A new compact linear programming formulation for choice network revenue management

The choice network revenue management model incorporates customer purchase behavioras a function of the offered products, and is the appropriate model for airline and hotel networkrevenue management, dynamic sales of bundles, and dynamic assortment optimization.The optimization problem is a stochastic dynamic program and is intractable. A certainty-equivalencerelaxation of the dynamic program, called the choice deterministic linear program(CDLP) is usually used to generate dyamic controls. Recently, a compact linear programmingformulation of this linear program was given for the multi-segment multinomial-logit (MNL)model of customer choice with non-overlapping consideration sets. Our objective is to obtaina tighter bound than this formulation while retaining the appealing properties of a compactlinear programming representation. To this end, it is natural to consider the affine relaxationof the dynamic program. We first show that the affine relaxation is NP-complete even for asingle-segment MNL model. Nevertheless, by analyzing the affine relaxation we derive a newcompact linear program that approximates the dynamic programming value function betterthan CDLP, provably between the CDLP value and the affine relaxation, and often comingclose to the latter in our numerical experiments. When the segment consideration sets overlap,we show that some strong equalities called product cuts developed for the CDLP remain validfor our new formulation. Finally we perform extensive numerical comparisons on the variousbounds to evaluate their performance.

Endogenous spillovers, increased competition and re-organization waves

We consider an entrepreneur that is the sole producer of a costreducing skill, but the entrepreneur that hires a team to usethe skill cannot prevent collusive trade for the innovation related knowledge between employees and competitors. We showthat there are two types of diffusion avoiding strategies forthe entrepreneur to preempt collusive communication i) settingup a large productive capacity (the traditional firm) and ii)keeping a small team (the lean firm). The traditional firm ischaracterized by its many "marginal" employees that work shortdays, receive flat wages and are incompletely informed about the innovation. The lean firm is small in number of employees,engages in complete information sharing among members, that are paid with stock option schemes. We find that the lean firm is superior to the traditional firm when technological entry costsare low and when the sector is immature.

Aggregate fluctuations and the network structure of intersectoral trade

This paper analyzes the flow of intermediate inputs across sectors by adopting a network perspective on sectoral interactions. I apply these tools to show how fluctuationsin aggregate economic activity can be obtained from independent shocks to individualsectors. First, I characterize the network structure of input trade in the U.S. On thedemand side, a typical sector relies on a small number of key inputs and sectors arehomogeneous in this respect. However, in their role as input-suppliers sectors do differ:many specialized input suppliers coexist alongside general purpose sectors functioningas hubs to the economy. I then develop a model of intersectoral linkages that can reproduce these connectivity features. In a standard multisector setup, I use this modelto provide analytical expressions linking aggregate volatility to the network structureof input trade. I show that the presence of sectoral hubs - by coupling productiondecisions across sectors - leads to fluctuations in aggregates.

An analysis of the accounting principles applied by the European Farm Accountancy Data Network

In spite of its relative importance in the economy of many countriesand its growing interrelationships with other sectors, agriculture has traditionally been excluded from accounting standards. Nevertheless, to support its Common Agricultural Policy, for years the European Commission has been making an effort to obtain standardized information on the financial performance and condition of farms. Through the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), every year data are gathered from a rotating sample of 60.000 professional farms across all member states. FADN data collection is not structured as an accounting cycle but as an extensive questionnaire. This questionnaire refers to assets, liabilities, revenues and expenses, and seems to try to obtain a "true and fair view" of the financial performance and condition of the farms it surveys. However, the definitions used in the questionnaire and the way data is aggregated often appear flawed from an accounting perspective. The objective of this paper is to contrast the accounting principles implicit in the FADN questionnaire with generally accepted accounting principles, particularly those found in the IVth Directive of the European Union, on the one hand, and those recently proposed by the International Accounting Standards Committee’s Steering Committeeon Agriculture in its Draft Statement of Principles, on the other hand. There are two reasons why this is useful. First, it allows to make suggestions how the information provided by FADN could be more in accordance with the accepted accounting framework, and become a more valuable tool for policy makers, farmers, and other stakeholders. Second, it helps assessing the suitability of FADN to become the starting point for a European accounting standard on agriculture.

The P-median problem in a changing network: The case of Barcelona

In this paper a p--median--like model is formulated to address theissue of locating new facilities when there is uncertainty. Severalpossible future scenarios with respect to demand and/or the travel times/distanceparameters are presented. The planner will want a strategy of positioning thatwill do as ``well as possible'' over the future scenarios. This paper presents a discrete location model formulation to address this P--Medianproblem under uncertainty. The model is applied to the location of firestations in Barcelona.

The organization of research corporations and researcher ability

This paper analyzes the formation of Research Corporations as an alternative governance structure for performing R&D compared to pursuing in-house R&D projects. Research Corporations are privatefor-profit research centers that bring together several firms with similar research goals. In a Research Corporation formal authority over the choice of projects is jointly exercised by the top management of the member firms. A private for-profit organization cannot commit not to interfere with the project choice of the researchers. However, increasing the number of member firms of the Research Corporation reduces the incentive of member firms to meddle with the research projects of researchers because exercising formal authority over the choice of research projects is a public good. The Research Corporation thus offers researchers greater autonomy than a single firm pursuing an identical research program in its in-house R&D department. This attracts higher ability researchers to the Research Corporation compared to the internal R&D department. The paper uses the theoretical model to analyze the organization of the Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC). The facts of this case confirm the existence of a tension between control over the choice of research projects and the ability of researchers that the organization is able to attract or hold onto.

