Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard(hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium isdetermined by the interaction of financial intermediaries.The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is thatintermediaries are restricted to trade non-exclusive contracts: theagents' contractual relationships with competing intermediaries cannot bemonitored (or are not contractible upon). We fully characterize equilibrium allocations and contracts. In thisset-up equilibrium allocations are clearly incentive constrainedinefficient. A robust property of equilibria with non-exclusivity isthat the contracts issued in equilibrium do not implement the optimalaction. Moreover we prove that, whenever equilibrium contracts doimplement the optimal action, intermediaries make positive profits andequilibrium allocations are third best inefficient (where the definitionof third best efficiency accounts for constraints which capture thenon-exclusivity of contracts).

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts

This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and theemployment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employmentcontracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows theeffects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Oncecalibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use moreintensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of thetotal employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We testand confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturingfirms with detailed information about the type of workers employedby the firms and about firm financing constraints.

Income taxation in a frictional labor market

A new model of wage dispersion is used to examine welfare aspects of income taxation. The model retains the dynamics of wage posting modelswhile exogenizing search e¤ort, therefore allowing more insight into policy issues. The results highlight effects that standard analyses do not take into account. The optimal income tax should depend on an incidenceeffect between workers and firms. This incidence effect arises from firmstrying to lower wages as much as possible. An employment tax proves, incertain cases, to be the best method to encourage labor force participation.

Protective or counter-productive? Labor market institutions and the effect of immigration on EU natives

We estimate the effect of immigrant flows on native employment in WesternEurope, and then ask whether the employment consequences of immigrationvary with institutions that affect labor market flexibility. Reducedflexibility may protect natives from immigrant competition in the nearterm, but our theoretical framework suggests that reduced flexibility islikely to increase the negative impact of immigration on equilibriumemployment. In models without interactions, OLS estimates for a panel ofEuropean countries in the 1980s and 1990s show small, mostly negativeimmigration effects. To reduce bias from the possible endogeneity ofimmigration flows, we use the fact that many immigrants arriving after1991 were refugees from the Balkan wars. An IV strategy based onvariation in the number of immigrants from former Yugoslavia generateslarger though mostly insignificant negative estimates. We then estimatemodels allowing interactions between the employment response toimmigration and institutional characteristics including business entrycosts. These results, limited to the sample of native men, generallysuggest that reduced flexibility increases the negative impact ofimmigration. Many of the estimated interaction terms are significant,and imply a significant negative effect on employment in countrieswith restrictive institutions.

Flexibility vs. rigidity: Does Spain have the worst of both worlds?

In this paper we study the structure of labor market flows in Spain and compare them with France and the US. We characterize a number of empirical regularities and stylized facts. One striking result is that the job finding rate is slightly higher than in France, while the jon loss rate is much higher, putting Spain half-way between France and the US. This suggests that while Spain has borne the full cost of its labor market reforms in terms of job precarity, the benefits in terms of job creation have been quite modest. We hypothesize that this has been due to the reform s credibility being imperfect, which leads toexpectation of reversal.

Declining labor force attachment and downward trends in unemployment and participation

The US labor market witnessed two apparently unrelated secular movements in thelast 30 years: a decline in unemployment between the early 1980s and the early 2000s,and a decline in participation since the early 2000s. Using CPS micro data and a stock-flow accounting framework, we show that a substantial, and hitherto unnoticed, factorbehind both trends is a decline in the share of nonparticipants who are at the margin ofparticipation. A lower share of marginal nonparticipants implies a lower unemploymentrate, because marginal nonparticipants enter the labor force mostly through unemployment,while other nonparticipants enter the labor force mostly through employment.

Labor market heterogeneity and the aggregate matching function

The matching function -a key building block in models of labor market frictions- impliesthat the job finding rate depends only on labor market tightness. We estimate such amatching function and find that the relation, although remarkably stable over 1967-2007,broke down spectacularly after 2007. We argue that labor market heterogeneities are notfully captured by the standard matching function, but that a generalized matching functionthat explicitly takes into account worker heterogeneity and market segmentation is fullyconsistent with the behavior of the job finding rate. The standard matching function canbreak down when, as in the Great Recession, the average characteristics of the unemployedchange too much, or when dispersion in labor market conditions -the extent to which somelabor markets fare worse than others- increases too much.

Factor shares, the price markup, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor

[spa] La participación del trabajo en la renta nacional es constante bajo los supuestos de una función de producción Cobb-Douglas y competencia perfecta. En este artículo se relajan estos supuestos y se investiga si el comportamiento no constante de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional se explica por (i) una elasticidad de sustitución entre capital y trabajo no unitaria y (ii) competencia no perfecta en el mercado de producto. Nos centramos en España y los U.S. y estimamos una función de producción con elasticidad de sustitución constante y competencia imperfecta en el mercado de producto. El grado de competencia imperfecta se mide a través del cálculo del price markup basado en laaproximación dual. Mostramos que la elasticidad de sustitución es mayor que uno en España y menor que uno en los US. También mostramos que el price markup aleja la elasticidad de sustitución de uno, lo aumenta en España, lo reduce en los U.S. Estos resultados se utilizan para explicar la senda decreciente de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional, común a ambas economías, y sus contrastadas sendas de capital.

