The economic tragedy of the XXth Century: Growth in Africa

The dismal growth performance of Africa is the worst economic tragedy ofthe XXth century. We document the evolution of per capita GDP for thecontinent as a whole and for subset of countries south of the Saharadesert. We document the worsening of various income inequality indexesand we estimate poverty rates and headcounts. We then analyze some ofthe central robust determinants of economic growth reported bySala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2003) and project the annual growthrates Africa would have enjoyed if these key determinants had taken OECDrather than African values. Expensive investment goods, low levels ofeducation, poor health, adverse geography, closed economies, too muchpublic expenditure and too many military conflicts are seen as keyexplanations of the economic tragedy.

Endogenous growth with capital in R&D production functions

[eng] In this paper we claim that capital is as important in the production of ideas as in the production of final goods. Hence, we introduce capital in the production of knowledge and discuss the associated problems arising from the public good nature of knowledge. We show that although population growth can affect economic growth, it is not necessary for growth to arise. We derive both the social planner and the decentralized economy growth rates and show the optimal subsidy that decentralizes it. We also show numerically that the effects of population growth on the market growth rate, the optimal growth rate and the optimal subsidy are small. Besides, we find that physical capital is more important for the production of knowledge than for the production of goods.

Endogenous growth with capital in R&D production functions

[eng] In this paper we claim that capital is as important in the production of ideas as in the production of final goods. Hence, we introduce capital in the production of knowledge and discuss the associated problems arising from the public good nature of knowledge. We show that although population growth can affect economic growth, it is not necessary for growth to arise. We derive both the social planner and the decentralized economy growth rates and show the optimal subsidy that decentralizes it. We also show numerically that the effects of population growth on the market growth rate, the optimal growth rate and the optimal subsidy are small. Besides, we find that physical capital is more important for the production of knowledge than for the production of goods.

Payments for environmental services in watersheds: insights from a comparative study of three cases in Central America

We have compared three cases of payments for water-related environmental services (PES) in Central America, in terms of socioeconomic background, opportunity costs of forest conservation and stakeholders’ perceptions on the conditions of water resources and other issues. We found that, in general, the foregone benefits from land uses alternative to forest cover are larger than the amount paid, which apparently contradicts the economic foundation of PES schemes. A number of possible explanations are explored. The results also suggest that trade-offs between different environmental and social goals are likely to emerge in PES schemes, posing some doubts on their ability to be multipurpose instruments for environmental improvement and rural development. We also found that PES schemes may work as a conflictresolution instrument, facilitating downstream -upstream problem solving, though at the same time they might introduce changes in social perceptions of property rights.

Crecimiento, instituciones e hidrocarburos : el proyecto petrolero mexicano en perspectiva histórica comparada (1938-2000)

En este trabajo se analiza la política petrolera mexicana durante el período 1938-2000 y su aportación al crecimiento económico mexicano. La orientación de la producción petrolera permite distinguir dos modelos de gestión de la industria petrolera. El primero de ellos; entre 1938-1976 tuvo por finalidad el aprovisionamiento energético del mercado interior a bajos precios. El segundo a partir de 1976 orientado hacia la exportación y la captura de la renta petrolera internacional. Esta ruptura en la política petrolera asociada constituye un caso interesante en sí mismo porque permite comparar los efectos de dos políticas totalmente opuestas sobre el crecimiento económico y sobre el desempeño de la propia industria petrolera en un país donde el Estado tiene derechos de propiedad exclusivos sobre el sector petrolero. Por ello, se aborda el tema como una problemática institucional que toma en cuenta tanto las características internas de México como la dinámica del mercado petrolero internacional. Se incide en el hecho de que el Estado mexicano ha utilizado a la industria petrolera y; concretamente los recursos que ésta genera no sólo como un instrumento para favorecer el crecimiento económico del país sino también para mantener el control del poder político frente a la élite económica. Así el inmovilismo institucional; la falta de ingresos e inversiones propias y el comportamiento rentista del Estado parecen haber condenado al sector petrolero mexicano al atraso y la ineficiencia. De este modo; se focaliza en las interrelaciones entre las instituciones económicas y políticas como elemento explicativo del por qué la industria petrolera no ha logrado convertirse en un elemento dinamizador del crecimiento económico mexicano en el largo plazo.

The Law of Impersonal Transactions: Meaning and Difficulties

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchange in which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect to previous "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs by protecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent by property right holders to avoid damaging property enforcement-e.g., it is they as principals who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicial verifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automatic byproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, by requiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a sort of legal commodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocation and specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legal commoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency-the law first developed for personal trade-and an unbalance in vested interests, as luddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

The Economic Effects of Christian Moralities

This article examines the different influences that Catholicism and Protestantism exert on economically relevant values. It argues that Catholic theology and practice facilitate personal transactions while Protestantism favors values and types of moral and legal enforcement better adapted for impersonal trade. Protestantism may thus be more conducive to economic growth through anonymous exchange while Catholicism may provide better support for personal contracting. Several components of this hypothesis are confirmed using statistical models with data from the 1998 ISSP international survey on religion. These show that Protestants are more trusting of anonymous counter parties, develop more reliable institutions for legal enforcement and are more willing to spend resources on monitoring and punishing other members of the community. Catholicism is more protective of the family and small-group relationships, and provides more tolerant and less motivating beliefs. Relatively smaller and less consistent differences appear in terms of worldly personal success and incentives.

