69 resultados para Exploit
Resumo:
Optimal tax formulas expressed in "sufficient statistics" are usually calibrated under the assumptionthat the relevant tax elasticities are unaffected by other available policy instruments.In practice though, tax authorities have many more instruments than the mere tax rates andtax elasticities are functions of all these policy instruments. In this paper we provide evidencethat tax elasticities are extremely sensitive to a particular policy instrument: the level of taxenforcement. We exploit a natural experiment that took place in France in 1983, when the taxadministration tightened the requirements to claim charitable deductions. The reform led to asubstantial drop in the amount of contributions reported to the administration, which can becredibly attributed to overreporting of charitable contributions before the reform, rather thanto a real change in giving behaviours. We show that the reform was also associated with asubstantial decline in the absolute value of the elasticity of reported contributions. This findingallows us to partially identify the elasticity of overreporting contributions, which is shown tobe large and inferior to -2 in the lax enforcement regime. We further show using bunching oftaxpayers at kink-points of the tax schedule that the elasticity of taxable income also experienceda significant decline after the reform. Our results suggest that optimizing the tax rate fora given tax elasticity when other policy instruments are not optimized can lead to misleadingconclusions when tax authorities have another instrument that could set the tax elasticity itselfat its optimal level as in Kopczuk and Slemrod [2002].
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This paper models a legislature in which the same agenda setter serves for two periods, showing how he can exploit a legislature (completely) in the first period by promising future benefits to legislators who support him. In equilibrium, a large majority of legislators vote for the first-period proposal because they thereby maintain the chance of belonging to the minimum winning coalition in the future. Legislators may therefore approve policies by large majorities, or even unanimously, that benefit few, or even none, of them. The results are robust; but institutional arrangements (such as entitlements) can reduce the agenda setter's power by reducing his discretion to reward and punish legislators, and rules (such as sequential voting) can increase a legislator's ability to resist exploitation. Keywords: Legislative bargaining, distributive politics, agenda-setting, proposal power. JEL C72, D72, D78.
Resumo:
This paper analyzes the role of formalization of land property rights in the war against illicit crops in Colombia. We argue that as a consequence of the increase of state presence and visibility during the period of 2000 and 2009, municipalities with a higher level of formalization of their land property rights saw a greater reduction in the area allocated to illicit crops. We hypothesize that this is due to the increased cost of growing illicit crops on formal land compared to informal, and due to the possibility of obtaining more benets in the newly in- stalled institutional environment when land is formalized. We exploit the variation in the level of formalization of land property rights in a set of municipalities that had their rst cadastral census collected in the period of 1994-2000; this selection procedure guarantees reliable data and an unbiased source of variation. Using fixed effects estimators, we found a signicant negative relationship between the level of formalization of land property rights and the number of hectares allocated to coca crops per municipality. These results remain robust through a number of sensitivity analyses. Our ndings contribute to the growing body of evidence on the positive effects of formal land property rights, and e ective policies in the war on drugs in Colombia.
Resumo:
Two graphs with adjacency matrices $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{B}$ are isomorphic if there exists a permutation matrix $\mathbf{P}$ for which the identity $\mathbf{P}^{\mathrm{T}} \mathbf{A} \mathbf{P} = \mathbf{B}$ holds. Multiplying through by $\mathbf{P}$ and relaxing the permutation matrix to a doubly stochastic matrix leads to the linear programming relaxation known as fractional isomorphism. We show that the levels of the Sherali--Adams (SA) hierarchy of linear programming relaxations applied to fractional isomorphism interleave in power with the levels of a well-known color-refinement heuristic for graph isomorphism called the Weisfeiler--Lehman algorithm, or, equivalently, with the levels of indistinguishability in a logic with counting quantifiers and a bounded number of variables. This tight connection has quite striking consequences. For example, it follows immediately from a deep result of Grohe in the context of logics with counting quantifiers that a fixed number of levels of SA suffice to determine isomorphism of planar and minor-free graphs. We also offer applications in both finite model theory and polyhedral combinatorics. First, we show that certain properties of graphs, such as that of having a flow circulation of a prescribed value, are definable in the infinitary logic with counting with a bounded number of variables. Second, we exploit a lower bound construction due to Cai, Fürer, and Immerman in the context of counting logics to give simple explicit instances that show that the SA relaxations of the vertex-cover and cut polytopes do not reach their integer hulls for up to $\Omega(n)$ levels, where $n$ is the number of vertices in the graph.
