Influencia de la información territorial en la simulación hidrológica. Aplicación a la cuenca de Canalda (El Solsonés)

La modelización hidrológica de cuencas requiere datos del territorio para hacer una correcta parametrización del modelo. La escala de entrada (grado de generalización) de los datos influirá en los cálculos de la escorrentía superficial realizados en la simulación. HEC-1 es un modelo empírico de simulación hidrológica de cuencas de amplia difusión. En la actualidad, se encuentra disponible conjuntamente con el programa informático WMS (Watershed Modeling System), que dispone de diferentes herramientas que facilitan el procesamiento de los datos del territorio. El modelo HEC-1 se ha aplicado a la cuenca de Canalda de 66 km2 (El Solsonés, Lleida) para conocer la influencia de generalizar los parámetros de entrada (usos y tipos de suelos y división en subcuencas) en el cálculo de la escorrentía superficial. Para aplicar el modelo ha sido necesario hacer un reconocimiento y estudio de los suelos de la cuenca, con énfasis especial en las propiedades físicas, la distribución y extensión de los suelos, obteniendo el mapa de suelos de la cuenca a escala 1:50.000. El proceso de generalización de los datos de entrada se ha efectuado con la escala base 1:50.000, realizando otras simulaciones a las escalas 1:100.000 y 1:200.000. En las simulaciones practicadas se obseva que el grado de generalización de los datos de entrada tiene efecto en el hidrograma de salida de la cuenca; al generalizar los datos a las escalas mencionadas se aprecia un retardo en el hidrograma y una reducción de la aportación total y del caudal punta.

A measure of stability as a criterion for the verification and analysis of simulation models

The aim of this study is to define a new statistic, PVL, based on the relative distance between the likelihood associated with the simulation replications and the likelihood of the conceptual model. Our results coming from several simulation experiments of a clinical trial show that the PVL statistic range can be a good measure of stability to establish when a computational model verifies the underlying conceptual model. PVL improves also the analysis of simulation replications because only one statistic is associated with all the simulation replications. As well it presents several verification scenarios, obtained by altering the simulation model, that show the usefulness of PVL. Further simulation experiments suggest that a 0 to 20 % range may define adequate limits for the verification problem, if considered from the viewpoint of an equivalence test.

Measuring school demand in the presence of spatial dependence. A conditional approach

Improving educational quality is an important public policy goal. However, its success requires identifying factors associated with student achievement. At the core of these proposals lies the principle that increased public school quality can make school system more efficient, resulting in correspondingly stronger performance by students. Nevertheless, the public educational system is not devoid of competition which arises, among other factors, through the efficiency of management and the geographical location of schools. Moreover, families in Spain appear to choose a school on the grounds of location. In this environment, the objective of this paper is to analyze whether geographical space has an impact on the relationship between the level of technical quality of public schools (measured by the efficiency score) and the school demand index. To do this, an empirical application is performed on a sample of 1,695 public schools in the region of Catalonia (Spain). This application shows the effects of spatial autocorrelation on the estimation of the parameters and how these problems are addressed through spatial econometrics models. The results confirm that space has a moderating effect on the relationship between efficiency and school demand, although only in urban municipalities.

The economic value of reciprocal bilingualism

Some bilingual societies exhibit a distribution of language skills that can- not be explained by economic theories that portray languages as pure commu- nication devices. Such distribution of skills are typically the result of public policies that promote bilingualism among members of both speech commu- nities (reciprocal bilingualism). In this paper I argue that these policies are likely to increase social welfare by diminishing economic and social segmenta- tion between the two communities. However, these gains tend to be unequally distributed over the two communities. As a result, in a large range of circum- stances these policies might not draw su¢ cient support. The model is built upon the communicative value of languages, but also emphasizes the role of linguistic preferences in the behavior of bilingual individuals.

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely office motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advan- tage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a different extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.

Aplicación del DEA en el análisis de beneficios en un sistema integrado verticalmente hacia adelante

En el presente trabajo se diseñan tres modelos DEA a partir de un sistema de producción cuyos componentes están colocados en un arreglo en serie que se integran verticalmente hacia adelante. El primer modelo busca optimizar los beneficios del sistema agregado, así como la mejora de los mismos en cada uno de los subsistemas. En el segundo de los modelos, además del objetivo anterior, se incluyen restricciones de transferencia de los recursos específicos asociados a cada subsistema, y en el tercer modelo se estima el intervalo de variación para los precios de transferencia de los inputs intermedios entre ambos subsistemas. Los modelos han sido programados y simulados en el software GAMS a partir de datos generados por una función de producción Cobb-Douglas para los inputs intermedios y los outputs finales.

