Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

One hundred issues of Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad (REFC)-insights into trends in the Spanish academic community

From the year of its foundation, until the foundation of Revista deContabilidad in 1997, REFC has been the only referred accounting journalin Spain. Published by the Spanish Association for Accounting and BusinessAdministration (AECA), this journal is at the heart of the emergence ofa distinctly Spanish academic accounting community.Our study is based on:1. An analysis of 100 issues of REFC covering the period from 1985 to 1999.2. A questionnaire to Spanish accounting academics on their perceptionsand experience of the journal.Key points emerging from this study include:a) A move away from interest in accounting concepts and rules, as wellas accounting history, and towards positive accounting theory, the impactof accounting information on capital markets, and financial analysis.b) The emergence of a small number of universities as the driving forcein Spanish accounting research.c) Spanish academics rate REFC highly compared to other Spanish journalsfor publication status, as a support for research, and as a support forteaching. A number of English language journals are rated more highly forboth publication status and as a support for teaching.

Extreme times in financial markets.

We apply the theory of continuous time random walks (CTRWs) to study some aspects involving extreme events in financial time series. We focus our attention on the mean exit time (MET). We derive a general equation for this average and compare it with empirical results coming from high-frequency data of the U.S. dollar and Deutsche mark futures market. The empirical MET follows a quadratic law in the return length interval which is consistent with the CTRW formalism.

Ex-Dividend Day Returns when Dividend and Capital Gains are Taxed at the Same Rate

Due to the overwhelming international evidence that stock prices drop by less than the dividend paid on ex-dividend days, the ex-dividend day anomaly is considered a stylized fact. Two main approaches have emerged to explain this empirical regularity: the tax-clientele hypothesis and the microstructure of financial markets. Although the most widely accepted explanation for this fact relies on taxes, the ex-dividend day anomaly has been reported even in countries where neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed. The 2006 tax reform in Spain established the same tax rate for dividends and capital gains. This paper investigates stock returns on ex-dividend days in the Spanish stock market after the 2006 tax reform using a random coefficient model. Contrary to previous research, we do not observe an ex-dividend day anomaly. Unlike previous investigations, which are mostly concerned with suggesting explanations as to why this anomaly has occurred, we are in the somewhat strange position of discussing why this anomaly has not occurred. Our findings are robust across companies and stock dividend yields, thus supporting a tax--based explanation for the ex-dividend day anomaly.