Social security in theory and practice (I): Facts and political theories

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? We document some of the internationally and historically common features of Social Security programs including explicit and implicit taxes on labor supply, pay-as-you-go features, intergenerational redistribution, benefits which areincreasing functions of lifetime earnings and not means-tested. We partition theories of Social Security into three groups: "political", "efficiency" and "narrative" theories. We explore three political theories in this paper: the majority rational voting model (with its two versions: "the elderly as the leaders of a winning coalition with the poor" and the "once and for all election" model), the "time-intensive model of political competition" and the "taxpayer protection model". Each of the explanations is compared with the international and historical facts. A companion paper explores the "efficiency" and "narrative" theories, and derives implicationsof all the theories for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan.

The political consequences of unemployment

We analyze the channels by which an ill-functioning labor market changes the preferences of the people for public policy and therefore the decisions that are made. We not only discuss labour market reform but other important aspects of policy making such as the size and structure of government spending. Theclass of mechanisms that we highlight can be summarized as the very existence of unemployment generating political support for "sclerosis". This may help to explain the timid pace of reform, in particular the fact that any recovery sends them at the backfront of the political agenda, and the sometimes violent opposition generated by some measures, as we have seen mostly in France.

Electoral competition under the threat of political unrest

We study elections in which one party (the strong party) controls a source of political unrest; e.g., this party could instigate riots if it lost the election. We show that the strong party is more likely to win the election when there is less information about its ability to cause unrest. This is because when theweak party is better informed, it can more reliably prevent political unrest by implementing a ``centrist'' policy. When there is uncertainty over the credibility of the threat, ``posturing'' by the strong party leads to platform divergence.

Regenerating cortical connections in a dish: the entorhino-hippocampal organotypic slice co-culture as tool for pharmacological screening of molecules promoting axon regeneration

We present a method for using long-term organotypic slice co-cultures of the entorhino-hippocampal formation to analyze the axon-regenerative properties of a determined compound. The culture method is based on the membrane interphase method, which is easy to perform and is generally reproducible. The degree of axonal regeneration after treatment in lesioned cultures can be seen directly using green fluorescent protein (GFP) transgenic mice or by axon tracing and histological methods. Possible changes in cell morphology after pharmacological treatment can be determined easily by focal in vitro electroporation. The well-preserved cytoarchitectonics in the co-culture facilitate the analysis of identified cells or regenerating axons. The protocol takes up to a month.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

Is there a connection between the tax administration and the political power?

This paper offers empirical evidence from Spain of a connection between the tax administration and the political power. Firstly, the regional tax administration is not immune to the budgetary situation of regional government, and tends to exert a greater (or lesser) effort in tax collection the greater (or lower) the (expected) public deficit. At the same time, the system of unconditional grants from the central layer of government provokes an ¿income effect¿ which disincentivises the efforts of the tax administration. Secondly, these efforts also decrease when the margin to lose a parliamentary seat in an electoral district is cut, although the importance of this disincentive decreases according to the parliamentary strength of the incumbent

Political economy of municipal water service privatization in Spain: a duration model analysis

This empirical work applies a duration model to the study of factors determining privatization of local water services. I assess how factors determining privatization decision evolve as time goes by. A sample of 133 Spanish municipalities during the six terms of office taken place during the 1980-2002 period is analyzed. A dynamic neighboring effect is hypothesized and successfully tested. In a first stage, private water supply firms may try to expand to regions where there is no service privatized, in order to spread over this region after having being installed thanks to its scale advantages. Other factors influencing privatization decision evolve during the two decades under study, from the priority to fix old infrastructures to the concern about service efficiency. Some complementary results regarding political and budgetary factors are also obtained

A comparison of the processes of institutionalisation of political economy in Spain and Italy (1860-1900)

