Axiomatization of the nucl eolus of assignment games

On the domain of general assignment games (with possible reservation prices) the core is axiomatized as the unique solution satisfying two consistency principles: projection consistency and derived consistency. Also, an axiomatic characterization of the nucleolus is given as the unique solution that satisfies derived consistency and equal maximum complaint between groups. As a consequence, we obtain a geometric characterization of the nucleolus. Maschler et al. (1979) provide a geometrical characterization for the intersection of the kernel and the core of a coalitional game, showing that those allocations that lie in both sets are always the midpoint of certain bargaining range between each pair of players. In the case of the assignment game, this means that the kernel can be determined as those core allocations where the maximum amount, that can be transferred without getting outside the core, from one agent to his / her optimally matched partner equals the maximum amount that he / she can receive from this partner, also remaining inside the core. We now prove that the nucleolus of the assignment game can be characterized by requiring this bisection property be satisfied not only for optimally matched pairs but also for optimally matched coalitions. Key words: cooperative games, assignment game, core, nucleolus

Catalogación y valoración de las webquests desde el área de educación física y el tratamiento de temáticas transversales

Gears of the current millennium have been activated by the hit entry into the information society that has generated a whole range of social and educational changes, it is difficult to stay out of their influence, such as: the dizzying presence of new technologies (NNTT) and the entrenchment of a crisis of values. Physical education has been affected by this avalanche of developments that have sparked the birth of original teaching and learning tools that can be applied in the classroom. In this sense, WebQuests have been configured as a unifying and educational activities that allow addressing the treatment of specific thematic area that we are dealing with the work of certain cross¿cutting. But how do you know what product we have before us, what is its effectiveness? What criteria will allow us to classify it as a fit and capable of being applied in our particular educational context? To clarify these and other issues that any teacher could arise before the election of a multimedia educational materials, our particular object of study has a double claim on the one hand, developing two tools: the card catalog and the heading of Valuation of WebQuests and secondly, to apply these tools in order to find out / determine the degree of quality of a sample of WebQuests. In this article sets forth, in summary form, the various stages of what our research has gone since the establishment of a synthesized theoretical basis, via the definition of the basic guidelines for the design of the exhibition and research results and ending with The list of the ideas and proposals arising from thework.

A security layer for JXTA core protocols

JXTA define un conjunto de seis protocolos básicos especialmente adecuados para una computación ad hoc, permanente, multi-hop, peer-to-peer (P2P). Estos protocolos permiten que los iguales cooperen y formen grupos autónomos de pares. Este artículo presenta un método que proporciona servicios de seguridad en los protocolos básicos: protección de datos, autenticidad, integridad y no repudio. Los mecanismos que se presentan son totalmente distribuidos y basados ¿¿en un modelo puro peer-to-peer, que no requieren el arbitraje de un tercero de confianza o una relación de confianza establecida previamente entre pares, que es uno de los principales retos en este tipo de entornos.

Self-Organising Maps and Correlation Analysis as a Tool to Explore Patterns in Excitation-Emission Matrix Data Sets and to Discriminate Dissolved Organic Matter Fluorescence Components

Dissolved organic matter (DOM) is a complex mixture of organic compounds, ubiquitous in marine and freshwater systems. Fluorescence spectroscopy, by means of Excitation-Emission Matrices (EEM), has become an indispensable tool to study DOM sources, transport and fate in aquatic ecosystems. However the statistical treatment of large and heterogeneous EEM data sets still represents an important challenge for biogeochemists. Recently, Self-Organising Maps (SOM) has been proposed as a tool to explore patterns in large EEM data sets. SOM is a pattern recognition method which clusterizes and reduces the dimensionality of input EEMs without relying on any assumption about the data structure. In this paper, we show how SOM, coupled with a correlation analysis of the component planes, can be used both to explore patterns among samples, as well as to identify individual fluorescence components. We analysed a large and heterogeneous EEM data set, including samples from a river catchment collected under a range of hydrological conditions, along a 60-km downstream gradient, and under the influence of different degrees of anthropogenic impact. According to our results, chemical industry effluents appeared to have unique and distinctive spectral characteristics. On the other hand, river samples collected under flash flood conditions showed homogeneous EEM shapes. The correlation analysis of the component planes suggested the presence of four fluorescence components, consistent with DOM components previously described in the literature. A remarkable strength of this methodology was that outlier samples appeared naturally integrated in the analysis. We conclude that SOM coupled with a correlation analysis procedure is a promising tool for studying large and heterogeneous EEM data sets.

