Aggregate shocks or vertical tax interdependence? Evidende from gasoline and cigarettes

[cat] Besley i Rosen -1998- van ser els primers autors en estimar empíricament la rellevància de les externalitats impositives verticals. Aquests autors varen fer-ho per al cas dels impostos sobre la benzina i el tabac, en concret, per al cas dels EEUU. Ara bé, no varen tenir en compte les diferències en el nivell de vida entre Estats: àrees amb un nivell elevat paguen menys en termes reals que àrees amb un nivell de vida baix, doncs l'impost unitari sobre la benzina o sobre el tabac no difereix d'acord amb l'Estat on l'impost s'aplica. En conseqüència, proposem que la competència impositiva vertical sigui estimada deflactant totes les variables monetàries utilitzant l'anomenat "House Price Index (HPI)", el qual està disponible al nivell dels Estats. Això genera una variable impositiva federal expressada en termes reals i que presenta variació entre Estats. Aquesta estratègia empírica ens permet diferenciar entre la interdependència vertical entre els tipus impositius federals i els estatals de shocks agregats al llarg del temps, utilitzant dades per als EEUU durant el període 1975 a 2006 per a benzina i tabac. Trobem una nivell significatiu de competència impositiva horitzontal, la qual és més elevada en el cas del tabac, però en cap cas reacció impositiva vertical. Els resultats són robustos al període analitzat.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

Parents’ Investments and Education Returns

[cat] Aquest article analitza la relació entre els ingressos dels pares i l’educació dels seus fills. En un context d’altruïsme perfecte, el model descriu les decisions dels pares sobre quant consumir i quant invertir en l’educació dels seus fills. El model prediu que els rendiments de l’educació en termes de sous haurien de ser lineals. Usant aquest model en una economia competitiva, es mostra com el resultat depèn dels subsidis o impostos del govern sobre l’educació. El compromís habitual igualtat-eficiència apareix en aquest context. Finalment, el model dóna intuïcions sobre la relació entre educació i productivitat.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Healthy, educated and wealthy : Is the welfare state really harmful for growth?

In this paper, we study how public and private expenditures in health and education affect economic growth by their influence on people's health, abilities, skills and knowledge. We consider a growth accounting framework in order to test whether welfare expenditures more than offset the efficiency losses caused by distortionary taxation, and whether the effects of public expenditure on economic growth differ from those of private expenditure. Our empirical analysis is based on a panel of 19 OECD countries observed between 1971 and 1998. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the contribution of welfare expenditures more than compensates for the distortions caused by the tax system; and the estimated positive impact is stronger for health than for education. We also find some evidence that public expenditure influences GDP growth more than private expenditure.

Sistema fiscal y reforma de la Seguridad Social

El presente trabajo analiza desde un punto de vista cuantitativo, mediante un modelo de equilibrio general de generaciones sucesivas, los efectos sobre la economía española de eliminar el actual sistema de Seguridad Social e implantar uno de capitalización. El análisis considera el proceso de transición y mide en términos de bienestar, quiénes son los agentes que se opondrían a este tipo de reforma. La consideración de la interacción entre el sistema de seguridad social y el sistema fiscal implica mayores beneficios asociados a una reforma de la seguridad social. Sin embargo, este tipo de reforma sigue generando pérdidas de bienestar para la mayoría de agentes vivos en el momentodel inicio de la reforma, existiendo un sesgo en favor del status quo.

Sistema fiscal y reforma de la Seguridad Social

El presente trabajo analiza desde un punto de vista cuantitativo, mediante un modelo de equilibrio general de generaciones sucesivas, los efectos sobre la economía española de eliminar el actual sistema de Seguridad Social e implantar uno de capitalización. El análisis considera el proceso de transición y mide en términos de bienestar, quiénes son los agentes que se opondrían a este tipo de reforma. La consideración de la interacción entre el sistema de seguridad social y el sistema fiscal implica mayores beneficios asociados a una reforma de la seguridad social. Sin embargo, este tipo de reforma sigue generando pérdidas de bienestar para la mayoría de agentes vivos en el momentodel inicio de la reforma, existiendo un sesgo en favor del status quo.

