154 resultados para Firm Processes
Resumo:
Low corporate taxes can help attract new firms. This is the main mechanism underpinning the standard 'race-to-the-bottom'view of tax competition. A recent theoretical literature has qualified this view by formalizing the argument that agglomeration forces can reduce firms' sensitivity to tax differentials across locations. We test this proposition using data on firm startups across Swiss municipalities. We find that, on average, high corporate income taxes do deter new firms, but that this relationship is significantly weaker in the most spatially concentrated sectors. Location choices of firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the twentieth percentile of the sample distribution are estimated to be twice as responsive to a given difference in local corporate tax burdens as firms in sectors with an agglomeration intensity at the eightieth percentile. Hence, our analysis confirms the theoretical prediction: agglomeration economies can neutralize the impact of tax differentials on firms' location choices.
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The present paper proposes a model for the persistence of abnormal returnsboth at firm and industry levels, when longitudinal data for the profitsof firms classiffied as industries are available. The model produces a two-way variance decomposition of abnormal returns: (a) at firm versus industrylevels, and (b) for permanent versus transitory components. This variancedecomposition supplies information on the relative importance of thefundamental components of abnormal returns that have been discussed in theliterature. The model is applied to a Spanish sample of firms, obtainingresults such as: (a) there are significant and permanent differences betweenprofit rates both at industry and firm levels; (b) variation of abnormal returnsat firm level is greater than at industry level; and (c) firm and industry levelsdo not differ significantly regarding rates of convergence of abnormal returns.
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This paper studies the effect of changes in foreign competition on the structureof compensation and incentives of U.S. executives. We measure foreign competitionas import penetration and use tariffs and exchange rates as instrumental variables toestimate its causal effect on pay. We find that higher foreign competition leads tomore incentive provision in a variety of ways. First, it increases the sensitivity of payto performance. Second, it increases whithin-firm pay differentials between executivelevels, with CEOs typically experiencing the largest wage increases, partly becausethey receive the steepest incentive contracts. Finally, higher foreign competition is alsoassociated with a higher demand for talent. These results indicate that increased foreigncompetition can explain some of the recent trends in compensation structures.
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We consider a dynamic multifactor model of investment with financing imperfections,adjustment costs and fixed and variable capital. We use the model to derive a test offinancing constraints based on a reduced form variable capital equation. Simulation resultsshow that this test correctly identifies financially constrained firms even when the estimationof firms investment opportunities is very noisy. In addition, the test is well specified inthe presence of both concave and convex adjustment costs of fixed capital. We confirmempirically the validity of this test on a sample of small Italian manufacturing companies.
Resumo:
According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest raterules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.
Resumo:
We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.
Resumo:
We study the existence of moments and the tail behaviour of the densitiesof storage processes. We give sufficient conditions for existence andnon-existence of moments using the integrability conditions ofsubmultiplicative functions with respect to Lévy measures. Then, we studythe asymptotical behavior of the tails of these processes using the concaveor convex envelope of the release rate function.
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In analyzing the distinctive contribution of foreign subsidiaries anddomestic firms to productivity growth in aggregate Belgian manufacturing,this paper shows that foreign ownership is an important source of firmheterogeneity affecting productivity dynamics. Foreign firms havecontributed disproportionately large to aggregate productivity growth,but more importantly reallocation processes differ significantly betweenthe groups of foreign subsidiaries and domestic firms.
Resumo:
Registering originative business contracts allows entrepreneurs and creditors to choose, andcourts to enforce market-friendly contract rules that protect innocent third parties whenadjudicating disputes on subsequent contracts. This reduces information asymmetry for thirdparties, which enhances impersonal trade. It does so without seriously weakening property rights,because it is rightholders who choose or activate the legal rules and can, therefore, minimize thecost of any possible weakening. Registries are essential not only to make the chosen rules publicbut to ensure rightholders commitment and avoid rule-gaming, because independent registriesmake rightholders choices verifiable by courts. The theory is supported by comparative andhistorical analyses.
