La Fil•loxera i la crisi vitícola a les comarques gironines: 1879-1900

El sector vitícola català, màxim exponent de l'expansió agrícola registrada des d'inici del segle XVIII fins a mitjan XIX, va patir en les darreres dècades de la passada centúria un gran daltabaix. Un insecte desconegut fins aleshores, la fil•loxera, originari del continent americà i contra el qual les vinyes europees no disposaven de cap mena de defensa, va destruir en un marge de cinquanta anys tots els antics ceps d'Europa.

Hermen Anglada-Camarasa: De Barcelona a París, 1871-1904

Estudi d’un període concret de l’artista català Hermenegild Anglada-Camarasa, els anys1871-1904. Són els anys de formació de l’artista a Catalunya, passant per Barcelona, Arbúcies i Vilanova i la Geltrú. També viatja a París i continua la formació allà, on contacta amb moviments artístics europeus i internacionals, es consolida la seva figura i comença a tenir força reconeixement a nivell internacional

Sobre la identitat dels Matiners a les comarques del N.E. de Catalunya

This study attempts to throw some light on the identity of the Matiners of the regions of north-eastern Catalonia by analizing a notebook which was a register of rebels. This notebook gives the age, geographical origin and profession of the rebels. The War of the matiners (1846-49) was a Catalan rebellion framed within the context of popular opposition to the regime of the moderates, and in the midst of a general crisis. Themen who formed the groups of ((trabucaires)) were particulary young (the problemof recriting must not be forgotten), and came from the country, the crafts, and industry, and were militarized above all in the interior regions

The "New Political Economy": Two Recent Books

This paper reviews two recent books on Political Economy by Allan Drazen and Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. It discusses some problems of the recent Political Economy literature.

Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation

We model the different ways in which precedents and contract standardization shapethe development of markets and the law. In a setup where more resourceful parties candistort contract enforcement to their advantage, we find that the introduction of astandard contract reduces enforcement distortions relative to precedents, exerting twoeffects: i) it statically expands the volume of trade, but ii) it crowds out the use ofinnovative contracts, hindering contractual innovation. We shed light on the largescale commercial codification occurred in the 19th century in many countries (evenCommon Law ones) during a period of booming commerce and long distance trade.

The 'new political economy': Two recent books

This paper reviews two recent books on Political Economy by Allan Drazen and Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. It discusses some problems of the recent Political Economy literature.

Judges' cognition and market order

We argue that during the crystallization of common and civil law in the 19th century, the optimal degree of discretion in judicial rulemaking, albeit influenced by the comparative advantages of both legislative and judicial rulemaking, was mainly determined by the anti-market biases of the judiciary. The different degrees of judicial discretion adopted in both legal traditions were thus optimally adapted to different circumstances, mainly rooted in the unique, market-friendly, evolutionary transition enjoyed by English common law as opposed to the revolutionary environment of the civil law. On the Continent, constraining judicial discretion was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing a market economy. The ongoing debasement of pro-market fundamentals in both branches of the Western legal system is explained from this perspective as a consequence of increased perceptions of exogenous risks and changes in the political system, which favored the adoption of sharing solutions and removed the cognitive advantage of parliaments and political leaders.

The overhang hangover

We revisit the debt overhang question. We first use non-parametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent)growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, we depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, we ask whether, as overhang level of debt is reached: (i)investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default, (ii) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor, and (iii) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to pre-empt default and exact punitive interest rates. We find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing, or the burden of debt.

Market institutions and judicial rulemaking

Assuming that the degree of discretion granted to judges was the main distinguishing feature between common and civil law until the 19th century, we argue that constraining judicial discretion was instrumental in protecting freedom of contract and developing the market order in civil law. We test this hypothesis by analyzing the history of Western law. In England, a unique institutional balance between the Crown and the Parliament guaranteed private property and prompted the gradual evolution towards a legal framework that facilitated market relationships, a process that was supported by the English judiciary. On the Continent, however, legal constraints on the market were suppressed in a top-down fashion by the founders of the liberal state, often against the will of the incumbent judiciary. Constraining judicial discretion there was essential for enforcing freedom of contract and establishing the legal order of the market economy. In line with this evidence, our selection hypothesis casts doubts on the normative interpretation of empirical results that proclaim the superiority of one legal system over another, disregarding the local conditions and institutional interdependencies on which each legal system was grounded.

Comparació de tres mètodes per a violí : Shinichi Suzuki, Paul Rolland i Mimi Zweig

Aquest treball és un anàlisi de tres aproximacions pedagògiques en el camp de la música sorgides al segle XX; la de Shinichi Suzuki, Paul Rolland i Mimi Zweig. Les tres estan centrades en l’ensenyament del violí i formen part de les aproximacions pedagògiques més conegudes i amb més reputació en aquest camp. S’han volgut estudiar i analitzar de manera separada cada una d’aquestes aproximacions i, posteriorment, fer-ne una comparació que permeti observar aquells aspectes que comparteixen i aquells amb els quals difereixen. La conclusió extreta és que el coneixement de diferents aproximacions pedagògiques i l’adequada combinació d’aquestes, a l’hora d’impartir la nostra tasca com a docents, és el que ens enriqueix com a pedagogs i també com a persones.

Catalogació patrimoni bibliogràfic: goigs: segle XIX

Catalogació dels goigs impresos durant el segle XIX, de la Biblioteca Pública de Girona. Son exemplars inclosos en el Catálogo Colectivo del Patrimonio Bibliográfico (CCPB), base de dades del Ministeri de Cultura.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Growth, convergence and public investment : a bayesian model averaging approach

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we study the determinants of economic growth among a wide set of potential variables for the Spanish provinces (NUTS3). Among others, we include various types of private, public and human capital in the group of growth factors. Also,we analyse whether Spanish provinces have converged in economic terms in recent decades. Thesecond objective is to obtain cross-section and panel data parameter estimates that are robustto model speci¯cation. For this purpose, we use a Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) approach.Bayesian methodology constructs parameter estimates as a weighted average of linear regression estimates for every possible combination of included variables. The weight of each regression estimate is given by the posterior probability of each model.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

The First privatization : selling SOEs and privatizing public monopolies in fascist Italy, 1922-1925

[cat] El primer govern feixista d’Itàlia va aplicar una política de privatització a gran escala entre 1922 i 1925. El govern va privatitzar el monopoli estatal de llumins, el monopoli estatal d’assegurances de vida, va vendre la major part de la xarxa i serveis de telefònica pública a empreses privades, va reprivatitzar el major productor de productes metàl·lics, i va atorgar concessions a empreses privades per construir i explotar autopistes de peatge. Tot i que algunes consideracions ideològiques van poder tenir alguna influència, la privatització va ser usada sobre tot com un instrument polític per construir confiança amb els grans industrials i per augmentar el suport al govern i al Partito Nazionale Fascista. La privatització també va contribuir a equilibrar el pressupost públic, qüestió aquesta que va ser el principal objectiu de la primera fase de la política econòmica feixista.