The Impact of EU Membership on the Economic Governance of Spain

[spa] España no fue admitida en la Comunidad Económica Europea durante el régimen de Franco por razones políticas. Integrarse a la Comunidad Europea en enero de 1986 fue el último peldaño hacia la consolidación definitiva de la democracia en España y de la apertura de su economía.. Los resultados de los veinticinco años como miembro de la UE se han traducido en un impulso sin precedentes de modernización y progreso. España adoptó el “Acervo Comunitario” y recibió considerables beneficios de su integración a la Comunidad, eliminando barreras, siguiendo las políticas comunes, recibiendo fondos europeos y adoptando la moneda europea común. A partir de un nivel del 60% del promedio europeo de renta per capita en 1986, el nivel actual –incluso con la crisis que estalló en 2008- se sitúa en torno al 105 por ciento. Los últimos tres años han sido diferentes y difíciles como consecuencia de la severa crisis económica y financiera.En este contexto este trabajo analiza como los sucesivos gobiernos de España han organizado la gobernanza económica para adaptarla a los cambios cuantitativos y cualitativos que se han ido produciendo en la integración europea.

Urban transport governance reform in Barcelona

The unusual mixed public-private structure of the urban bus market in the metropolitan area of Barcelona provides an interesting context in which to analyze the management challenges and opportunities of the partial privatization of public services. Initiatives used by the public regulator to promote competition for contracts, such as short term concessions to private contractors and the removal of entry barriers, have considerable potential for improving efficiency and quality. The growth in the share of routes managed by private firms in recent years shows that privatization is a credible threat that may well stimulate improved performance among public managers. The type of reform implemented in Barcelona is of interest to all metropolitan areas large enough to operate under constant returns to scale regimes, and suitable for potential concessions of routes in segregated areas inside the metropolitan area, so as not to miss out on the benefits of economies of density.

Risk Management or Uncertainty Governance? The Challenge of an Interdiscplinary Approach

Peer-reviewed

Prices versus exams as strategic instruments for competing universities

In this paper we investigate the optimal choice of prices and/or exams by universities in the presence of credit constraints. We first compare the optimal behavior of a public, welfare maximizing, monopoly and a private, profit maximizing, monopoly. Then we model competition between a public and a private institution and investigate the new role of exams/prices in this environment. We find that, under certain circumstances, the public university may have an interest to raise tuition fees from minimum levels if it cares for global welfare. This will be the case provided that (i) the private institution has higher quality and uses only prices to select applicants, or (ii) the private institution has lower quality and uses also exams to select students. When this is the case, there are efficiency grounds for raising public prices

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely office motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advan- tage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a different extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.