On reduced games and the lexmax solution

For a family of reduced games satisfying a monotonicity property, we introduced the reduced equal split-off set, an extension of the equal split-off set (Branzei et. al, 2006), and study its relation with the core. Regardless of the reduction operation we consider, the intersection between both sets is either empty or a singleton containing the lexmax solution (Arin et al., 2008). We also provide a procedure for computing the lexmax solution for a class of games that includes games with large core (Sharkey, 1982). [JEL Classification: C71]

A priori parameterisation of the CERES soil-crop models and tests against several European data sets

Mechanistic soil-crop models have become indispensable tools to investigate the effect of management practices on the productivity or environmental impacts of arable crops. Ideally these models may claim to be universally applicable because they simulate the major processes governing the fate of inputs such as fertiliser nitrogen or pesticides. However, because they deal with complex systems and uncertain phenomena, site-specific calibration is usually a prerequisite to ensure their predictions are realistic. This statement implies that some experimental knowledge on the system to be simulated should be available prior to any modelling attempt, and raises a tremendous limitation to practical applications of models. Because the demand for more general simulation results is high, modellers have nevertheless taken the bold step of extrapolating a model tested within a limited sample of real conditions to a much larger domain. While methodological questions are often disregarded in this extrapolation process, they are specifically addressed in this paper, and in particular the issue of models a priori parameterisation. We thus implemented and tested a standard procedure to parameterize the soil components of a modified version of the CERES models. The procedure converts routinely-available soil properties into functional characteristics by means of pedo-transfer functions. The resulting predictions of soil water and nitrogen dynamics, as well as crop biomass, nitrogen content and leaf area index were compared to observations from trials conducted in five locations across Europe (southern Italy, northern Spain, northern France and northern Germany). In three cases, the model’s performance was judged acceptable when compared to experimental errors on the measurements, based on a test of the model’s root mean squared error (RMSE). Significant deviations between observations and model outputs were however noted in all sites, and could be ascribed to various model routines. In decreasing importance, these were: water balance, the turnover of soil organic matter, and crop N uptake. A better match to field observations could therefore be achieved by visually adjusting related parameters, such as field-capacity water content or the size of soil microbial biomass. As a result, model predictions fell within the measurement errors in all sites for most variables, and the model’s RMSE was within the range of published values for similar tests. We conclude that the proposed a priori method yields acceptable simulations with only a 50% probability, a figure which may be greatly increased through a posteriori calibration. Modellers should thus exercise caution when extrapolating their models to a large sample of pedo-climatic conditions for which they have only limited information.

Assignment markets with the same core

[spa] En el contexto de los juegos de asignación bilaterales, estudiamos el conjunto de matrices asociadas a mercados de asignación con el mismo nucleo. Se proporcionan condiciones sobre las entradas de la matriz que aseguran que los juegos de asignación asociados tienen el mismo núcleo. Se prueba que este conjunto de matrices que dan lugar al mismo núcleo forman un semirretículo con un número finito de elementos minimales y un único máximo. Se da una caracterización de estos elementos minimales. También se proporciona una condición suficiente para obtener un retículo.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).

A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs cooperatius, demostrant que les distribucions que pertanyen a ambdós conjunts es troben en el punt mig d’un cert rang de negociació entre parelles de jugadors. En el cas dels jocs d’assignació, aquesta caracterització vol dir que el kernel només conté aquells elements del core on el màxim que un jugador pot transferir a una parella òptima és igual al màxim que aquesta parella li pot transferir, sense sortir-se’n del core. En aquest treball demostrem que el nucleolus d’un joc d’assignació queda caracteritzat si requerim que aquesta propietat de bisecció es compleixi no només per parelles, sinó també per coalicions entre sectors aparellades òptimament.

A geometric chracterization of the nucleolus of the assignment game

Maschler et al. (1979) caracteritzen geomètricament la intersecció del kernel i del core en els jocs cooperatius, demostrant que les distribucions que pertanyen a ambdós conjunts es troben en el punt mig d’un cert rang de negociació entre parelles de jugadors. En el cas dels jocs d’assignació, aquesta caracterització vol dir que el kernel només conté aquells elements del core on el màxim que un jugador pot transferir a una parella òptima és igual al màxim que aquesta parella li pot transferir, sense sortir-se’n del core. En aquest treball demostrem que el nucleolus d’un joc d’assignació queda caracteritzat si requerim que aquesta propietat de bisecció es compleixi no només per parelles, sinó també per coalicions entre sectors aparellades òptimament.

Assignment markets with the same core

[spa] En el contexto de los juegos de asignación bilaterales, estudiamos el conjunto de matrices asociadas a mercados de asignación con el mismo nucleo. Se proporcionan condiciones sobre las entradas de la matriz que aseguran que los juegos de asignación asociados tienen el mismo núcleo. Se prueba que este conjunto de matrices que dan lugar al mismo núcleo forman un semirretículo con un número finito de elementos minimales y un único máximo. Se da una caracterización de estos elementos minimales. También se proporciona una condición suficiente para obtener un retículo.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the core

[cat] En aquest treball introduïm la classe de "multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games", que generalitza la coneguda classe de jocs d’assignació de Böhm-Bawerk bilaterals a situacions amb un nombre arbitrari de sectors. Trobem els extrems del core de qualsevol multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game a partir d’un joc convex definit en el conjunt de sectors enlloc del conjunt de venedors i compradors. Addicionalment estudiem quan el core d’aquests jocs d’assignació és estable en el sentit de von Neumann-Morgenstern.

Consistency and the core of multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball es demostra que en el domini dels jocs d’assignació equilibrats multisectorials (Quint, 1991), el core és l’única solució no buida que satisfà derived consistency i projection consistency. També es caracteritza el core en tota la classe dels jocs d’assignació multisectorials amb els axiomes de singleness best, individual antimonotonicity i derived consistency. Com a casos particulars, s’obtenen dues noves axiomàtiques del core per als jocs d’assignació bilaterals (Shapley and Shubik, 1972).