Financing local development: Quasi-experimental evidence from municipalities in Brazil, 1980-1991

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of additional unrestrictedgrant financing on local public spending, public service provision, schooling, literacy, andincome at the community (municipio) level in Brazil. Additional transfers increased local publicspending per capita by about 20% with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or otherrevenue sources. The additional local spending increased schooling per capita by about 7% andliteracy rates by about 4 percentage points. The implied marginal cost of schooling -accountingfor corruption and other leakages- amounts to about US$ 126, which turns out to be similar tothe average cost of schooling in Brazil in the early 1980s. In line with the effect on human capital,the poverty rate was reduced by about 4 percentage points, while income per capita gains werepositive but not statistically significant. Results also suggest that additional public spending hadstronger effects on schooling and literacy in less developed parts of Brazil, while poverty reductionwas evenly spread across the country.

The economic tragedy of the XXth Century: Growth in Africa

The dismal growth performance of Africa is the worst economic tragedy ofthe XXth century. We document the evolution of per capita GDP for thecontinent as a whole and for subset of countries south of the Saharadesert. We document the worsening of various income inequality indexesand we estimate poverty rates and headcounts. We then analyze some ofthe central robust determinants of economic growth reported bySala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2003) and project the annual growthrates Africa would have enjoyed if these key determinants had taken OECDrather than African values. Expensive investment goods, low levels ofeducation, poor health, adverse geography, closed economies, too muchpublic expenditure and too many military conflicts are seen as keyexplanations of the economic tragedy.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.

Human capital distribution, growth and convergence

This paper studies the dynamic relationship between distribution and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations model with accumulation of human and physical capital. It is shown how human capital can determine a relationship between per capita growth rates and inequality in the distribution of income. Family background effects and spillovers in the transmission of human capital generate a dynamics in which aggregate variables depend not only on the stock, but also on the distribution of human capital. The evolution of this distribution over time is then characterized under different assumptions on private returns and the form of the externality in the technology for humancapital. Conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of a constant growth equilibrium with a stationary distribution are derived. Increasing returns, idiosyncratic abilities and the possibility of poverty traps are explicitely characterized in a closed form solution of the equilibrium dynamics, showing the role played by technology and preferences parameters.

Protectionist but globalised? Latin American custom duties and trade during the pre-1914 belle époque

While it is true that Latin American republics had no rival on maximising revenues from custom collection during the belle époque, this paper shows that Latin American countries were also generous importers, only behind the larger commercial countries of Western Europe in terms of imports per capita. Latin American citizens were much more linked to international trade than citizens of most regions of the world. Their relation to the world economy was tighter both via their imports and their exports relative to their population and income levels. This paper comes to show that there is no contradiction between the high custom collection by the Latin American republics and their high level of interaction with the global economy in the pre-1914 belle époque, although large country differences can be observed when descending from the regional to the national level.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

The poor stay poor: Non-convergence across countries and regions

We study the issue of income convergence across countries and regions witha Bayesian estimator which allows us to use information in an efficient andflexible way. We argue that the very slow convergence rates to a commonlevel of per-capita income found, e.g., by Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin,is due to a 'fixed effect bias' that their cross-sectional analysisintroduces in the results. Our approach permits the estimation of differentconvergence rates to different steady states for each cross sectional unit.When this diversity is allowed, we find that convergence of each unit to(its own) steady state income level is much faster than previously estimatedbut that cross sectional differences persist: inequalities will only bereduced by a small amount by the passage of time. The cross countrydistribution of the steady state is largely explained by the cross countrydistribution of initial conditions.

Capital goods imports and investments in Latin America in the mid 1920s

The assessment of Latin American long term economic performance is in urgent need ofmobilizing more data to match the pressing demands of growth analysts. We present asystematic comparison of capital goods imports for 20 Latin American countries in 1925. It relies on both the foreign trade data of the importing countries and of the major exporting countries the industrialized economies of the time. The quality of foreign trade figures is tested; an homogeneous estimate of capital goods imported is derived, and its per capita ranking is discussed providing new light on Latin American development levels before import substitution.

Organisational innovations and health care decentralisation: A perspective from Spain

Recent policy developments in public health care systems lead to a greater diversity in health care. Decentralisation, either geographically or at an institutional level, is the key force, because it encourages innovation and local initiatives in health care provision. The devolution of responsibilities allows for a sort of de-construction of the status quo by changing both organizational forms and service provision. The new organizations enjoy greater freedom in the way they pay their staff, and are judged according to their results. These organizations may retain financial surpluses, develop spin-off companies and commission a range of specialised services (such as Diagnostic and Treatment Centres in UK) from providers outside the institutional setting in order to have more access to capital markets. However this diversity may generate a feeling of lack of commitment to a national health service and ultimately a loss of social cohesion. By fiscal decentralisation to regional authorities or planned delegation of financial agreements to the providers, financial incentives are more explicit and may seem to place profit-making above a commitment to better health care. An evaluation of the myths and realities of the decentralization process is needed. Here, I offer an assessment pros and cons of the decentralization process of health care in Spain, drawing on the experience of regional reforms from the pioneering organisational innovations implemented in Catalonia in 1981, up to the observed dispersion of health care spending per capita among regions at present.

Why are capital flows so much more volatile in emerging than in developed countries?

