The impact of the reference price system on the pharmaceutical market: A theoretical approach

This article analyses the impact of the reference pricesystem on the price-setting strategies of thepharmaceutical firms and on the level of generic usage.This model is the first to take explicitly into accountthe impact of the reference price mechanism on the levelof competition between brand-name and generic drugs andnational pharmaceutical spending. We consider aduopolistic model with one firm producing the brand-namedrug, whose patent has already expired, and the otherproducing the corresponding generic version. We work ina partial equilibrium framework where firms set pricessequentially and consumers face heterogeneous switchingcosts.We show that brand producers compensate thedecline of profits by selling greater quantities insteadof charging higher prices, thus fostering pricecompetition in the pharmaceutical market. This result isa consequence of both the assumption of a verticallydifferentiated model and the introduction of thereference price system.

Measuring time-varying economic fears with consumption-based stochastic discount factors

This paper analyzes empirically the volatility of consumption-based stochastic discount factors as a measure of implicit economic fears by studying its relationship with future economic and stock market cycles. Time-varying economic fears seem to be well captured by the volatility of stochastic discount factors. In particular, the volatility of recursive utility-based stochastic discount factor with contemporaneous growth explains between 9 and 34 percent of future changes in industrial production at short and long horizons respectively. They also explain ex-ante uncertainty and risk aversion. However, future stock market cycles are better explained by a similar stochastic discount factor with long-run consumption growth. This specification of the stochastic discount factor presents higher volatility and lower pricing errors than the specification with contemporaneous consumption growth.

Putting health in all policies: The National Institute for Welfare Enhancement

Welfare is a rather vague term whose meaning depends on ideology, values andjudgments. Material resources are just means to enhance people s well-being, butgrowth of the Gross Domestic Production is still the standard measure of thesuccess of a society. Fortunately, recent advances in measuring social performanceinclude health, education and other social outcomes. Because what we measureaffects what we do it is hoped that social policies will change. The movementHealth in all policies and its associated Health Impact Assessment methodologywill contribute to it. The task consists of designing transversal policies thatconsider health and other welfare goals, the short term and long-term implicationsand intergenerational redistributions of resources. As long as marginalproductivity on health outside the healthcare system is higher than inside it,efficiency needs cross-sectoral policies. And fairness needs them even more,because in order to reduce social inequalities in health, a wide social and politicalresponse is needed.Unless we reduce the well-documented inefficiencies in our current health caresystems the welfare states will fail to consolidate and the overall economic wellbeingcould be in serious trouble. In this article we sketched some policy solutionssuch as pricing according to net benefits of innovation and public encouragementof radical innovation besides the small type incremental and market-ledinnovation. We proposed an independent agency, the National Institute forWelfare Enhancement to guarantee long term fair and efficient social policies inwhich health plays a central role.

Seeking theta's desperately: Estimating the distribution of consumers under increasing block rates

This paper shows that the distribution of observed consumption is not a good proxy for the distribution of heterogeneous consumers when the current tariff is an increasing block tariff. We use a two step method to recover the "true" distribution of consumers. First, we estimate the demand function induced by the current tariff. Second, using the demand system, we specify the distribution of consumers as a function of observed consumption to recover the true distribution. Finally, we design a new two-part tariff which allows us to evaluate the equity of the existence of an increasing block tariff.

Selling to consumers with endogenous types

For many goods (such as experience goods or addictive goods), consumers preferences may change over time. In this paper, we examine a monopolist s optimal pricing schedule when current consumption can affect a consumer s valuation in the future and valuations are unobservable. We assume that consumers are anonymous, i.e. the monopolist can t observe a consumer s past consumption history. For myopic consumers, the optimal consumption schedule is distorted upwards, involving substantial discounts for low valuation types. This pushes low types into higher valuations, from which rents can be extracted.For forward looking consumers, there may be a further upward distortion of consumption due to a reversal of the adverse selection effect; low valuation consumers now have a strong interest in consumption in order to increase their valuations. Firms will find it profitable to educate consumers and encourage forward looking behavior.

Earnings management and audit adjustments: An empirical study of IBEX 35 constituents

Doubts about the reliability of a company's qualitative financial disclosure increase market participant expectations from the auditor's report. The auditing process is supposed to serve as a monitoring device that reduces management incentives to manipulate reported earnings. Empirical research confirms that it could be an efficient device under some circumstancesand recognizes that our estimates of the informativeness of audit reports are unavoidably biased (e.g., because of a client's anticipation of the auditing process). This empirical study supports the significant role of auditors in the financial market, in particular in the prevention of earnings management practice. We focus on earnings misstatements, which auditors correct with anadjustment, using a sample of past and current constituents of the benchmark market index in Spain, IBEX 35, and manually collected audit adjustments reported over the 1997-2004 period (42 companies, 336 annual reports, 75 earnings misstatements). Our findings confirm that companies more often overstate than understate their earnings. An investor may foresee earningsmisreporting, as manipulators have a similar profile (e.g., more leveraged and with lower sales). However, he may receive valuable information from the audit adjustment on the size of earnings misstatement, which can be significantly large (i.e., material in almost all cases). We suggest that the magnitude of an audit adjustment depends, other things constant, on annual revenues and free cash levels. We also examine how the audit adjustment relates to the observed market price, trading volume and stock returns. Our findings are that earnings manipulators have a lower price and larger trading volume compared to their rivals. Their returns are positively associated with the magnitude of earnings misreporting, which is not consistent with the possible pricing of audit information.

