A simple model of multiple equilibria based on risk

This paper shows how risk may aggravate fluctuations in economies with imperfect insurance and multiple assets. A two period job matching model is studied, in which risk averse agents act both as workers and as entrepreneurs. They choose between two types of investment: one type is riskless, while the other is a risky activity that creates jobs.Equilibrium is unique under full insurance. If investment is fully insured but unemployment risk is uninsured, then precautionary saving behavior dampens output fluctuations. However, if both investment and employment are uninsured, then an increase in unemployment gives agents an incentive to shift investment away from the risky asset, further increasing unemployment. This positive feedback may lead to multiple Pareto ranked equilibria. An overlapping generations version of the model may exhibit poverty traps or persistent multiplicity. Greater insurance is doubly beneficial in this context since it can both prevent multiplicity and promote risky investment.

The growth and diffusion of knowlegde and the theory of the firm

We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.

Speculative securities

A speculative security is an asset whose payoff depends on a random shock uncorrelated with economic fundamentals (a sunspot) about which some traders have superior information. In this paper we show that agents may find it desirable to trade such a security in spite of the fact that it is a poorer hedge against their endowment risks as the time oftrade, and has an associated adverse selection cost. In the specific institutional setting of innovation of futures contracts, we show that a futures exchange may not have an incentive to introduce a speculative security even when all traders favor it.

Nominal debt as a burden on monetary policy

We study the effects of nominal debt on the optimal sequential choice of monetary policy. When the stock of debt is nominal, the incentive to generate unanticipated inflation increases the cost of the outstanding debt even if no unanticipated inflation episodes occur in equilibrium. Without full commitment, the optimal sequential policy is to deplete the outstanding stock of debt progressively until these extra costs disappear. Nominal debt is therefore a burden on monetary policy, not only because it must be serviced, but also because it creates a time inconsistency problem that distorts interest rates. The introduction of alternative forms of taxation may lessen this burden, if there is enough commtiment to fiscal policy. If there is full commitment to an optimal fiscal policy, then the resulting monetary policy is the Friedman rule of zero nominal interest rates.

A positive theory of geographic mobility and social insurance

This paper presents a tractable dynamic general equilibrium model thatcan explain cross-country empirical regularities in geographical mobility,unemployment and labor market institutions. Rational agents vote overunemployment insurance (UI), taking the dynamic distortionary effects ofinsurance on the performance of the labor market into consideration.Agents with higher cost of moving, i.e., more attached to their currentlocation, prefer more generous UI. The key assumption is that an agent'sattachment to a location increases the longer she has resided there. UIreduces the incentive for labor mobility and increases, therefore, thefraction of attached agents and the political support for UI. The mainresult is that this self-reinforcing mechanism can give rise to multiplesteady-states-one 'European' steady-state featuring high unemployment,low geographical mobility and high unemployment insurance, and one'American' steady-state featuring low unemployment, high mobility andlow unemployment insurance.

L'Impuls de la marca-ciutat Barcelona com a mecanisme de reactivació econòmica

La recerca tracta sobre els diferents mecanismes que les ciutats i les regions utilitzen per millorar la seva imatge. En aquest sentit, el treball se centra en la marca-ciutat, el màrqueting de ciutats i els diferents models de comunicació emprats per exaltar la reputació dels territoris. Pel que fa la segona part de la recerca, consisteix en l’estudi de la marca-ciutat Barcelona en els àmbits dels negocis, la societat del coneixement, el turisme, la sostenibilitat i la qualitat de vida i la cultura. Per tant, el propòsit d’aquesta recerca és comprendre quines accions desenvolupen els principals actors per incentivar els negocis a Barcelona, descobrir quines iniciatives s’han pres per potenciar l’economia del coneixement, el turisme, la sostenibilitat i la qualitat de vida i la indústria cultural a la ciutat de Barcelona

An approach to costs and energy consumption in private urban Spanish Mediterranean landscapes from a simplified model in sprinkle irrigation

The number of private gardens has increased in recent years, creating a more pleasant urban model, but not without having an environmental impact, including increased energy consumption, which is the focus of this study. The estimation of costs and energy consumption for the generic typology of private urban gardens is based on two simplifying assumptions: square geometry with surface areas from 25 to 500 m2 and hydraulic design with a single pipe. In total, eight sprinkler models have been considered, along with their possible working pressures, and 31 pumping units grouped into 5 series that adequately cover the range of required flow rates and pressures, resultin in 495 hydraulic designs repeated for two climatically different locations in the Spanish Mediterranean area (Girona and Elche). Mean total irrigation costs for the locality with lower water needs (Girona) and greater needs (Elche) were € 2,974 ha-¹ yr-¹ and € 3,383 ha-¹ yr-¹, respectively. Energy costs accounted for 11.4% of the total cost for the first location, and 23.0% for the second. While a suitable choice of the hydraulic elements of the setup is essential, as it may provide average energy savings of 77%, due to the low energy cost in relation to the cost of installation, the potential energy savings do not constitute a significant incentive for the irrigation system design. The low efficiency of the pumping units used in this type of garden is the biggest obstacle and constraint to achieving a high quality energy solution

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Incentives and promotion in wage hierarchies

Most of the large firms organization schemes consist in hierarchical structures of tiers with different wage levels. Traditionally the existence of this kind of organizations has been associated to the separation of productive and managerial or supervision tasks and to differences in the skills of the workers. However, many firms now employ workers with similar skills, and then the hierarchical structure can be related to an incentive scheme to ensure that workers supply effort. The model we present investigates how firm owners should determine the optimal wage distribution in order to maximize profits.