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Adversarial relationships have long dominated business relationships,but Supply Chain Management (SCM) entails a new perspective. SCM requiresa movement away from arms-length relationships toward partnership stylerelations. SCM involves integration, co-ordination and collaborationacross organisations and throughout the supply chain. It means that SCMrequires internal (intraorganisational) and external (interorganisational)integration. This paper analyses the relationship between internal andexternal integration processes, their effect on firms performance andtheir contribution to the achievement of a competitive advantage.Performance improvements are analysed through costs, stock out and leadtime reductions. And, the achievement of a better competitive positionis measured by comparing the firm s performance with its competitors performance. To analyse this, an empirical study has been conducted inthe Spanish grocery sector.
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We set up a dynamic model of firm investment in which liquidity constraintsenter explicity into the firm's maximization problem. The optimal policyrules are incorporated into a maximum likelihood procedure which estimatesthe structural parameters of the model. Investment is positively related tothe firm's internal financial position when the firm is relatively poor. This relationship disappears for wealthy firms, which can reach theirdesired level of investment. Borrowing is an increasing function of financial position for poor firms. This relationship is reversed as a firm's financial position improves, and large firms hold little debt.Liquidity constrained firms may be unused credits lines and the capacity toinvest further if they desire. However the fear that liquidity constraintswill become binding in the future induces them to invest only when internalresources increase.We estimate the structural parameters of the model and use them to quantifythe importance of liquidity constraints on firms' investment. We find thatliquidity constraints matter significantly for the investment decisions of firms. If firms can finance investment by issuing fresh equity, rather than with internal funds or debt, average capital stock is almost 35% higher overa period of 20 years. Transitory shocks to internal funds have a sustained effect on the capital stock. This effect lasts for several periods and ismore persistent for small firms than for large firms. A 10% negative shock to firm fundamentals reduces the capital stock of firms which face liquidityconstraints by almost 8% over a period as opposed to only 3.5% for firms which do not face these constraints.
Resumo:
A new parametric minimum distance time-domain estimator for ARFIMA processes is introduced in this paper. The proposed estimator minimizes the sum of squared correlations of residuals obtained after filtering a series through ARFIMA parameters. The estimator iseasy to compute and is consistent and asymptotically normally distributed for fractionallyintegrated (FI) processes with an integration order d strictly greater than -0.75. Therefore, it can be applied to both stationary and non-stationary processes. Deterministic components are also allowed in the DGP. Furthermore, as a by-product, the estimation procedure provides an immediate check on the adequacy of the specified model. This is so because the criterion function, when evaluated at the estimated values, coincides with the Box-Pierce goodness of fit statistic. Empirical applications and Monte-Carlo simulations supporting the analytical results and showing the good performance of the estimator in finite samples are also provided.
Resumo:
We model firm-owned capital in a stochastic dynamic New-Keynesian generalequilibrium model à la Calvo. We find that this structure impliesequilibrium dynamics which are quantitatively di¤erent from the onesassociated with a benchmark case where households accumulate capital andrent it to firms. Our findings therefore stress the importance ofmodeling an investment decision at the firm level in addition to ameaningful price setting decision. Along the way we argue that the problemof modeling firm-owned capital with Calvo price-setting has not been solvedin a correct way in the previous literature.
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This paper studies how firms make layoff decisions in the presence of adverse shocks. In this uncertain environment, workers' expectations about their job security affect their on-the-job performance. This productivity effect on job insecurity forces firms to strike a balance between laying off redundant workers and maintaining survivors' commitment when deciding on the amount and timing of downsizing. This framework offers an explanation of conservative employment practices (such as zero or reduced layoffs) based on firms having private information about their future profits. High retention rates and wages can signal that the firm has a bright future, boosting workers' confidence. Moreover, the model provides clear predictions about when waves of downsizing will occur as opposed to one-time massive cuts.
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We analyze the implications of a market imperfection related to the inability to establish intellectual property rights, that we label {\it unverifiable communication}. Employees are able to collude with external parties selling ``knowledge capital'' of the firm. The firm organizer engages in strategic interaction simultaneously with employees and competitors, as she introduces endogenous transaction costs in the market for information between those agents. Incentive schemes and communication costs are the key strategic variables used by the firm to induce frictions in collusive markets. Unverifiable communication introduces severe allocative distortions, both at internal product development and at intended sale of information (technology transfer). We derive implications of the model for observable decisions like characteristics of the employment relationship (full employment, incompatibility with other jobs), firms' preferences over cluster characteristics for location decisions, optimal size at entry, in--house development vs sale strategies for innovations and industry evolution.