Attribution and reciprocity in a simulated labor market: An experimental investigation

While papers such as Akerlof and Yellen (1990) and Rabin (1993) argue that psychological considerations such as fairness and reciprocity are important in individual decision-making, there is little explicit empirical evidence of reciprocal altruism in economic environments. This paper tests whether attribution of volition in choosing a wage has a significant effect on subsequent costly effort provision. An experiment was conducted in which subjects are first randomly divided into groups of employers and employees. Wages were selected and employees asked to choose an effort level, where increased effort is costly to the employee, but highly beneficial to the employer. The wage-determination process was common knowledge and wages were chosen either by the employer or by an external process. There is evidence for both distributional concerns and reciprocal altruism. The slope of the effort/wage profile is clearly positive in all cases, but is significantly higher when wages are chosen by the employer, offering support for the hypothesis of reciprocity. There are implications for models of utility and a critique of some current models is presented.

Common law and civil law as pro-market adaptations

We argue that in the development of the Western legal system, cognitive departures are themain determinant of the optimal degree of judicial rule-making. Judicial discretion, seen here as the main distinguishing feature between both legal systems, is introduced in civil law jurisdictions to protect, rather than to limit, freedom of contract against potential judicial backlash. Such protection was unnecessary in common law countries, where free-market relations enjoyed safer judicial ground mainly due to their relatively gradual evolution, their reliance on practitioners as judges, and the earlier development of institutional checks and balances that supported private property rights. In our framework, differences in costs and benefits associated with self-interest and lack of information require a cognitive failure to be active.

Interbank market integration under asymmetric information

We argue that the main barrier to an integrated international interbankmarket is the existence of asymmetric information between differentcountries, which may prevail in spite of monetary integration or successfulcurrency pegging. In order to address this issue, we study the scope forinternational interbank market integration with unsecured lending whencross-country information is noisy. We find not only that an equilibriumwith integrated markets need not always exist, but also that when it does,the integrated equilibrium may coexist with one of interbank marketsegmentation. Therefore, market deregulation, per se, does not guaranteethe emergence of an integrated interbank market. The effect of a repo marketwhich, a priori, was supposed to improve efficiency happens to be morecomplex: it reduces interest rate spreads and improves upon the segmentationequilibrium, but\ it may destroy the unsecured integrated equilibrium, sincethe repo market will attract the best borrowers. The introduction of othertransnational institutional arrangements, such as multinational banking,correspondent banking and the existence of "too-big-to-fail" banks mayreduce cross country interest spreads and provide more insurance againstcountry wide liquidity shocks. Still, multinational banking, as theintroduction of repos, may threaten the integrated interbank marketequilibrium.

Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets.

A subsampling approach to estimating the distribution of diversing statistics with application to assessing financial market risks

In this paper we propose a subsampling estimator for the distribution ofstatistics diverging at either known rates when the underlying timeseries in strictly stationary abd strong mixing. Based on our results weprovide a detailed discussion how to estimate extreme order statisticswith dependent data and present two applications to assessing financialmarket risk. Our method performs well in estimating Value at Risk andprovides a superior alternative to Hill's estimator in operationalizingSafety First portofolio selection.

Toward a theory of labor market institutions

Standard economic analysis holds that labor market rigidities are harmfulfor job creation and typically increase unemployment. But many orthodoxreforms of the labor market have proved difficult to implement because ofpolitical opposition. For these reasons it is important to explain why weobserve such regulations. In this paper I outline a theory of how they may arise and why they fit together. This theory is fully developed in aforthcoming book (Saint-Paul (2000)), to which the reader is referred forfurther details.

Monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market

Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper sets upa model where the central bank uses real-time data from the bond market togetherwith standard macroeconomic indicators to estimate the current state of theeconomy more efficiently, while taking into account that its own actions influencewhat it observes. The timeliness of bond market data allows for quicker responsesof monetary policy to disturbances compared to the case when the central bankhas to rely solely on collected aggregate data. The information content of theterm structure creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomythat is novel to the literature. To quantify the importance of the bond market asa source of information, the model is estimated on data for the United Statesand Australia using Bayesian methods. The empirical exercise suggests that thereis some information in the US term structure that helps the Federal Reserve toidentify shocks to the economy on a timely basis. Australian bond prices seemto be less informative than their US counterparts, perhaps because Australia is arelatively small and open economy.

Structural unemployment

Structural unemployment is due to mismatch between available jobs and workers.We formalize this concept in a simple model of a segmented labor market with searchfrictions within segments. Worker mobility, job mobility and wage bargaining costsacross segments generate structural unemployment. We estimate the contribution ofthese costs to fluctuations in US unemployment, operationalizing segments as statesor industries. Most structural unemployment is due to wage bargaining costs, whichare large but nevertheless contribute little to unemployment fluctuations. Structuralunemployment is as cyclical as overall unemployment and no more persistent, bothin the current and in previous recessions.

Selective hiring and welfare analysis in labor market models

Firms select not only how many, but also which workers to hire. Yet, in standardsearch models of the labor market, all workers have the same probability of being hired.We argue that selective hiring crucially affects welfare analysis. Our model is isomorphicto a search model under random hiring but allows for selective hiring. With selectivehiring, the positive predictions of the model change very little, but the welfare costsof unemployment are much larger because unemployment risk is distributed unequallyacross workers. As a result, optimal unemployment insurance may be higher and welfareis lower if hiring is selective.

Determining underlying macroeconomic fundamentals during emerging market crises: Are conditions as bad as they seem?

Emerging market crises are characterized by large swings in both macroeconomic fundamentalsand asset prices. The economic significance of observed movements in macroeconomicvariables is obscured by the brief and extreme nature of crises. In this paper we propose to study the macroeconomic consequences of crises by studying the behavior of effective fundamentals, constructed by studying the relative movements of stock prices during crises. We find that these effective fundamentals provide a different picture than that implied by observed fundamentals. First, asset prices often reflect expectations of improvement in fundamentals after the initial devaluations; specifically, effective depreciations are positive but not as large as the observed ones. Second, crises vary in their effect on credit market conditions, with investors expecting tightening of credit in some cases (Mexico 1994, Philippines 1997), but loosening of credit in others (Sweden 1992, Korea 1997, Brazil 1999).

Information revelation and market incompleteness

\documentstyle[portada,11pt]{article}This paper shows that the presence of private information in aneconomy can be a source of market incompleteness even when it is feasibleto issue a set of securities that completely eliminates the informationalasymmetries in equilibrium. We analyze a simple security design model in which avolume maximizing futures exchange chooses not only the characteristics ofeach individual contract but also the number of contracts. Agents have rationalexpectations and differ in information, endowments and, possibly, attitudestoward risk. The emergence of complete or incomplete markets in equilibriumdepends on whether the {\it adverse selection effect} is stronger or weakerthan the {\it Hirshleifer effect}, as new securitiesare issued and prices reveal more information. When the Hirshleifer effectdominates, the exchange chooses an incomplete set of financial contracts, andthe equilibrium price is partially revealing.

Market versus limit orders in an imperfectly competitive security

This paper analyzes the choice between limit and market orders in animperfectly competitive noisy rational expectations economy. There is a uniqueinsider, who takes into account the effect their trading has on prices. If theinsider behaves as a price taker, she will choose market orders if her privateinformation is very precise and she will choose limit orders otherwise. On thecontrary, if the insider recognizes and exploits her ability to affect themarket price, her optimal choice is to place limit orders whatever the precisionof her private information.