The Three Horsemen of Growth: Plague, War and Urbanization in Early Modern Europe

How did Europe overtake China? We construct a simple Malthusian model with two sectors, and use it to explain how European per capita incomes and urbanization rates could surge ahead of Chinese ones. That living standards could exceed subsistence levels at all in a Malthusian setting should be surprising. Rising fertility and falling mortality ought to have reversed any gains. We show that productivity growth in Europe can only explain a small fraction of rising living standards. Population dynamics - changes of the birth and death schedules - were far more important drivers of the longrun Malthusian equilibrium. The Black Death raised wages substantially, creating important knock-on effects. Because of Engel's Law, demand for urban products increased, raising urban wages and attracting migrants from rural areas. European cities were unhealthy, especially compared to Far Eastern ones. Urbanization pushed up aggregate death rates. This effect was reinforced by more frequent wars (fed by city wealth) and disease spread by trade. Thus, higher wages themselves reduced population pressure. Without technological change, our model can account for the sharp rise in European urbanization as well as permanently higher per capita incomes. We complement our calibration exercise with a detailed analysis of intra-European growth in the early modern period. Using a panel of European states in the period 1300-1700, we show that war frequency can explain a good share of the divergent fortunes within Europe.

The drift of public spending towards the elderly: A generational analysis of the trend of public policies in Spain

The tendency for public welfare spending to be increasingly aimed at the elderly has been pointed out for the US and other developed countries. While population ageing is a common trend, it is not obvious why the shift in spending exceeds the trend in ageing, or why per capita spending on the elderly increases.We show that this is the case in Spain, identify the losers from this development, discuss the policies that underlie this trend, and propose adjustments based on Musgrave s fixed proportions rule as an inter-generationally fair distribution.

The impact of "early" nineteenth-century globalization on foreign trade in the Southern Cone: A study of British trade statistics

This paper deals with the impact of "early" nineteenth-century globalization (c.1815-1860) on foreign trade in the Southern Cone (SC). Most of the evidence is drawn from bilateral trades between Britain and the SC, at a time when Britain was the main commercial partner of the new republics. The main conclusion drawn is that early globalization had a positive impact on foreign trade in the SC, and this was due to: improvements in the SC's terms of trade during this period; the SC's per capita consumption of textiles (the main manufacture traded on world markets at that time) increased substantially during this period, at a time when clothing was one of the main items of SC household budgets; British merchants brought with them capital, shipping, insurance, and also facilitated the formation of vast global networks, which further promoted the SC's exports to a wider range of outlets.

Banks and development: Jewish communities in the Italian Renaissance and current economic performance

Are differences in local banking development long-lasting? Do they affect long-term economic performance?I answer these questions by relying on an historical development that occurred in Italian cities during the 15thcentury. A sudden change in the Catholic doctrine had driven the Jews toward money lending. Cities thatwere hosting Jewish communities developed complex banking institutions for two reasons: first, the Jews werethe only people in Italy who were allowed to lend for a profit and, second, the Franciscan reaction to Jewishusury led to the creation of charity lending institutions, the Monti di Pietà, that have survived until today andhave become the basis of the Italian banking system. Using Jewish demography in 1500 as an instrument, Iprovide evidence of (1) an extraordinary persistence in the level of banking development across Italian cities (2)large effects of current local banking development on per-capita income. Additional firm-level analyses suggestthat well-functioning local banks exert large effects on aggregate productivity by reallocating resources towardmore efficient firms. I exploit the expulsion of the Jews from the Spanish territories in Italy in 1541 to arguethat my results are not driven by omitted institutional, cultural and geographical characteristics. In particular,I show that, in Central Italy, the difference in current income between cities that hosted Jewish communitiesand cities that did not exists only in those regions that were not Spanish territories in the 16th century.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

The macroeconomic effects of German unification: Real adjustments and the welfare state

We study the effects of German unification in a model with capital accumulation, skill differences and a welfare state. We argue that this event is similar to a mass migration of low-skilled agents holding no capital into a foreign country. Absent a welfare state, we observe an investment boom, depressed output and employment conditions. Capital owners and high-skilled agents are willing to give up to 4% of per-capita consumption to favor unification. When a welfare state exists the investment boom disappears and the recession is prolonged. Now, with unification, capital owners and high-skilled agents lose 4% of per-capita consumption.

It's still 2%: evidence on convergence from 116 years of the US States panel data

A new debate over the speed of convergence in per capita income across economies is going on. Cross sectional estimates support the idea of slow convergence of about two percent per year. Panel data estimates support the idea of fast convergence of five, ten or even twenty percent per year. This paper shows that, if you ``do it right'', even the panel data estimation method yields the result of slow convergence of about two percent per year.