Graduate labor mismatch in Central and Eastern Europe

[cat] Utilitzant l’enquesta REFLEX/HEGESCO, aquest article explora la probabilitat de desajustament entre educació i treball a l’Europa de l’Est i Central. Classifiquem els països en dos grups segons la transparència dels títols educatius al mercat de treball. Polònia, la República Txeca i Eslovènia formen el grup amb més transparència, i Hongria, Lituània i Estònia formen el grup amb més opacitat. Analitzem tres tipus de desajustaments: el vertical (infra‐, sobre‐educació), l’horitzontal (desajustament del camp d’estudi) i el desajust en habilitats. Focalitzem l’anàlisi en l’efecte dels camps d’estudi i les competències dels individus en el desajustament del mercat laboral en aquests països. Els resultats mostren importants diferències entre els dos grups de països estudiats.

Inter-firm labor mobility and knowledge diffusion: a theoretical approach

[cat] Analitzem una economia amb dues característiques principals: la mobilitat dels treballadors implica transferència de coneixement i la productivitat de l’empresa augmenta amb l’intercanvi de coneixement. Cada empresa desenvolupa un tipus de coneixement que serà trasmès a la resta de la indústria mitjançant la mobilitat de treballadors. Estudiem dues estructures de mercat laboral i utilitzant un anàlisi comparatiu derivem les implicacions del model. Els resultats revelen com la mobilitat de treballadors depèn en la varietat i nivell del coneixement, la presència de costos de mobilitat, les institucions, la capacitat d’absorvir coneixement per part de les empreses i la mida de la indústria. Els resultats no depenen de l’estructura del mercat laboral.

On the industry experience premium and labor mobility

[cat] Hi ha evidència que l'experiència es remunera diferentment segons la indústria. Proposem un model teòric que explica aquestes diferències. Suposem que la mobilitat de treballadors aporta coneixement extern a l'empresa i això augmenta la seva productivitat. Els resultats mostren que l'experiència és millor remunerada en les indústries amb costos de mobilitat baixos, amb molt aprenentatge (learning-by-doing) i alt nivell tecnològic. A més, trobem una relació en forma de U entre la remuneració de l'experiència i el nivell d'absorció de coneixement extern, la substitutibilitat entre diferents tipus de treballadors i la varietat de coneixement dins la indústria. Els resultats són consistents amb l'evidència que les indústries intensives en I and D remuneren millor l'experiència.

Union power, minimum wage legislation endogenous labor supplies and production

The objective of this work is to study the impact of the unions' bargaining power on production and wages. We present a model where a competitive final good is produced through two substitutable intermediate goods, one produced by unskilled labor and the other by skilled labor. Potential workers decide at their cost to become skilled or unskilled and, thus, labor supplies are determined endogenously. We find that the reallocation of the labor supplies due to changes in the unskilled (or skilled) unions¿ bargaining power may have a positive impact on the final goods production. At the same time, total labor earnings increase with the unskilled unions¿ bargaining power if the final goods production increases too. We also show that the minimum wage legislation has efects similar to an increase in the bargaining power of the unskilled unions.

Factor shares, the price markup, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor

[spa] La participación del trabajo en la renta nacional es constante bajo los supuestos de una función de producción Cobb-Douglas y competencia perfecta. En este artículo se relajan estos supuestos y se investiga si el comportamiento no constante de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional se explica por (i) una elasticidad de sustitución entre capital y trabajo no unitaria y (ii) competencia no perfecta en el mercado de producto. Nos centramos en España y los U.S. y estimamos una función de producción con elasticidad de sustitución constante y competencia imperfecta en el mercado de producto. El grado de competencia imperfecta se mide a través del cálculo del price markup basado en laaproximación dual. Mostramos que la elasticidad de sustitución es mayor que uno en España y menor que uno en los US. También mostramos que el price markup aleja la elasticidad de sustitución de uno, lo aumenta en España, lo reduce en los U.S. Estos resultados se utilizan para explicar la senda decreciente de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional, común a ambas economías, y sus contrastadas sendas de capital.

Graduate labor mismatch in Central and Eastern Europe

[cat] Utilitzant l’enquesta REFLEX/HEGESCO, aquest article explora la probabilitat de desajustament entre educació i treball a l’Europa de l’Est i Central. Classifiquem els països en dos grups segons la transparència dels títols educatius al mercat de treball. Polònia, la República Txeca i Eslovènia formen el grup amb més transparència, i Hongria, Lituània i Estònia formen el grup amb més opacitat. Analitzem tres tipus de desajustaments: el vertical (infra‐, sobre‐educació), l’horitzontal (desajustament del camp d’estudi) i el desajust en habilitats. Focalitzem l’anàlisi en l’efecte dels camps d’estudi i les competències dels individus en el desajustament del mercat laboral en aquests països. Els resultats mostren importants diferències entre els dos grups de països estudiats.