world

This paper analyses the economic growth performance in the Arab world overthe last forty years. The Arab world has managed to reduce povertyperformance despite its relatively disappointing growth performance. Werelate this poor performance of both oil and non-oil producers toinvestment. Contrary to widespread belief, we do not find evidence that lowquantity of investment is the main of low growth. The decline in theinvestment rate followed rather than preceded the reduction in the aggregategrowth rate. We conclude that the low quality of investment projects is thekey determinant of growth. The excessive reliance on public investment, thelow quality of financial institutions, the bad business environment (due topolitical and social instability and to excessive public intervention andoverregulation) and the low quality of human capital are importantdeterminants of systematically unproductive investment decisions and, thus,low economic growth.

Is lumpy investment really irrelevant for the business cycle?

New-Keynesian (NK) models can only account for the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks if it is assumed that aggregate capital accumulation is much smoother than it would be the case under frictionless firm-level investment, as discussed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). We find that lumpy investment, when combined with price stickiness and market power of firms,can rationalize this assumption. Our main result is in stark contrast with the conclusions obtained by Thomas (2002) in the context of a real business cycle (RBC) model. We use our model to explain the economic mechanism behind this difference in the predictions of RBC and NK theory.

Enforcement problems and secondary markets

There is a large and growing literature that studies the effects of weak enforcement institutions on economic performance. This literature has focused almost exclusively on primary markets, in which assets are issued and traded to improve the allocation of investment and consumption. The general conclusion is that weak enforcement institutions impair the workings of these markets, giving rise to various inefficiencies.But weak enforcement institutions also create incentives to develop secondary markets, in which the assets issued in primary markets are retraded. This paper shows that trading in secondary markets counteracts the effects of weak enforcement institutions and, in the absence of further frictions, restores efficiency.

Understanding portfolio efficiency with conditioning information

We show that unconditionally efficient returns do not achieve the maximum unconditionalSharpe ratio, neither display zero unconditional Jensen s alphas, when returns arepredictable. Next, we define a new type of efficient returns that is characterized by thoseunconditional properties. We also study a different type of efficient returns that is rationalizedby standard mean-variance preferences and motivates new Sharpe ratios and Jensen salphas. We revisit the testable implications of asset pricing models from the perspective ofthe three sets of efficient returns. We also revisit the empirical evidence on the conditionalvariants of the CAPM and the Fama-French model from a portfolio perspective.

Does foreign direct investment crowd out domestic entrepreneurship?

In analyzing firm entry and exit across Belgian manufacturing industries,this paper presents evidence that import competition and foreign directinvestment discourage entry and stimulate exit of domestic entrepreneurs.These results are in line with theoretical occupational choice modelsthat predict foreign direct investment would crowd out domesticentrepreneurs through their selections in product and labor markets.However, the empirical results also suggest that this crowding out effectmay be moderated or even reversed in the long-run due to the long termpositive effects of FDI on domestic entrpreneurship as a result oflearning, demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreignand domestic firms.

Financing constraints, irreversibility and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financingconstraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firmscannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint thatthey can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examinethe cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and outputin the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields threemain results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investmentis reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint onvariable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interactionbetween the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and materialdeliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they arehighly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Testing financing constraints on firm investment using variable capital

We consider a dynamic multifactor model of investment with financing imperfections,adjustment costs and fixed and variable capital. We use the model to derive a test offinancing constraints based on a reduced form variable capital equation. Simulation resultsshow that this test correctly identifies financially constrained firms even when the estimationof firms investment opportunities is very noisy. In addition, the test is well specified inthe presence of both concave and convex adjustment costs of fixed capital. We confirmempirically the validity of this test on a sample of small Italian manufacturing companies.

Firm-specific investment, sticky prices and the Taylor principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest raterules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

Measuring intangibles' productivity. Empirical evidence from Spanish firms

As companies and shareholders begin to note the potential repercussions of intangible assets uponbusiness results, the inability of the traditional financial statement model to reflect these new waysof creating business value has become evident. Companies have widely adopted newmanagement tools, covering in this way the inability of the traditional financial statement model toreflect these new ways of creating business value.However, there are few prior studies measuring on a quantifiable manner the level of productivityunexplained in the financial statements. In this study, we measure the effect of intangible assets onproductivity using data from Spanish firms selected randomly by size and sector over a ten-yearperiod, from 1995 to 2004. Through a sample of more than 10,000 Spanish firms we analyse towhat extent labour productivity can be explained by physical capital deepening, by quantifiedintangible capital deepening and by firm s economic efficiency (or total factor productivity PTF).Our results confirm the hypothesis that PTF weigh has increased during the period studied,especially on those firms that have experienced a significant raise in quantified intangible capital,evidencing that there are some important complementary effects between capital investment andintangible resources in the explanation of productivity growth. These results have significantdifferences considering economic sector and firm s dimension.

Communication, coordination and efficiency in evolutionary one-population models

We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.

On the efficiency and sensitivity of a pyramidal classification algorithm

In this paper we propose a Pyramidal Classification Algorithm,which together with an appropriate aggregation index producesan indexed pseudo-hierarchy (in the strict sense) withoutinversions nor crossings. The computer implementation of thealgorithm makes it possible to carry out some simulation testsby Monte Carlo methods in order to study the efficiency andsensitivity of the pyramidal methods of the Maximum, Minimumand UPGMA. The results shown in this paper may help to choosebetween the three classification methods proposed, in order toobtain the classification that best fits the original structureof the population, provided we have an a priori informationconcerning this structure.

Cost efficiency in primary care contracting: A stochastic frontier cost function approach

The principal aim of this paper is to estimate a stochastic frontier costfunction and an inefficiency effects model in the analysis of the primaryhealth care services purchased by the public authority and supplied by 180providers in 1996 in Catalonia. The evidence from our sample does not supportthe premise that contracting out has helped improve purchasing costefficiency in primary care. Inefficient purchasing cost was observed in thecomponent of this purchasing cost explicitly included in the contract betweenpurchaser and provider. There are no observable incentives for thecontracted-out primary health care teams to minimise prescription costs, whichare not explicitly included in the present contracting system.

Overconfidence and market efficiency with heterogeneous agents

We study financial markets in which both rational and overconfident agents coexist and make endogenous information acquisition decisions. We demonstrate the following irrelevance result: when a positive fraction of rational agents (endogeneously) decides to become informed in equilibrium, prices are set as if all investors were rational, and as a consequence the overconfidence bias does not aect informational efficiency, price volatility, rational traders expected profits or their welfare. Intuitively, as overconfidence goes up, so does price infornativeness, which makes rational agents cut their information acquisition activities, effectively undoing the standard effect of more aggressive trading by the overconfident.