Further evidence on the statistical properties of real GNP

The well-known lack of power of unit root tests has often been attributed to the shortlength of macroeconomic variables and also to DGP s that depart from the I(1)-I(0)alternatives. This paper shows that by using long spans of annual real GNP and GNPper capita (133 years) high power can be achieved, leading to the rejection of both theunit root and the trend-stationary hypothesis. This suggests that possibly neither modelprovides a good characterization of these data. Next, more flexible representations areconsidered, namely, processes containing structural breaks (SB) and fractional ordersof integration (FI). Economic justification for the presence of these features in GNP isprovided. It is shown that the latter models (FI and SB) are in general preferred to theARIMA (I(1) or I(0)) ones. As a novelty in this literature, new techniques are appliedto discriminate between FI and SB models. It turns out that the FI specification ispreferred, implying that GNP and GNP per capita are non-stationary, highly persistentbut mean-reverting series. Finally, it is shown that the results are robust when breaksin the deterministic component are allowed for in the FI model. Some macroeconomicimplications of these findings are also discussed.

Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicalparties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our researchdesign exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around severalpopulation cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentagepoints in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency modelof electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studiedhere had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expectedelectoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued byvoters.

Financing local development: Quasi-experimental evidence from municipalities in Brazil, 1980-1991

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of additional unrestrictedgrant financing on local public spending, public service provision, schooling, literacy, andincome at the community (municipio) level in Brazil. Additional transfers increased local publicspending per capita by about 20% with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or otherrevenue sources. The additional local spending increased schooling per capita by about 7% andliteracy rates by about 4 percentage points. The implied marginal cost of schooling -accountingfor corruption and other leakages- amounts to about US$ 126, which turns out to be similar tothe average cost of schooling in Brazil in the early 1980s. In line with the effect on human capital,the poverty rate was reduced by about 4 percentage points, while income per capita gains werepositive but not statistically significant. Results also suggest that additional public spending hadstronger effects on schooling and literacy in less developed parts of Brazil, while poverty reductionwas evenly spread across the country.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.

Human capital distribution, growth and convergence

This paper studies the dynamic relationship between distribution and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations model with accumulation of human and physical capital. It is shown how human capital can determine a relationship between per capita growth rates and inequality in the distribution of income. Family background effects and spillovers in the transmission of human capital generate a dynamics in which aggregate variables depend not only on the stock, but also on the distribution of human capital. The evolution of this distribution over time is then characterized under different assumptions on private returns and the form of the externality in the technology for humancapital. Conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of a constant growth equilibrium with a stationary distribution are derived. Increasing returns, idiosyncratic abilities and the possibility of poverty traps are explicitely characterized in a closed form solution of the equilibrium dynamics, showing the role played by technology and preferences parameters.

Protectionist but globalised? Latin American custom duties and trade during the pre-1914 belle époque

While it is true that Latin American republics had no rival on maximising revenues from custom collection during the belle époque, this paper shows that Latin American countries were also generous importers, only behind the larger commercial countries of Western Europe in terms of imports per capita. Latin American citizens were much more linked to international trade than citizens of most regions of the world. Their relation to the world economy was tighter both via their imports and their exports relative to their population and income levels. This paper comes to show that there is no contradiction between the high custom collection by the Latin American republics and their high level of interaction with the global economy in the pre-1914 belle époque, although large country differences can be observed when descending from the regional to the national level.

The colonial origins of Civil War

The dominant hypothesis in the literature that studies conflict is that poverty is the main cause of civil wars. We instead analyze the effect of institutions on civil war, controlling for income per capita. In our set up, institutions are endogenous and colonial origins affect civil wars through their legacy on institutions. Our results indicate that institutions, proxied by the protection of property rights, rule of law and the efficiency of the legal system, are a fundamental cause of civil war. In particular, an improvement in institutions from the median value in the sample to the 75th percentile is associated with a 38 percentage points reduction in the incidence of civil wars. Moreover, once institutions are included as explaining civil wars, income does not have any effect on civil war, either directly or indirectly.

The poor stay poor: Non-convergence across countries and regions

We study the issue of income convergence across countries and regions witha Bayesian estimator which allows us to use information in an efficient andflexible way. We argue that the very slow convergence rates to a commonlevel of per-capita income found, e.g., by Barro and Xavier Sala-i-Martin,is due to a 'fixed effect bias' that their cross-sectional analysisintroduces in the results. Our approach permits the estimation of differentconvergence rates to different steady states for each cross sectional unit.When this diversity is allowed, we find that convergence of each unit to(its own) steady state income level is much faster than previously estimatedbut that cross sectional differences persist: inequalities will only bereduced by a small amount by the passage of time. The cross countrydistribution of the steady state is largely explained by the cross countrydistribution of initial conditions.