Employee referrals and the inter-industry wage structure

This paper investigates the role of employee referrals in the labor market.Using an original data set, I find that industries that pay wage premia andhave characteristics associated with high-wage sectors rely mainly on employeereferrals to fill jobs. Moreover, unemployment rates are higher in industries which use employee referrals more extensively. This paper develops an equilibrium matching model which can explain these empirical regularities. Inthis model, the matching process sorts heterogeneous firms and workers into two distinct groups: referrals match "good" jobs to "good" workers, while formalmethods (e.g., newspaper ads and employment agencies) match less-attractive jobs to disadvantaged workers. Thus, well-connected workers who learn quickly aboutjob opportunities use referrals to jump job queues, while those who are less well placed in the labor market search for jobs through formal methods. The split of firms and workers between referrals and formal search is, however, not necessarily efficient. Congestion externalities in referral search imply that unemployment would be closer to the optimal rate if firms and workers 'at themargin' searched formally.

Understanding the gains from wage flexibility: The exchange rate connection

We study the gains from increased wage flexibility and their dependence on exchange rate policy, using a small open economy model with staggered price andwage setting. Two results stand out: (i) the impact of wage adjustments on employment is smaller the more the central bank seeks to stabilize the exchange rate,and (ii) an increase in wage flexibility often reduces welfare, and more likely so ineconomies under an exchange rate peg or an exchange rate-focused monetary policy.Our findings call into question the common view that wage flexibility is particularlydesirable in a currency union.