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With this paper we build a two-region model where both innovation and imitation are performed. In particular imitation takes the form of technological spillovers that lagging regions may exploit given certain human capital conditions. We show how the high skill content of each region’s workforce (rather than the average human capital stock) is crucial to determine convergence towards the income level of the leader region and to exploit the technological spillovers coming from the frontier. The same applies to bureaucratic/institutional quality which are conductive to higher growth in the long run. We test successfully our theoretical result over Spanish regions for the period between 1960 and 1997. We exploit system GMM estimators which allow us to correctly deal with endogeneity problems and small sample bias.
Resumo:
Background It is well known that the pattern of linkage disequilibrium varies between human populations, with remarkable geographical stratification. Indirect association studies routinely exploit linkage disequilibrium around genes, particularly in isolated populations where it is assumed to be higher. Here, we explore both the amount and the decay of linkage disequilibrium with physical distance along 211 gene regions, most of them related to complex diseases, across 39 HGDP-CEPH population samples, focusing particularly on the populations defined as isolates. Within each gene region and population we use r2 between all possible single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP) pairs as a measure of linkage disequilibrium and focus on the proportion of SNP pairs with r2 greater than 0.8. Results Although the average r2 was found to be significantly different both between and within continental regions, a much higher proportion of r2 variance could be attributed to differences between continental regions (2.8% vs. 0.5%, respectively). Similarly, while the proportion of SNP pairs with r2 > 0.8 was significantly different across continents for all distance classes, it was generally much more homogenous within continents, except in the case of Africa and the Americas. The only isolated populations with consistently higher LD in all distance classes with respect to their continent are the Kalash (Central South Asia) and the Surui (America). Moreover, isolated populations showed only slightly higher proportions of SNP pairs with r2 > 0.8 per gene region than non-isolated populations in the same continent. Thus, the number of SNPs in isolated populations that need to be genotyped may be only slightly less than in non-isolates. Conclusion The 'isolated population' label by itself does not guarantee a greater genotyping efficiency in association studies, and properties other than increased linkage disequilibrium may make these populations interesting in genetic epidemiology.
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The aim of this paper is to analyze the effects of intermunicipal cooperation and privatization on the delivery costs of urban solid waste services. The results of our empirical analysis, which we conducted among a sample of very small municipalities, indicate that small towns that cooperate incur lower costs for their waste collection service. Cooperation also raises collection frequency and improves the quality of the service in small towns. By contrast, the form of production, whether it is public or private, does not result in systematic differences in costs. Interestingly, the degree of population dispersion has a significant positive relation with service costs. No evidence of scale economies is found because, it would seem, small municipalities exploit them by means of intermunicipal cooperation.
Resumo:
Several empirical studies have analyzed the factors that influence local privatization. Variables related to fiscal stress, cost reduction, political processes and ideological attitudes are the most common explanatory variables used in these studies. In this paper, we add to this literature by examining the influence of transaction costs and political factors on local governments’ choices through new variables. In addition to this, we consider the role of additional aspects, such as intermunicipal cooperation as a potential alternative to privatization in order to exploit scale economies or scope economies. We consider two relevant services: solid waste collection and water distribution. Results from our estimates show that privatization (that is, contracting out to a private firm) is less common for water distribution than for solid waste collection. Higher transaction costs in water distribution are consistent with this finding. Furthermore, we find that municipalities with a conservative ruling party privatize more often regardless of the ideological orientation of the constituency. This shows that those political interests able to influence local elections are more important in determining the form of delivery than is the basic ideological stance of the constituency. Finally, we find that intermunicipal cooperation is an alternative to local privatization.
Resumo:
We show how certain N-dimensional dynamical systems are able to exploit the full instability capabilities of their fixed points to do Hopf bifurcations and how such a behavior produces complex time evolutions based on the nonlinear combination of the oscillation modes that emerged from these bifurcations. For really different oscillation frequencies, the evolutions describe robust wave form structures, usually periodic, in which selfsimilarity with respect to both the time scale and system dimension is clearly appreciated. For closer frequencies, the evolution signals usually appear irregular but are still based on the repetition of complex wave form structures. The study is developed by considering vector fields with a scalar-valued nonlinear function of a single variable that is a linear combination of the N dynamical variables. In this case, the linear stability analysis can be used to design N-dimensional systems in which the fixed points of a saddle-node pair experience up to N21 Hopf bifurcations with preselected oscillation frequencies. The secondary processes occurring in the phase region where the variety of limit cycles appear may be rather complex and difficult to characterize, but they produce the nonlinear mixing of oscillation modes with relatively generic features