The effects of tax deductibility on the mix of property taxes and use charges: an empirical analysis of the spanish case

This paper tests some hypothesis about the determinants of the local tax structure. In particular, we focus on the effects that the property tax deductibility in the national income tax has on the relative use of the property tax and user charges. We deal with the incentive effects that local governments face regarding the different sources of revenue by means of a model in which the local tax structure and the level of public expenditure arise as a result of the maximizing behaviour of local politicians subject to the economic effects of the tax system. We attempt to test the hypothesis developed with data corresponding to a set of Spanish municipalities during the period 1987-9l. We find that tax deductibility provides incentives to raise revenues from the property tax but does not introduce a biass against user charges or in favor of overall spending growth

Incentives and promotion in wage hierarchies

Most of the large firms organization schemes consist in hierarchical structures of tiers with different wage levels. Traditionally the existence of this kind of organizations has been associated to the separation of productive and managerial or supervision tasks and to differences in the skills of the workers. However, many firms now employ workers with similar skills, and then the hierarchical structure can be related to an incentive scheme to ensure that workers supply effort. The model we present investigates how firm owners should determine the optimal wage distribution in order to maximize profits.

Impact of Duration of Primary Education on School Enrollment, Graduation and Drop-outs: A Cross- Country Analysis

Using a panel data for non-OECD countries covering the period 1970-2012, this chapter analyzes the impact of the duration of primary education on school enrollment, drop-out and completion rates. The empirical results show that for children in elementary school one ad- ditional grade of primary education have a negative impact on the enrollment rate, while the e ect on drop-outs is positive. Analogously, it is obtained that an additional grade in primary education reduces the enrollment rate in secondary education. These results are in line with the fertility model approach, that is, in developing and underdeveloped countries parents do not have incentive to send children to school given the high perceived economic value of children.

Moral Hazard in Repeated Procurement of Services

This paper analyzes repeated procurement of services as a four-stage game divided into two periods. In each period there is (1) a contest stage à la Tullock in which the principal selects an agent and (2) a service stage in which the selected agent provides a service. Since this service effort is non-verifiable, the principal faces a moral hazard problem at the service stages. This work considers how the principal should design the period-two contest to mitigate the moral hazard problem in the period-one service stage and to maximize total service and contest efforts. It is shown that the principal must take account of the agent's past service effort in the period-two contest success function. The results indicate that the optimal way to introduce this `bias' is to choose a certain degree of complementarity between past service and current contest efforts. This result shows that contests with `additive bias' (`multiplicative bias') are optimal in incentive problems when effort cost is low (high). Furthermore, it is shown that the severity of the moral hazard problem increases with the cost of service effort (compared to the cost of contest effort) and the number of agents. Finally, the results are extended to more general contest success functions. JEL classification: C72; D82 Key words: Biased contests; Moral Hazard; Repeated Game; Incentives.

Elements apresos i/o retinguts per infants de dos centres de contextos diferents a partir d'una comunicació generada entre ells amb les TIC

La comunicació com a mètode per aprendre no és nou, tot i així les noves tecnologies obren la porta a noves oportunitats i nous projectes entorn aquest concepte. No només es tracta de treballar elements curriculars, sinó també actitudinals a través de la opció de connexió entre contextos. L’objectiu d’aquesta recerca és analitzar quina és l’actitud i els aprenentatges i/o retencions dels infants a partir d’una connexió generada entre dos contextos. Per tal de donar resposta a aquest plantejament de la investigació es crea una intervenció entre les aules i s’utilitzen com a instruments de recollida de dades les observacions, els dibuixos i els grups de discussió. Els resultats mostren una actitud oberta i d’interès per part dels infants davant de la metodologia de comunicació a l’aula, però un aprenentatge i/o retenció relacionat amb els continguts dels elements de l’altre context per sobre dels elements TIC. Es conclou doncs que dins l’aula treballant amb les noves tecnologies es genera un incentiu pels infants fent evident que hi ha hagut un aprenentatge compartit.

Reward networks in the brain as captured by connectivity measures

An assortment of human behaviors is thought to be driven by rewards including reinforcement learning, novelty processing, learning, decision making, economic choice, incentive motivation, and addiction. In each case the ventral tegmental area/ventral striatum (nucleus accumbens) (VTAVS) system has been implicated as a key structure by functional imaging studies, mostly on the basis of standard, univariate analyses. Here we propose that standard functional magnetic resonance imaging analysis needs to be complemented by methods that take into account the differential connectivity of the VTAVS system in the different behavioral contexts in order to describe reward based processes more appropriately. We fi rst consider the wider network for reward processing as it emerged from animal experimentation. Subsequently, an example for a method to assess functional connectivity is given. Finally, we illustrate the usefulness of such analyses by examples regarding reward valuation, reward expectation and the role of reward in addiction.