The sustainable debts of Philip II: A reconstruction of Castile's fiscal position, 1566-1596

The defaults of Philip II have attained mythical status as the origin of sovereigndebt crises. We reassess the fiscal position of Habsburg Castile, derivingcomprehensive estimates of revenue, debt, and expenditure from new archivaldata. The king s debts were sustainable. Primary surpluses were large and rising.Debt-to-revenue ratios remained broadly unchanged during Philip s reign.Castilian finances in the sixteenth century compare favorably with those of otherearly modern fiscal states at the height of their imperial ambitions, includingBritain. The defaults of Philip II therefore reflected short-term liquidity crises,and were not a sign of unsustainable debts.

Fiscal decentralization in Spain: An asymmetric transition to democracy

Asymmetric fiscal decentralization, by which we mean different fiscal arrangements between the central government and different groups of, or individual, lower-level governments, may be justified from an economic efficiency perspective. As argued by Tiebout (1956), Oates (1972) and others, a decentralized system of regional and local governments is better able to accommodate differences in tastes for public goods and services. This efficiency argument calls for decentralization of fiscal authority to regional and local governments, but not necessarily asymmetric decentralization. However, when the differences in tastes for public goods and services arise out of differences in history, culture and language across regions of a country, asymmetric treatment may be justified. History, culture and language may influence how a group of people (a region) views autonomy, independence and fiscal authority. Some regions may have had experience with autonomous government in the past, they may have a culture that is strongly reliant upon (or leery of) the central government, or they may be fearful of losing their separate languages if they do not have special arrangements. To accommodate differences in taste for independence, autonomy, and fiscal authority, it may be necessary to have different fiscal arrangements between the central government and the different regions comprising the country.

Tobin meets Oates: Solidarity and the optimal fiscal federal structure

We explore the implications for the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization when people spreferences for goods and services, which classic treatments of fiscal federalism (Oates, 1972)place in the purview of local governments, exhibit specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), orsolidarity. We find that a system in which the central government provides a common minimumlevel of the publicly provided good, and local governments are allowed to use their ownresources to provide an even higher local level, performs better from an efficiency perspectiverelative to all other systems analyzed for a relevant range of preferences over solidarity.

Does it cost to be virtuous? The macroeconomic effects of fiscal constraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features of macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the typical transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting is responsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and the reform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

Why do differences in the degree of fiscal decentralization endure?

A notable difference between the U.S. and many countries in Europe is in the degree of fiscal decentralization. Regional (and local) governments in the U.S. have significant autonomy in setting their own taxes and determining how to spend their revenues. This is not true of their counterparts in Spain, France, the United Kingdom, Czech Republic and many other European countries. In recent years, many countries formerly subject to dictatorshipsor communism have been considering decentralizing fiscal responsibility to sub-national governments as part of the process of democratization (see Bird and Ebel, forthcoming). Yet, much of Europe remains immune to adopting effective decentralization in which sub-national units have true taxing authority.

Price differentials in monetary unions: The role of fiscal shocks

We study the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price differentials for47 US states and 9 EU countries. We identify shocks using sign restrictions on the dynamicsof deficits and output and construct two estimates for structural price differentials dynamics which optimally weight the information contained in the data for all units. Fiscal shocks explain between 14 and 23 percent of the variability of price differentials both in the US and in the EU. On average, expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive price differential responses while distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative price differential responses. In a number of units, price differential responses to expansionary fiscal shocks are negative. Spillovers and labor supply effects partially explain this pattern while geographical, political, and economic indicators do not.

The elusive costs and the immaterial gains of fiscal contraints

We study whether and how fiscal restrictions alter the business cycle features macrovariables for a sample of 48 US states. We also examine the 'typical' transmission properties of fiscal disturbances and the implied fiscal rules of states with different fiscal restrictions. Fiscal constraints are characterized with a number of indicators. There are similarities in second moments of macrovariables and in the transmission properties of fiscal shocks across states with different fiscal constraints. The cyclical response of expenditure differs in size and sometimes in sign, but heterogeneity within groups makes point estimates statistically insignificant. Creative budget accounting isresponsible for the pattern. Implications for the design of fiscal rules and thereform of the Stability and Growth Pact are discussed.

Accions transversals del CME contra l'odi i la discriminació (2008-2013)

1.El Pla de govern 2004-2007, va incloure per primera vegada polítiques específiques per a les persones LGTB. Es va crear el Pla interdepartamental per a la no discriminació de las persones LGTB 2006-2014, que crea el Consell Nacional para persones LGTB del Departament d’Acció Social i Ciutadania i detalla “accions de govern” que afecten al Departament d’Interior. A nivell municipal: creació de diferents consells LGTB.Creació el 2007 de la figura del Fiscal interlocutor en delictes amb component de discriminació per orientació sexual. Coincidència durant 2008 de diferents esdevenimentsLGTB: Conferencia internacional de policies gais-les en Barcelona, Eurogames, Creuers internacionals, mostra internacional de cinema, Gaycircus, Loveball, Circuit-festival, etc.

Balance de la adopción internacional en España y perspectivas de futuro

El present Treball Fi de Carrera tracta de dur a terme un estudi sobre l'adopció internacional a Espanya. Per analitzar els aspectes d'aquesta figura ens centrarem primerament en la protecció del menor i el seu desenvolupament en el nostre ordenament a través de diverses normatives, tant estatals com convencionals. Únicament amb el desenvolupament de la protecció del menor, podem parlar de l'aparició de l'adopció internacional com a tal a Espanya. Investigarem amb quins materials jurídics comptava Espanya abans i després de la Llei 54/2007 d'adopció internacional, així com els aspectes històrics i demogràfics i les seves respectives causes i conseqüències. Així mateix, observarem el perfil de l'adoptant, així com el de l'adoptat quan arriba al nostre país.

IV Col·loqui Internacional Problemes i Mètodes de Literatura Catalana Antiga. Història i llegenda al Renaixement (Universitat de Girona, 8-11 de juliol del 2002)

Crònica IV Col·loqui Internacional Problemes i Mètodes de Literatura Catalana Antiga. Història i llegenda al Renaixement (Universitat de Girona, 8-11 de juliol del 2002)

Los criterios de valoración tributarios de los precios de transferencia

Aquest treball té com a objectiu l'estudi de la correcta determinació dels preus de transferència, mitjançant els quals una empresa transmet els seus béns materials i actius intangibles o presta serveis a empreses associades. En primer lloc, s'han revisat els fonaments teòrics de l'aplicació dels preus de transferència a nivell internacional establerts per les Directrius de la OCDE i el Fòrum Conjunt sobre Preus de Transferència a la Unió Europea., sempre anomenant les particularitats que atorga la legislació espanyola en la matèria. Seguidament, s'analitzen els diferents mètodes existents per a la determinació dels preus de transferència, il·lustrats amb diversos exemples, i l'anàlisi de comparabilitat que es deurà realitzar al buscar operacions vinculades comparables que permetin la fixació dels preus de transferència. A continuació, es descriuen els procediments administratius que s'utilitzen per intentar reduir i resoldre les controvèrsies que puguin sorgir en aqusta matèria, així com les obligacions de documentació que recauen sobre els contribuents. Finalment, s'exposen algunes reflexions i conclusions sobre els aspectes positius i negatius d'aquesta regulació

Concurs internacional obert pel projecte i direcció de l'obra de l'ampliació del CEIP Montgat

Projecte i direcció de l'obra de l'ampliació del CEIP Montgat (2a fase). Localització: Montcada (Barcelona)