Influence activity and the organization of research and development

The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.

Building an honest microfinance organization: Embezzlement and the optimality of rigid repayment schedules and joint liability

We consider the agency problem of a staff member managing microfinancing programs, who can abuse his discretion to embezzle borrowers' repayments. The fact that most borrowers of microfinancing programs are illiterate and live in rural areas where transportation costs are very high make staff's embezzlement particularly relevant as is documented by Mknelly and Kevane (2002). We study the trade-off between the optimal rigid lending contract and the optimal discretionary one and find that a rigid contract is optimal when the audit cost is larger than gains from insurance. Our analysis explains rigid repayment schedules used by the Grameen bank as an optimal response to the bank staff's agency problem. Joint liability reduces borrowers' burden of respecting the rigid repayment schedules by providing them with partial insurance. However, the same insurance can be provided byborrowers themselves under individual liability through a side-contract.

Corporate criminal law and organization incentives: A managerial perspective

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economictheory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes?Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Shouldcorporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two majorcontributions to the literature. First, it provides a common analyticalframework to most results presented and largely discussed in the field.In second place, by making use of the framework, we provide new insightsinto how corporations should be punished for the offenses committed bytheir employees.

Assessing an intuitive condition for stability under a range of traffic conditions via a generalised Lu-Kumar network

We argue the importance both of developing simple sufficientconditions for the stability of general multiclass queueing networks and also of assessing such conditions under a range of assumptions on the weight of the traffic flowing between service stations. To achieve the former, we review a peak-rate stability condition and extend its range of application and for the latter, we introduce a generalisation of the Lu-Kumar network on which the stability condition may be tested for a range of traffic configurations. The peak-rate condition is close to exact when the between-station traffic is light, but degrades as this traffic increases.

Optimal information transmission in organizations: Search and congestion

We propose a stylized model of a problem-solving organization whoseinternal communication structure is given by a fixed network. Problemsarrive randomly anywhere in this network and must find their way to theirrespective specialized solvers by relying on local information alone.The organization handles multiple problems simultaneously. For this reason,the process may be subject to congestion. We provide a characterization ofthe threshold of collapse of the network and of the stock of foatingproblems (or average delay) that prevails below that threshold. We buildupon this characterization to address a design problem: the determinationof what kind of network architecture optimizes performance for any givenproblem arrival rate. We conclude that, for low arrival rates, the optimalnetwork is very polarized (i.e. star-like or centralized ), whereas it islargely homogenous (or decentralized ) for high arrival rates. We also showthat, if an auxiliary assumption holds, the transition between these twoopposite structures is sharp and they are the only ones to ever qualify asoptimal.

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization

In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence.

On bounds for network revenue management

The Network Revenue Management problem can be formulated as a stochastic dynamic programming problem (DP or the\optimal" solution V *) whose exact solution is computationally intractable. Consequently, a number of heuristics have been proposed in the literature, the most popular of which are the deterministic linear programming (DLP) model, and a simulation based method, the randomized linear programming (RLP) model. Both methods give upper bounds on the optimal solution value (DLP and PHLP respectively). These bounds are used to provide control values that can be used in practice to make accept/deny decisions for booking requests. Recently Adelman [1] and Topaloglu [18] have proposed alternate upper bounds, the affine relaxation (AR) bound and the Lagrangian relaxation (LR) bound respectively, and showed that their bounds are tighter than the DLP bound. Tight bounds are of great interest as it appears from empirical studies and practical experience that models that give tighter bounds also lead to better controls (better in the sense that they lead to more revenue). In this paper we give tightened versions of three bounds, calling themsAR (strong Affine Relaxation), sLR (strong Lagrangian Relaxation) and sPHLP (strong Perfect Hindsight LP), and show relations between them. Speciffically, we show that the sPHLP bound is tighter than sLR bound and sAR bound is tighter than the LR bound. The techniques for deriving the sLR and sPHLP bounds can potentially be applied to other instances of weakly-coupled dynamic programming.

European research funding and regional technological capabilities: Network composition analysis

We use network and correspondence analysis to describe the compositionof the research networks in the European BRITE--EURAM program. Our mainfinding is that 27\% of the participants in this program fall into one oftwo sets of highly ``interconnected'' institutions --one centered aroundlarge firms (with smaller firms and research centers providing specializedservices), and the other around universities--. Moreover, these ``hubs''are composed largely of institutions coming from the technologically mostadvanced regions of Europe. This is suggestive of the difficulties of attainingEuropean ``cohesion'', as technically advanced institutions naturally linkwith partners of similar technological capabilities.

Validation procedures in radiological diagnostic models. Neural network and logistic regression

The objective of this paper is to compare the performance of twopredictive radiological models, logistic regression (LR) and neural network (NN), with five different resampling methods. One hundred and sixty-seven patients with proven calvarial lesions as the only known disease were enrolled. Clinical and CT data were used for LR and NN models. Both models were developed with cross validation, leave-one-out and three different bootstrap algorithms. The final results of each model were compared with error rate and the area under receiver operating characteristic curves (Az). The neural network obtained statistically higher Az than LR with cross validation. The remaining resampling validation methods did not reveal statistically significant differences between LR and NN rules. The neural network classifier performs better than the one based on logistic regression. This advantage is well detected by three-fold cross-validation, but remains unnoticed when leave-one-out or bootstrap algorithms are used.