La Solvencia financiera del asegurador de vida y su relación con el coste de capital

Esta investigación relaciona el margen de solvencia que normativamente deben acreditar los aseguradores de vida con los recursos propios que cualquier empresa debe poseer para poder ejercer su actividad. Analizaremos la incidencia que la remuneración de esos recursos tiene en la propia actividad de comercialización de los seguros demostrando su relación inversa con el tipo de interés garantizado en los contratos. Analizaremos asimismo la incidencia que los eventuales cambios en los tipos de interés pueden tener en la remuneración que puede ofrecerse a esos recursos y propondremos una ecuación que incorpore todos estos aspectos, comprobando que las relaciones que actualmente ofrece la disciplina académica son casos particulares de la ecuación general, casos que demostraremos que incorporan unas hipótesis implícitas bastante restrictivas.

The Cost of ownership in the governance of interfirm collaborations

This paper investigates the selection of governance forms in interfirm collaborations taking into account the predictions from transaction costs and property rights theories. Transaction costs arguments are often used to justify the introduction of hierarchical controls in collaborations, but the ownership dimension of going from “contracts” to “hierarchies” has been ignored in the past and with it the so called “costs of ownership”. The theoretical results, tested with a sample of collaborations in which participate Spanish firms, indicate that the cost of ownership may offset the benefits of hierarchical controls and therefore limit their diffusion. Evidence is also reported of possible complementarities between reputation effects and forms of ownership that go together with hierarchical controls (i.e. joint ventures), in contrast with the generally assumed substitutability between the two.

A Rembrandt is a Rembrandt

As paintings are assets, we propose to model a painting's price dynamics as a diffusion process, i.e., as the financial literature models share prices, but correcting by size. We show that the influence of size on the artwork price diminishes as the paintings gets older because 1) prices incorporate progressively more noise and 2) for high quality artists, the relative importance of size on price decreases as the artist consolidates and authorship gains importance as explanatory variable. Our theoretical results are consistent with data from a sample of 19th- and 20th-century Catalan painters of similar quality. These findings suggest that an artist's quality and antiquity should be taken into account in order to obtain more efficient estimates of parameters in hedonic art market models.

Dynamic matching and bargaining: the role of deadlines

We consider a dynamic model where traders in each period are matched randomly into pairs who then bargain about the division of a fixed surplus. When agreement is reached the traders leave the market. Traders who do not come to an agreement return next period in which they will be matched again, as long as their deadline has not expired yet. New traders enter exogenously in each period. We assume that traders within a pair know each other's deadline. We define and characterize the stationary equilibrium configurations. Traders with longer deadlines fare better than traders with short deadlines. It is shown that the heterogeneity of deadlines may cause delay. It is then shown that a centralized mechanism that controls the matching protocol, but does not interfere with the bargaining, eliminates all delay. Even though this efficient centralized mechanism is not as good for traders with long deadlines, it is shown that in a model where all traders can choose which mechanism to

Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences

In this paper, we study individual incentives to report preferences truthfully for the special case when individuals have dichotomous preferences on the set of alternatives and preferences are aggregated in form of scoring rules. In particular, we show that (a) the Borda Count coincides with Approval Voting on the dichotomous preference domain, (b) the Borda Count is the only strategy-proof scoring rule on the dichotomous preference domain, and (c) if at least three individuals participate in the election, then the dichotomous preference domain is the unique maximal rich domain under which the Borda Count is strategy-proof.

The Instrumental voter goes to the news-agent: demand for information, election closeness, and the media

This paper studies the impact of instrumental voting on information demand and mass media behaviour during electoral campaigns. If voters act instrumentally then information demand should increase with the closeness of an election. Mass media are modeled as profit-maximizing firms that take into account information demand, the value of customers to advertisers and the marginal cost of customers. Information supply should be larger in electoral constituencies where the contest is expected to be closer, there is a higher population density, and customers are on average more profitable for advertisers. The impact of electorate size is theoretically undetermined. These conclusions are then tested with comfortable results on data from the 1997 general election in Britain.

Spatial competition between two candidates of different quality: the effects of candidate ideology and private information

This paper examines competition in a spatial model of two-candidate elections, where one candidate enjoys a quality advantage over the other candidate. The candidates care about winning and also have policy preferences. There is two-dimensional private information. Candidate ideal points as well as their tradeoffs between policy preferences and winning are private information. The distribution of this two-dimensional type is common knowledge. The location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, with a distribution that is commonly known by both candidates. Pure strategy equilibria always exist in this model. We characterize the effects of increased uncertainty about the median voter, the effect of candidate policy preferences, and the effects of changes in the distribution of private information. We prove that the distribution of candidate policies approaches the mixed equilibrium of Aragones and Palfrey (2002a), when both candidates' weights on policy preferences go to zero.

The provision of quality in a bilateral search market

We accomplish two goals. First, we provide a non-cooperative foundation for the use of the Nash bargaining solution in search markets. This finding should help to close the rift between the search and the matching-and-bargaining literature. Second, we establish that the diversity of quality offered (at an increasing price-quality ratio) in a decentralized market is an equilibrium phenomenon - even in the limit as search frictions disappear.