A comparison of stock market mechanisms

This paper studies the relationship between the amount of publicinformation that stock market prices incorporate and the equilibriumbehavior of market participants. The analysis is framed in a static, NREEsetup where traders exchange vectors of assets accessing multidimensionalinformation under two alternative market structures. In the first(the unrestricted system), both informed and uninformed speculators cancondition their demands for each traded asset on all equilibrium prices;in the second (the restricted system), they are restricted to conditiontheir demand on the price of the asset they want to trade. I show thatinformed traders incentives to exploit multidimensional privateinformation depend on the number of prices they can condition upon whensubmitting their demand schedules, and on the specific price formationprocess one considers. Building on this insight, I then give conditionsunder which the restricted system is more efficient than the unrestrictedsystem.

Optimal regulation of a fully insured deposit banking system

We analyze risk sensitive incentive compatible deposit insurancein the presence of private information when the market value of depositinsurance can be determined using Merton's (1997) formula. We show that,under the assumption that transferring funds from taxpayers to financialinstitutions has a social cost, the optimal regulation combines differentlevels of capital requirements combined with decreasing premia on depositinsurance. On the other hand, it is never efficient to require the banksto hold riskless assets, so that narrow banking is not efficient. Finally,chartering banks is necessary in order to decrease the cost of asymmetricinformation.

Generic entry into a regulated pharmaceutical market

The aim of this paper is to analyse empirically entry decisions by generic firms intomarkets with tough regulation. Generic drugs might be a key driver of competitionand cost containment in pharmaceutical markets. The dynamics of reforms ofpatents and pricing across drug markets in Spain are useful to identify the impact ofregulations on generic entry. Estimates from a count data model using a panel of 86active ingredients during the 1999 2005 period show that the drivers of genericentry in markets with price regulations are similar to less regulated markets: genericfirms entries are positively affected by the market size and time trend, and negativelyaffected by the number of incumbent laboratories and the number of substitutesactive ingredients. We also find that contrary to what policy makers expected, thesystem of reference pricing restrains considerably the generic entry. Short run brandname drug price reductions are obtained by governments at the cost of long runbenefits from fostering generic entry and post-patent competition into the markets.

A general decomposition formula for derivative prices in stochastic volatility models

We see that the price of an european call option in a stochastic volatilityframework can be decomposed in the sum of four terms, which identifythe main features of the market that affect to option prices: the expectedfuture volatility, the correlation between the volatility and the noisedriving the stock prices, the market price of volatility risk and thedifference of the expected future volatility at different times. We alsostudy some applications of this decomposition.

Valuation bubbles and sequential bubbles

Price bubbles in an Arrow-Debreu valuation equilibrium in infinite-timeeconomy are a manifestation of lack of countable additivity of valuationof assets. In contrast, known examples of price bubbles in sequentialequilibrium in infinite time cannot be attributed to the lack of countableadditivity of valuation. In this paper we develop a theory of valuation ofassets in sequential markets (with no uncertainty) and study the nature ofprice bubbles in light of this theory. We consider an operator, calledpayoff pricing functional, that maps a sequence of payoffs to the minimumcost of an asset holding strategy that generates it. We show that thepayoff pricing functional is linear and countably additive on the set ofpositive payoffs if and only if there is no Ponzi scheme, and providedthat there is no restriction on long positions in the assets. In the knownexamples of equilibrium price bubbles in sequential markets valuation islinear and countably additive. The presence of a price bubble indicatesthat the asset's dividends can be purchased in sequential markers at acost lower than the asset's price. We also present examples of equilibriumprice bubbles in which valuation is nonlinear but not countably additive.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Understanding portfolio efficiency with conditioning information

We show that unconditionally efficient returns do not achieve the maximum unconditionalSharpe ratio, neither display zero unconditional Jensen s alphas, when returns arepredictable. Next, we define a new type of efficient returns that is characterized by thoseunconditional properties. We also study a different type of efficient returns that is rationalizedby standard mean-variance preferences and motivates new Sharpe ratios and Jensen salphas. We revisit the testable implications of asset pricing models from the perspective ofthe three sets of efficient returns. We also revisit the empirical evidence on the conditionalvariants of the CAPM and the Fama-French model from a portfolio perspective.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Pitfalls in the modeling of forward-looking price setting and investment decisions

The present paper makes progress in explaining the role of capital for inflation and output dynamics. We followWoodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming Calvo pricing combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the firm level. Our main result is that capital accumulation affects inflation dynamics primarily through its impact on the marginal cost. This mechanism is much simpler than the one implied by the analysis in Woodford's text. The reason is that his analysis suffers from a conceptual mistake, as we show. The latter obscures the economic mechanism through which capital affects inflation and output dynamics in the Calvo model, as discussed in Woodford (2004).