[spa] El estudio de los procesos a través de los cuales la economía política se ha transformado en una disciplina académica es un área de creciente interés en la historia del pensamiento económico. Dicho estudio se ha abordado a través del análisis de la importancia de la economía política en un conjunto de instituciones, consideradas clave en la expansión de la economía en las sociedades occidentales en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y primeras décadas del XX: universidades, sociedades económicas, publicaciones periódicas de contenido económico y los parlamentos nacionales. Este papel presenta una comparación entre los desarrollos del proceso de institutionalización de la economía política en España e Italia, a través del estudio de la presencia de esta disciplina en las instituciones mencionadas para el periodo 1860-1900. El objetivo es medir la posible existencia de una vía común en la institucionalización de la economía política en ambos países, como un primer paso hacia la elaboración de un modelo supranacional de institucionalización de la economía en este periodo.

Connections between signal processing and complex analysis

We describe one of the research lines of the Grup de Teoria de Funcions de la UAB UB, which deals with sampling and interpolation problems in signal analysis and their connections with complex function theory.

Reelin regulates the development and synaptogenesis of the layer-specific entorhino-hippocampal connections

Here we examine the role of Reelin, an extracellular protein involved in neuronal migration, in the formation of hippocampal connections. Both at prenatal and postnatal stages, the general laminar and topographic distribution of entorhinal projections is preserved in the hippocampus of reeler mutant mice, in the absence of Reelin. However, developing and adult entorhinal afferents show severe alterations, including increased numbers of misrouted fibers and the formation of abnormal patches of termination from the medial and lateral entorhinal cortices. At perinatal stages, single entorhinal axons in reeler mice are grouped into thick bundles, and they have decreased axonal branching and decreased extension of axon collaterals. We also show that the number of entorhino-hippocampal synapses is lower in reeler mice than in control animals during development. Studies performed in mixed entorhino-hippocampal co-cultures combining slices from reeler and wild-type mice indicate that these abnormalities are caused by the lack of Reelin in the target hippocampus. These findings imply that Reelin fulfills a modulatory role during the formation of layer-specific and topographic connections in the hippocampus. They also suggest that Reelin promotes maturation of single fibers and synaptogenesis by entorhinal afferents.

TrkB and TrkC signaling are required for maturation and synaptogenesis of hippocampal connections

Recent studies have suggested a role for neurotrophins in the growth and refinement of neural connections, in dendritic growth, and in activity-dependent adult plasticity. To unravel the role of endogenous neurotrophins in the development of neural connections in the CNS, we studied the ontogeny of hippocampal afferents intrkB (¿/¿) and trkC (¿/¿) mice. Injections of lipophilic tracers in the entorhinal cortex and hippocampus of newborn mutant mice showed that the ingrowth of entorhinal and commissural/associational afferents to the hippocampus was not affected by these mutations. Similarly, injections of biocytin in postnatal mutant mice (P10¿P16) did not reveal major differences in the topographic patterns of hippocampal connections. In contrast, quantification of biocytin-filled axons showed that commissural and entorhinal afferents have a reduced number of axon collaterals (21¿49%) and decreased densities of axonal varicosities (8¿17%) in both trkB (¿/¿) and trkC (¿/¿) mice. In addition, electron microscopic analyses showed thattrkB (¿/¿) and trkC (¿/¿) mice have lower densities of synaptic contacts and important structural alterations of presynaptic boutons, such as decreased density of synaptic vesicles. Finally, immunocytochemical studies revealed a reduced expression of the synaptic-associated proteins responsible for synaptic vesicle exocytosis and neurotransmitter release (v-SNAREs and t-SNAREs), especially in trkB (¿/¿) mice. We conclude that neither trkB nor trkC genes are essential for the ingrowth or layer-specific targeting of hippocampal connections, although the lack of these receptors results in reduced axonal arborization and synaptic density, which indicates a role for TrkB and TrkC receptors in the developmental regulation of synaptic inputs in the CNS in vivo. The data also suggest that the genes encoding for synaptic proteins may be targets of TrkB and TrkC signaling pathways.