Heterogeneous life-cycle profiles, income risk and consumption inequality

Was the increase in income inequality in the US due to permanent shocks or merely to an increase in the variance of transitory shocks? The implications for consumption and welfare depend crucially on the answer to this question. We use CEX repeated cross-section data on consumption and income to decompose idiosyncratic changes in income into predictable life-cycle changes, transitory and permanent shocks and estimate the contribution of each to total inequality. Our model fits the joint evolution of consumption and income inequality well and delivers two main results. First, we find that permanent changes in income explain all of the increase in inequality in the 1980s and 90s. Second, we reconcile this finding with the fact that consumption inequality did not increase much over this period. Our results support the view that many permanent changes in income are predictable for consumers, even if they look unpredictable to the econometrician, consistent withmodels of heterogeneous income profiles.

The long term effects of legalizing divorce on children

We estimate the effect of divorce legalization on the long-term well-being ofchildren. Our identification strategy relies on exploiting the different timing of divorcelegalization across European countries. Using European Community Household Paneldata, we compare the adult outcomes of cohorts who were raised in an environmentwhere divorce was banned with cohorts raised after divorce was legalized in the samecountry. We also have control countries where all cohorts were exposed (or notexposed) to divorce as children, thus leading to a difference-in-differences approach. Wefind that women who grew up under legal divorce have lower earnings and income aswell as worse health as adults compared with women who grew up under illegal divorce.These effects are not found for men. We find no effects of divorce legalization onchildren s family formation or dissolution patterns.

Is altruism important for understanding the long-run effects of social security?

This paper quantifies the effects of social security on capital accumulation and wealth distribution in a life cycle framework with altruistic individuals. The main findings of this paper are that the current U.S. social security system has a significant impact on capital accumulation and wealth distribution. I find that social security crowds out 8\% of the capital stock of an economy without social security. This effect is driven by the distortions of labor supply due to the taxation of labor income rather than by the intergenerational redistribution of income imposed by the social security system. In contrast to previous analysis of social security, I found that social security does not affect the savings rate of the economy. Another interesting finding is that even though the current U.S. social security system is progressive in its benefits, it may lead to a more disperse distribution of wealth.

Credible redistributive policies and migration across US States

Does worker mobility undermine governments ability to redistribute income? Thispaper analyzes the experience of US states in the recent decades. We build a tractablemodel where both migration decisions and redistribution policies are endogenous. Wecalibrate the model to match skill premium and worker productivity at the state level,as well as the size and skill composition of migration flows. The calibrated modelis able to reproduce the large changes in skill composition as well as key qualitativerelationships of labor flows and redistribution policies observed in the data. Our resultssuggest that regional di¤erences in labor productivity are an important determinantof interstate migration. We use the calibrated model to compare the cross-section ofredistributive policies with and without worker mobility. The main result of the paperis that interstate migration has induced substantial convergence in tax rates acrossUS states, but no race to the bottom. Skill-biased in-migration has reduced the skillpremium and the need for tax-based redistribution in the states that would have hadthe highest tax rates in the absence of mobility.

Education, growth and income inequality

Estimates of the e¤ect of education on GDP (the social return to education)have been hard to reconcile with micro evidence on the private return. We present a simple explanation that combines two ideas: imperfect substitution between worker types and endogenous skill biased technological progress. When types of workers are imperfect substitutes, the supply of human capital is negatively related to its return, and a higher education level compresses wage di¤erentials. We use cross-country panel data on income inequality to estimate the private return and GDP data to estimate the social return. The results show that the private return falls by 2 percentage points when the average education level increases by a year, which is consistent with Katz and Murphy's [1992] estimate of the elasticity of substitution between worker types. We find no evidence for dynamics in the private return, and certainly not for a reversal of the negative e¤ect as described in Acemoglu [2002]. The short run social return equals the private return.

Income maintenance programs and multidimensional screening

This paper examines properties of optimal poverty assistance programs under different informational environments using an income maintenanceframework. To that end, we make both the income generating ability andthe disutility of labor of individuals unobservable, and compare theresulting benefit schedules with those of programs found in the UnitedStates since Welfare Reform (1996). We find that optimal programs closelyresemble a Negative Income Tax with a Benefit Reduction rate that dependson the distribution of population characteristics. A policy of workfare(unpaid public sector work) is inefficient when disutility of labor isunobservable, but minimum work requirements (for paid work) may be usedin that same environment. The distortions to work incentives and thepresence of minimum work requirements depend on the observability andrelative importance of the population's characteristics.

The labor market effects of payroll taxes in a middle-income country: Evidence from Colombia

We use a panel of manufacturing plants from Colombia to analyze how the risein payroll tax rates over the 1980 s and 1990 s affected the labor market.Our estimates indicate that formal wages fall by between 1.4% and 2.3% as aresult of a 10% rise in payroll taxes. This 'less-than-full-shifting' islikely to be the result of weak linkages between benefits and taxes and thepresence of downward wage rigidities induced by a binding minimum wage inColombia. Because the costs of taxation are only partly shifted fromemployers to employees, employment should also fall. Our results indicatethat a 10% increase in payroll taxes lowered formal employment by between4% and 5%. In addition, we find less shifting and larger disemploymenteffects for production than non-production workers. These results suggestthat policies aimed at boosting the relative demand of low-skill workers byreducing social security taxes on those with low earnings may be effectivein a country like Colombia, especially if tax cuts are targeted to indirectbenefits.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the familywith the evidence on intervivos transfers in the US? This paper expandsthe altruism model by introducing e ?ort of the child and by relaxingthe assumption of perfect information of the parent about the labormarket opportunities of the child. First, I solve and simulate a modelof altruism under imperfect information. Second, I use cross-sectionaldata to test a prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especiallyresponsive to the income variations of children who are very attached tothe labor market? The results suggest that imperfect information accountsfor several patterns of intergenerational transfers in the US.

