The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.

Real wage rigidities and the new Keynesian model

Most central banks perceive a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the gap between output and desired output. However, the standard new Keynesian framework implies no such trade-off. In that framework, stabilizing inflation is equivalent to stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. In this paper, we argue that this property of the new Keynesian framework, which we call the divine coincidence, is due to a special feature of the model: the absence of non trivial real imperfections.We focus on one such real imperfection, namely, real wage rigidities. When the baseline new Keynesian model is extended to allow for real wage rigidities, the divine coincidence disappears, and central banks indeed face a trade-off between stabilizing inflation and stabilizing the welfare-relevant output gap. We show that not only does the extended model have more realistic normative implications, but it also has appealing positive properties. In particular, it provides a natural interpretation for the dynamic inflation-unemployment relation found in the data.

Price increase and stability with new entries in Cournot markets

It is widely accepted in the literature about the classicalCournot oligopoly model that the loss of quasi competitiveness is linked,in the long run as new firms enter the market, to instability of the equilibrium. In this paper, though, we present a model in which a stableunique symmetric equilibrium is reached for any number of oligopolistsas industry price increases with each new entry. Consequently, the suspicion that non quasi competitiveness implies, in the long run, instabilityis proved false.

Is lumpy investment really irrelevant for the business cycle?

New-Keynesian (NK) models can only account for the dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks if it is assumed that aggregate capital accumulation is much smoother than it would be the case under frictionless firm-level investment, as discussed in Woodford (2003, Ch. 5). We find that lumpy investment, when combined with price stickiness and market power of firms,can rationalize this assumption. Our main result is in stark contrast with the conclusions obtained by Thomas (2002) in the context of a real business cycle (RBC) model. We use our model to explain the economic mechanism behind this difference in the predictions of RBC and NK theory.

Value and depreciation of mineral resources over the very long run: An empirical contrast of different methods

The paper contrasts empirically the results of alternative methods for estimating thevalue and the depreciation of mineral resources. The historical data of Mexico andVenezuela, covering the period 1920s-1980s, is used to contrast the results of severalmethods. These are the present value, the net price method, the user cost method andthe imputed income method. The paper establishes that the net price and the user costare not competing methods as such, but alternative adjustments to different scenariosof closed and open economies. The results prove that the biases of the methods, ascommonly described in the theoretical literature, only hold under the most restrictedscenario of constant rents over time. It is argued that the difference between what isexpected to happen and what actually did happen is for the most part due to a missingvariable, namely technological change. This is an important caveat to therecommendations made based on these models.

Valuation bubbles and sequential bubbles

Price bubbles in an Arrow-Debreu valuation equilibrium in infinite-timeeconomy are a manifestation of lack of countable additivity of valuationof assets. In contrast, known examples of price bubbles in sequentialequilibrium in infinite time cannot be attributed to the lack of countableadditivity of valuation. In this paper we develop a theory of valuation ofassets in sequential markets (with no uncertainty) and study the nature ofprice bubbles in light of this theory. We consider an operator, calledpayoff pricing functional, that maps a sequence of payoffs to the minimumcost of an asset holding strategy that generates it. We show that thepayoff pricing functional is linear and countably additive on the set ofpositive payoffs if and only if there is no Ponzi scheme, and providedthat there is no restriction on long positions in the assets. In the knownexamples of equilibrium price bubbles in sequential markets valuation islinear and countably additive. The presence of a price bubble indicatesthat the asset's dividends can be purchased in sequential markers at acost lower than the asset's price. We also present examples of equilibriumprice bubbles in which valuation is nonlinear but not countably additive.

Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

A house price index defined in the potential outcomes framework

Current methods for constructing house price indices are based on comparisons of sale prices of residential properties sold two or more times and on regression of the sale prices on the attributes of the properties and of their locations. The two methods have well recognised deficiencies, selection bias and model assumptions, respectively. We introduce a new method based on propensity score matching. The average house prices for two periods are compared by selecting pairs of properties, one sold in each period, that are as similar on a set of available attributes (covariates) as is feasible to arrange. The uncertainty associated with such matching is addressed by multiple imputation, framing the problem as involving missing values. The method is applied to aregister of transactions ofresidential properties in New Zealand and compared with the established alternatives.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Costly search and design

Firms compete by choosing both a price and a design from a family of designs thatcan be represented as demand rotations. Consumers engage in costly sequential searchamong firms. Each time a consumer pays a search cost he observes a new offering. Anoffering consists of a price quote and a new good, where goods might vary in the extentto which they are good matches for the consumer. In equilibrium, only two design-styles arise: either the most niche where consumers are likely to either love or loathethe product, or the broadest where consumers are likely to have similar valuations. Inequilibrium, different firms may simultaneously offer both design-styles. We performcomparative statics on the equilibrium and show that a fall in search costs can lead tohigher industry prices and profits and lower consumer surplus. Our analysis is relatedto discussions of how the internet has led to the prevalence of niche goods and the"long tail" phenomenon.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

New evidence on inflation persistence and price stickiness in the Euro area: Implications for macro modelling

This paper evaluates new evidence on price setting practices and inflation persistence in the euro area with respect to its implications for macro modelling. It argues that several of the most commonly used assumptions in micro-founded macro models are seriously challenged by the new findings.

A simple access pricing rule to achieve the Ramsey outcome for interconnected networks

This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.

The dog that did not bark: Insider trading and crashes

This paper documents that at the individual stock level insiders sales peak many months before a large drop in the stock price, while insiders purchases peak only the month before a large jump. We provide a theoretical explanation for this phenomenon based on trading constraints and asymmetric information. We test our hypothesis against competing stories such as patterns of insider trading driven by earnings announcement dates, or insiders timing their trades to evade prosecution. Finally we provide new evidence regarding crashes and the degree of information asymmetry.