Bridging DSGE models and the raw data

A method to estimate DSGE models using the raw data is proposed. The approachlinks the observables to the model counterparts via a flexible specification which doesnot require the model-based component to be solely located at business cycle frequencies,allows the non model-based component to take various time series patterns, andpermits model misspecification. Applying standard data transformations induce biasesin structural estimates and distortions in the policy conclusions. The proposed approachrecovers important model-based features in selected experimental designs. Twowidely discussed issues are used to illustrate its practical use.

Credit lines: The other side of corporate liquidity

In this paper we offer the first large sample evidence on the availability and usage ofcredit lines in U.S. public corporations and use it to re-examine the existing findings oncorporate liquidity. We show that the availability of credit lines is widespread and thataverage undrawn credit is of the same order of magnitude as cash holdings. We test thetrade-off theory of liquidity according to which firms target an optimum level of liquidity,computed as the sum of cash and undrawn credit lines. We provide support for the existenceof a liquidity target, but also show that the reasons why firms hold cash and credit linesare very different. While the precautionary motive explains well cash holdings, the optimumlevel of credit lines appears to be driven by the restrictions imposed by the credit line itself,in terms of stated purpose and covenants. In support to these findings, credit line drawdownsare associated with capital expenditures, acquisitions, and working capital.

The equity premium and the risk free rate: A cross country, cross maturity examination

This paper examines the relationship between the equity premium and the risk free rate at three different maturities using post 1973 data fora panel of 7 OECD countries. We show the existence of subsample instabilities,of some cross country differences and of inconsistencies with the expectations theory of the term structure. We perform simulations using a standard consumptionbased CAPM model and demonstrate that the basic features of Mehra and Prescott's(1985) puzzle remain, regardless of the time period, the investment maturity and the country considered. Modifications of the basic setup are also considered.

Interbank liquidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 crisis

We study the credit supply effects of the unexpected freeze of the Europeaninterbank market, using exhaustive Portuguese loan-level data. We find thatbanks that rely more on interbank borrowing before the crisis decrease theircredit supply more during the crisis. The credit supply reduction is stronger forfirms that are smaller, with weaker banking relationships. Small firms cannotcompensate the credit crunch with other sources of debt. Furthermore, theimpact of illiquidity on the credit crunch is stronger for less solvent banks.Finally, there are no overall positive effects of central bank liquidity, but higherhoarding of liquidity.

Negativity effect and the emergence of ideologies

``Negativity effect'' refers to the psychological phenomenon that peopletend to attach greater weight to negative information than to equallyextreme and equally likely positive information in a variety of informationprocessing tasks. Numerous studies of impression formation have found thatnegative information is weighted more heavily than positive information asimpressions of others are formed. There is empirical evidence in politicalscience that shows the importance of the negativity effect in the informationprocessing of the voters. This effect can explain the observed decreaseof popularity for a president the longer he is in office. \\We construct a dynamic model of political competition, incorporating thenegativity effect in the decision rule of the voters and allowing their preferencesto change over time, according to the past performance of the candidateswhile in office. Our model may explain the emergence of ideologies out ofthe competition for votes of myopic candidates freely choosing policypositions. This result gives rise to the formation of political parties,as infinitely--lived agents with a certain ideology. Furthermore, in thismodel some voters may start out by switching among parties associated withdifferent policies, but find themselves supporting one of the parties fromsome point on. Thus, the model describes a process by which some votersbecome identified with a ``right'' or ``left'' bloc, while others ``swing''between the two parties.