138 resultados para Political parties -- Pennsylvania
Resumo:
In the evolution of Catalan nationalism, as much politician as cultural, the period of II Spanish Republic (1931-1939) was essential. The obtaining of the Statute of Autonomy (1931-1932) supposed the beginning of a stage of expansion in multiple aspects. One of them were the contacts with the Catalanists nuclei of the rest of the cultural space of Catalan language in which, at that time, it would begin to call Catalan Countries (Balearic Islands, Valencian Country, Andorra, Rosselló, to l'Alguer). On Those Collaborations between cultural organizations, political and particular parties Catalonia always will be the model to follow. The Increasing connections will be visualized on press, as well as on cultural celebrations, policy of parties and Constituent Courts. This evolution will be cut by the Franco victory in the Civil War in 1939.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the different compositions of the catalan governing coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in catalan politics, there have been two main political issues over which the different parties have taken positions: rightist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. I find that for any allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the governing coalition. I show the features that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of the advantage of the key party.
Resumo:
We study the process by which subordinated regions of a country can obtain a more favourable political status. In our theoretical model a dominant and a dominated region first interact through a voting process that can lead to different degrees of autonomy. If this process fails then both regions engage in a costly political conflict which can only lead to the maintenance of the initial subordination of the region in question or to its complete independence. In the subgame-perfect equilibrium the voting process always leads to an intermediate arrangement acceptable for both parts. Hence, the costly political struggle never occurs. In contrast, in our experiments we observe a large amount of fighting involving high material losses, even in a case in which the possibilities for an arrangement without conflict are very salient. In our experimental environment intermediate solutions are feasible and stable, but purely emotional elements prevent them from being reached.