The marginal propensity to spend on adult children

We examine how much of an extra dollar of parental lifetime resources willultimately be passed on to adult children in the form of inter vivostransfers and bequests. We infer bequests from the stock of wealth late inlife. We use mortality rates and age specific estimates of the response oftransfers and wealth to permanent income to compute the expected presentdiscounted values of these responses to permanent income. Our estimatesimply parents pass on between 2 and 3 cents out of an extra dollar ofexpected lifetime resources in bequests and about 2 cents in transfers.The estimates increase with parental income and are smaller for nonwhites.They imply that about 15 percent of the effect of parental income onlifetime resources of adult children is through transfers and bequestsand about 85 percent is through the intergenerational correlation inearnings, although these estimates are sensitive to assumptions about theintergenerational earnings correlation, taxes, and the number of children.We compare our estimates to the implications of alternative computablebenchmark models of savings behavior in order to assess the likelyimportance of intended bequests for the wealth/income relationship.

Does risk aversion or attraction depend on income? An experiment

Does risk attitude (aversion or attraction) vary with the level of the income at risk? About half of our subjects chose to insure all levels, whereas another half chose instead not to insure low levels, but to insure high levels.

Income taxation in a frictional labor market

A new model of wage dispersion is used to examine welfare aspects of income taxation. The model retains the dynamics of wage posting modelswhile exogenizing search e¤ort, therefore allowing more insight into policy issues. The results highlight effects that standard analyses do not take into account. The optimal income tax should depend on an incidenceeffect between workers and firms. This incidence effect arises from firmstrying to lower wages as much as possible. An employment tax proves, incertain cases, to be the best method to encourage labor force participation.

Intergenerational justice when future worlds are uncertain

Let there be a positive (exogenous) probability that, at each date, the human species will disappear.We postulate an Ethical Observer (EO) who maximizes intertemporal welfare under thisuncertainty, with expected-utility preferences. Various social welfare criteria entail alternativevon Neumann- Morgenstern utility functions for the EO: utilitarian, Rawlsian, and an extensionof the latter that corrects for the size of population. Our analysis covers, first, a cake-eating economy(without production), where the utilitarian and Rawlsian recommend the same allocation.Second, a productive economy with education and capital, where it turns out that the recommendationsof the two EOs are in general different. But when the utilitarian program diverges, thenwe prove it is optimal for the extended Rawlsian to ignore the uncertainty concerning the possibledisappearance of the human species in the future. We conclude by discussing the implicationsfor intergenerational welfare maximization in the presence of global warming.

Parental altruism under imperfect information: Theory and evidence

Can we reconcile the predictions of the altruism model of the family withthe evidence on parental monetary transfers in the US? This paper providesa new assessment of this question. I expand the altruism model by introducingeffort of the child and by relaxing the assumption of perfect informationof the parent about the labor market opportunities of the child. First,I solve and simulate a model of altruism and labor supply under imperfectinformation. Second, I use cross-sectional data to test the following prediction of the model: Are parental transfers especially responsive tothe income variations of children who are very attached to the labor market? The results of the analysis suggest that imperfect informationaccounts for many of the patterns of intergenerational transfers in theUS.

Foreign direct investments and spillovers through workers' mobility

We analyze a model where a multinational firm can use its superiortechnology in a foreign subsidiary only after appropriate trainingof local managers. Technological spillovers from foreign directinvestment arise when such managers are later hired by a localfirm. Benefits for the host economy may also take the form of therent that trained managers receive by the foreign affiliate toprevent them from moving to local competitors. We study conditionsunder which technological spillovers occur. We also show that undercertain circumstances the multinational firm might find it optimalto resort to export instead of foreign direct investment, to avoiddissipation of its intangible assets.

Life-time redistribution effects of the Spanish public pension system

The paper analyses the inter and intragenerational redistribution effects ofthe public pensions system in Spain. This is achieved by first comparing the expected present value of life-time income transfers (PVT) and internalrates of return (IRR) of different population cohorts. Secondly, we study the intragenerational aspects of the Spanish public pensions by calculating PVTs the IRRs for workers of different categories, grouped by earnings, gender and marital status.The results obtained show the nature of the important intergenerational effects of the Social Security System in Spain. The oldest 1935 cohort clearlybenefits in relation to the youngest 1965 cohort. This is basically due to thegap between current wages and the contribution bases established in the 60s and 70s in Spain during the early stages of the Social Security System, and to the worsening shortfall in Social Security funding, combined with the longer of life expectancy.In addition, intragenerational effects exist by income levels. For contributors who pay between the minimum and the maximum allowable contribution bases, net transfers and rates of return are higher in actuarial terms for high incomecontributors. The social security `dealï is again more profitable for highincome individuals since they contribute at the maximum basis, with respect tolow income contributors at the minimum basis. This is due to the late entry and a higher survival rate for high income contributors.The system tends to favour women, given that they generally live longer than men and this factor is only partially offset by their lower wages. Married males, given the fact that they have longer life expectancy and leave a pension to their spouse, obtain higher present net transfers too than do single contributors.We close the paper with some comments on the slight impact and moderate effects of proposals for Social Security reform and on how these may change the previously observed redistribution effects.