Building a Social Accounting Matrix within the ESA95 Framework: Obtaining a Dataset for Applied General Equilibrium Modelling

This research provides a description of the process followed in order to assemble a "Social Accounting Matrix" for Spain corresponding to the year 2000 (SAMSP00). As argued in the paper, this process attempts to reconcile ESA95 conventions with requirements of applied general equilibrium modelling. Particularly, problems related to the level of aggregation of net taxation data, and to the valuation system used for expressing the monetary value of input-output transactions have deserved special attention. Since the adoption of ESA95 conventions, input-output transactions have been preferably valued at basic prices, which impose additional difficulties on modellers interested in computing applied general equilibrium models. This paper addresses these difficulties by developing a procedure that allows SAM-builders to change the valuation system of input-output transactions conveniently. In addition, this procedure produces new data related to net taxation information.

Optimal fiscal policy in overlapping generations models

[eng] This paper provides, from a theoretical and quantitative point of view, an explanation of why taxes on capital returns are high (around 35%) by analyzing the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with intergenerational redistribution. For this purpose, the government is modeled explicitly and can choose (and commit to) an optimal tax policy in order to maximize society's welfare. In an infinitely lived economy with heterogeneous agents, the long run optimal capital tax is zero. If heterogeneity is due to the existence of overlapping generations, this result in general is no longer true. I provide sufficient conditions for zero capital and labor taxes, and show that a general class of preferences, commonly used on the macro and public finance literature, violate these conditions. For a version of the model, calibrated to the US economy, the main results are: first, if the government is restricted to a set of instruments, the observed fiscal policy cannot be disregarded as sub optimal and capital taxes are positive and quantitatively relevant. Second, if the government can use age specific taxes for each generation, then the age profile capital tax pattern implies subsidizing asset returns of the younger generations and taxing at higher rates the asset returns of the older ones.

The Unemployment Benefit System: a Redistributive or an Insurance Institution?

[eng] In this paper we analyze how the composition of labor taxation affects unemployment in a unionized economy with capital accumulation and an unemployment benefit system. We show that if the unemployment benefit system is gross Bismarckian then the unemployment rate is reduced if wage taxes are decreased (and thus payroll taxes are increased). However, if the unemployment benefit system is net Bismarckian then the unemployment rate does not depend on how the system is financed. Besides, in a Beveridgean system the labor tax composition does not affect the unemployment rate if and only if the unemployed do not pay taxes and the employed pay a constant marginal tax rate. We also analyze when an unemployment benefit budget-balanced rule makes the economy to have a hysteresis process.

Parents’ Investments and Education Returns

[cat] Aquest article analitza la relació entre els ingressos dels pares i l’educació dels seus fills. En un context d’altruïsme perfecte, el model descriu les decisions dels pares sobre quant consumir i quant invertir en l’educació dels seus fills. El model prediu que els rendiments de l’educació en termes de sous haurien de ser lineals. Usant aquest model en una economia competitiva, es mostra com el resultat depèn dels subsidis o impostos del govern sobre l’educació. El compromís habitual igualtat-eficiència apareix en aquest context. Finalment, el model dóna intuïcions sobre la relació entre educació i productivitat.

Los retos del regulador en la consolidación del proceso de liberlización del sector eléctrico

La conexión entre energía e industrialización es un hecho universal y bien documentado desde hace más de dos siglos, cuando la máquina de vapor que permitió convertir la energía calorífica del carbón en energía mecánica supuso un gran avance histórico. En este sentido, el rasgo dominante de todo el siglo xx ha sido un intenso crecimiento de la demanda de energía, especialmente acusado en las décadas posteriores a la segunda guerra mundial, asociado al proceso de intenso crecimiento económico.

Tú la llevas

La tendencia financiera europea está a favor de un renacimiento del mito tributario de cargarle en cuenta al forastero una parte de los servicios públicos subcentrales. Siendo amplio el ciclo productivo del turista -transporte, alojamiento, manutención y entretenimiento- es posible incidir en distintas fases del mismo y lo más fácil es aprovechar el alojamiento para la imposición de una tasa.

Tasa Tobin: arena en las ruedas

El artículo trata de un impuesto concebido por James Tobin al que se ha llamado la tasa Tobin. La idea de esta tasa es brillante y bastaría una decidida voluntad política de llevarla a cabo para que fuese efectiva.