Do you work or do you study? Children's work in a comparative historical perspective

In this paper we compare two historical scenarios very different one to each other bothin institutional and geographical terms. What they have in common is the situation ofrelative poverty of most of the population. On the one side we are dealing withhistorical industrializing Catalonia in the North East of Spain, a country exhibiting pooreconomic yields in the context of European and non European industrializing nations inthe 19th century. We compare children s work patterns in 19th century Catalonia withthose of current developing countries in Latin America, Africa and South and East Asia.This kind of exercise in which the nexus of the comparison are the levels of wealth ofcountries that are unsuccessful to achieve high standards of economic growth allows usto combine the micro historical analysis (in the Catalan case) with the macrocomparative approach in current developing countries. By means of both, the microhistorical analysis and the macro regression analysis we obtain the result that adultwomen s skills and real wages are a key factor when we want to explain the patterns ofchildren work. While female real wages increased a sharp rate in 19th century Cataloniawe obtain very different results in the case of developing countries. This differentgender bias helps to explain why in some cases children continue to work and also whysome parts of the world continue to be poor according to our regression analysis.

Prime property institutions for a subprime era: Toward innovative models of homeownership

This Article breaks new ground toward contractual and institutional innovation in models of homeownership, equity building, and mortgage enforcement. Inspired by recent developments in the affordable housing sector and other types of public financing schemes, we suggest extending institutional and financial strategies such as time- and place-based division of property rights, conditional subsidies, and credit mediation to alleviate the systemic risks of mortgage foreclosure. Two new solutions offer a broad theoretical basis for such developments in the economic and legal institution of homeownership: a for-profit shared equity scheme led by local governments alongside a private market shared equity model, one of "bootstrapping home buying with purchase options".

Bank versus venture capital

Why do some start-up firms raise funds from banks andothers from venture capitalists? To answer this question,I develop a model of start-up financing when intellectualproperty rights are not well protected. The upside of VCfinancing is that the VC understands the business betterthan a bank. The downside, however, is that the VC maysteal the idea and use it himself. The results of themodel are consistent with empirical regularities onstart-up financing. The model implies that thecharacteristics of the firms financing from venturecapitalists are low-collateral, high-growth and high-profitability. The model also suggests that thetighter protection of intellectual property rightscontributes to the recent dramatic growth of the USventure capital industry.

The overhang hangover

We revisit the debt overhang question. We first use non-parametric techniques to isolate a panel of countries on the downward sloping section of a debt Laffer curve. In particular, overhang countries are ones where a threshold level of debt is reached in sample, beyond which (initial) debt ends up lowering (subsequent)growth. On average, significantly negative coefficients appear when debt face value reaches 60 percent of GDP or 200 percent of exports, and when its present value reaches 40 percent of GDP or 140 percent of exports. Second, we depart from reduced form growth regressions and perform direct tests of the theory on the thus selected sample of overhang countries. In the spirit of event studies, we ask whether, as overhang level of debt is reached: (i)investment falls precipitously as it should when it becomes optimal to default, (ii) economic policy deteriorates observably, as it should when debt contracts become unable to elicit effort on the part of the debtor, and (iii) the terms of borrowing worsen noticeably, as they should when it becomes optimal for creditors to pre-empt default and exact punitive interest rates. We find a systematic response of investment, particularly when property rights are weakly enforced, some worsening of the policy environment, and a fall in interest rates. This easing of borrowing conditions happens because lending by the private sector virtually disappears in overhang situations, and multilateral agencies step in with concessional rates. Thus, while debt relief is likely to improve economic policy (and especially investment) in overhang countries, it is doubtful that it would ease their terms of borrowing, or the burden of debt.

Complementarity between human capital and trade in regional technological progress

The effect of openness and trade orientation on economic growth remains a highly contentious issue in the literature. Trade facilitates the spread of knowledge and the adoption of more advanced and efficient technologies, which hastens total factor productivity (TFP) growth and, hence, per capita income. New technologies that spread through trade require a sufficiently skilled labour force to adapt them to the domestic productive environment. Thus, openness and human capital accumulation will lead to TFP growth and the greater the complementarity between both variables, the higher the TFP growth. This paper discusses the implications of these assumptions and tests their empirical validity, using a pool of data for manufacturing industry in Spanish regions in a period in which both the stock of human capital and openness experienced a notable increase.

Complementarity between human capital and trade in regional technological progress

The effect of openness and trade orientation on economic growth remains a highly contentious issue in the literature. Trade facilitates the spread of knowledge and the adoption of more advanced and efficient technologies, which hastens total factor productivity (TFP) growth and, hence, per capita income. New technologies that spread through trade require a sufficiently skilled labour force to adapt them to the domestic productive environment. Thus, openness and human capital accumulation will lead to TFP growth and the greater the complementarity between both variables, the higher the TFP growth. This paper discusses the implications of these assumptions and tests their empirical validity, using a pool of data for manufacturing industry in Spanish regions in a period in which both the stock of human capital and openness experienced a notable increase.

The law of impersonal transactions

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchangein which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect toprevious "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs byprotecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent byproperty rightholders to avoid damaging property enforcement?e.g., it isthey, as principals, who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicialverifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automaticbyproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, byrequiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a legalcommodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocationand specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legalcommoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency?the law firstdeveloped for personal trade?and an unbalance in vested interests, asluddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.