The standard deviations of capital flows to emerging countries are 80 percent higher than those to developed countries. First, we show that very little of this difference can be explained by more volatile fundamentals or by higher sensitivity to fundamentals. Second, we show that most of the difference in volatility can be accounted for by three characteristics of capital flows: (i) capital flows to emerging countries are more subject to occasional large negative shocks ( crises ) than those to developed countries, (ii) shocks are subject to contagion, and (iii) the most important one shocks to capital flows to emerging countries are more persistent than those to developed countries. Finally, we study a number of country characteristics to determine which are most associated with capital flow volatility. Our results suggest that underdevelopment of domestic financial markets, weak institutions, and low income per capita, are all associated with capital flow volatility.

Book production and the onset of modern economic growth

Endogenous growth theory suggests that human capital formation plays a significant role for the wealth and poverty of nations. In contrast to previous studies which denied the role of human capital as a crucial determinant of for really long-term growth, we confirm its importance. Indicators of human capital like literacy rates are lacking for the period of 1450-1913; hence, we use per capita book production as a proxy for advanced literacy skills. This study explains how, and to what extent, growth disparities are a function of human capital formation.

Malthusian dynamism and the rise of Europe: Make war, not love

This paper argues that Malthusian regimes are capable of sustained changes in per capita incomes. Shifting mortality and fertility schedules can lead to different steady-state income levels, with long periods of growth during the transition. Europe checked the downward pressure on wages through late marriage, which reduced fertility, and a mortality regime that combined high death rates with high incomes. We argue that both emerged as a result of the Black Death.

Trends in hours, balanced growth and the role of technology in the business cycle

The present paper revisits a property embedded in most dynamic macroeconomic models: the stationarity of hours worked. First, I argue that, contrary to what is often believed, there are many reasons why hours could be nonstationary in those models, while preserving the property of balanced growth. Second, I show that the postwar evidence for most industrialized economies is clearly at odds with the assumption of stationary hours per capita. Third, I examine the implications of that evidence for the role of technology as a source of economic fluctuations in the G7 countries.

The three horsemen of riches: Plague, war and urbanization in early modern Europe

How did Europe escape the "Iron Law of Wages?" We construct a simple Malthusian model withtwo sectors and multiple steady states, and use it to explain why European per capita incomes andurbanization rates increased during the period 1350-1700. Productivity growth can only explain a smallfraction of the rise in output per capita. Population dynamics changes of the birth and death schedules were far more important determinants of steady states. We show how a major shock to population cantrigger a transition to a new steady state with higher per-capita income. The Black Death was such ashock, raising wages substantially. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, andurban centers grew in size. European cities were unhealthy, and rising urbanization pushed up aggregatedeath rates. This effect was reinforced by diseases spread through war, financed by higher tax revenues.In addition, rising trade also spread diseases. In this way higher wages themselves reduced populationpressure. We show in a calibration exercise that our model can account for the sustained rise in Europeanurbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes in 1700, without technological change.Wars contributed importantly to the "Rise of Europe", even if they had negative short-run effects. We thustrace Europe s precocious rise to economic riches to interactions of the plague shock with the belligerentpolitical environment and the nature of cities.

Differences in diet between the two largest breeding colonies of Audouin's gulls: the effects of fishery activities

We analysed and compared the diet of Audouin´s gulls Larus audouinii between their two largest breeding sites in the world: the Ebro Delta and the Chafarinas Islands (western Mediterranean). These two localities showed marked differences in the features of the commercial fishing fleet: in the Ebro Delta area a large fishing fleet produced large amounts of discards, while in the Chafarinas the fleet discarded smaller amounts of fish and marine invertebrates, due to the smaller number of vessels. It is also likely that the percentage of discards from total catches is also lower around the Chafarinas than at the Ebro Delta. We distinguished two types of fishing to compare diet compositions: diurnal (only trawling activity) and diurnal and nocturnal (trawling and purse-seine activity, respectively). We also differentiated regurgitates from young nestlings (up to 20 days old) and from older nestlings or adult birds. At the two localities, fish was the main food of Audouin´s gulls, with epipelagic prey (mainly clupeoids) being more important when both diurnal and nocturnal fisheries were operating. This confirms that epipelagic prey either caught actively by the gulls or linked to fisheries was particularly important in the feeding habits of Audouin´s gulls. Nevertheless, differences between the two colonies appear mainly when only trawlers operated: while at the Ebro Delta gulls showed higher consumption of benthic-mesopelagic prey (probably linked to a higher trawler discard availability), gulls from the Chafarinas Islands consumed higher biomass of epipelagic prey probably caught actively at night. When both fleets operated around the two colonies, the average biomass of prey in a regurgitate of younger chicks was significantly higher at the Ebro Delta than at Chafarinas, and the opposite trend was recorded for older nestlings and adults. Niche width was broader in Chafarinas than in the Ebro Delta for both age classes and for any fishing fleet schedule, suggesting again that the exploitation of discards was higher at the Ebro Delta than at the Chafarinas, where gulls showed a more varied diet. Despite the fact that availability of discards was probably higher at the Ebro Delta than at Chafarinas, the per capita availability was not so different at both localities due to the increasing seabird community population at the Ebro Delta, which ca. doubled that at Chafarinas in the last decade.