Discovering the campus together: a mobile and computer-based learning experience

One of the most relevant difficulties faced by first-year undergraduate students is to settle into the educational environment of universities. This paper presents a case study that proposes a computer-assisted collaborative experience designed to help students in their transition from high school to university. This is done by facilitating their first contact with the campus and its services, the university community, methodologies and activities. The experience combines individual and collaborative activities, conducted in and out of the classroom, structured following the Jigsaw Collaborative Learning Flow Pattern. A specific environment including portable technologies with network and computer applications has been developed to support and facilitate the orchestration of a flow of learning activities into a single integrated learning setting. The result is a Computer-Supported Collaborative Blended Learning scenario, which has been evaluated with first-year university students of the degrees of Software and Audiovisual Engineering within the subject Introduction to Information and Communications Technologies. The findings reveal that the scenario improves significantly students’ interest in their studies and their understanding about the campus and services provided. The environment is also an innovative approach to successfully support the heterogeneous activities conducted by both teachers and students during the scenario. This paper introduces the goals and context of the case study, describes how the technology was employed to conduct the learning scenario, the evaluation methods and the main results of the experience.

Testing I(1) against I(d) alternatives in the presence of deteministic components

This paper discusses the role of deterministic components in the DGP and in the auxiliary regression model which underlies the implementation of the Fractional Dickey-Fuller (FDF) test for I(1) against I(d) processes with d ∈ [0, 1). This is an important test in many economic applications because I(d) processess with d & 1 are mean-reverting although, when 0.5 ≤ d & 1,, like I(1) processes, they are nonstationary. We show how simple is the implementation of the FDF in these situations, and argue that it has better properties than LM tests. A simple testing strategy entailing only asymptotically normally distributed tests is also proposed. Finally, an empirical application is provided where the FDF test allowing for deterministic components is used to test for long-memory in the per capita GDP of several OECD countries, an issue that has important consequences to discriminate between growth theories, and on which there is some controversy.

Panel index VAR models: Specification, Estimation, Testing and Leading Indicators

This paper proposes a method to conduct inference in panel VAR models with cross unit interdependencies and time variations in the coefficients. The approach can be used to obtain multi-unit forecasts and leading indicators and to conduct policy analysis in a multiunit setups. The framework of analysis is Bayesian and MCMC methods are used to estimate the posterior distribution of the features of interest. The model is reparametrized to resemble an observable index model and specification searches are discussed. As an example, we construct leading indicators for inflation and GDP growth in the Euro area using G-7 information.

Optable : The operation table serious game

Aquest treball consisteix en la realització d'un estudi al voltant dels anomenats serious games, jocs destinats a l'aprenentatge. Concretament, el projecte es centra en els serious games d'àmbit sanitari. A més d'un estudi de l'art, el treball consta del desenvolupament d'un serious game anomenat Optable per a la pràctica de la preparació del material quirúrgic d'una taula d'operacions. Aquesta aplicació ha estat desenvolupada sota llicència GNU GPL.

Stepwise multiple testing as formalized data snooping

It is common in econometric applications that several hypothesis tests arecarried out at the same time. The problem then becomes how to decide whichhypotheses to reject, accounting for the multitude of tests. In this paper,we suggest a stepwise multiple testing procedure which asymptoticallycontrols the familywise error rate at a desired level. Compared to relatedsingle-step methods, our procedure is more powerful in the sense that itoften will reject more false hypotheses. In addition, we advocate the useof studentization when it is feasible. Unlike some stepwise methods, ourmethod implicitly captures the joint dependence structure of the teststatistics, which results in increased ability to detect alternativehypotheses. We prove our method asymptotically controls the familywise errorrate under minimal assumptions. We present our methodology in the context ofcomparing several strategies to a common benchmark and deciding whichstrategies actually beat the benchmark. However, our ideas can easily beextended and/or modied to other contexts, such as making inference for theindividual regression coecients in a multiple regression framework. Somesimulation studies show the improvements of our methods over previous proposals. We also provide an application to a set of real data.

The customer valuations game as a basis for revenue management

I describe the customer valuations game, a simple intuitive game that can serve as a foundation for teaching revenue management. The game requires little or no preparation, props or software, takes around two hours (and hence can be finished in one session), and illustrates the formation of classical (airline and hotel) revenue management mechanisms such as advanced purchase discounts, booking limits and fixed multiple prices. I normally use the game as a base to introduce RM and to develop RM forecasting and optimization concepts off it. The game is particularly suited for non-technical audiences.

The credit ratings game

The spectacular failure of top-rated structured finance products has broughtrenewed attention to the conflicts of interest of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs). We modelboth the CRA conflict of understating credit risk to attract more business, and the issuerconflict of purchasing only the most favorable ratings (issuer shopping), and examine theeffectiveness of a number of proposed regulatory solutions of CRAs. We find that CRAs aremore prone to inflate ratings when there is a larger fraction of naive investors in the marketwho take ratings at face value, or when CRA expected reputation costs are lower. To theextent that in booms the fraction of naive investors is higher, and the reputation risk forCRAs of getting caught understating credit risk is lower, our model predicts that CRAs aremore likely to understate credit risk in booms than in recessions. We also show that, due toissuer shopping, competition among CRAs in a duopoly is less efficient (conditional on thesame equilibrium CRA rating policy) than having a monopoly CRA, in terms of both totalex-ante surplus and investor surplus. Allowing tranching decreases total surplus further.We argue that regulatory intervention requiring upfront payments for rating services (beforeCRAs propose a rating to the issuer) combined with mandatory disclosure of any ratingproduced by CRAs can substantially mitigate the con.icts of interest of both CRAs andissuers.

Under-achievement and the glass ceiling: Evidence from a TV game show

We use a Colombian TV game show to test gender differences in competitivebehavior where there is no opportunity for discrimination and females face no genderspecificexternal constraints. Each game started with six contestants who had toanswer general knowledge questions in private. There were five rounds of questionsand, at the end of each, one participant was eliminated. Despite equality in startingnumbers, women earn less than men and exit the game at a faster rate. In particular,there are more voluntary withdrawals by women than men. We draw an analogybetween the game and the process by which employees rise through the levels of acorporation. As such, we note that glass ceilings may result, in part, from women sown behavior and this raises the issue of how women are socialized to behave. At thesame time, our results illustrate that maintaining and promoting gender diversity at thelower/middle ranks of organizations is necessary to obtain gender diversity at the top.

Testing I(1) against I(d) alternatives in the presence of deteministic components

This paper discusses the role of deterministic components in the DGP and in the auxiliaryregression model which underlies the implementation of the Fractional Dickey-Fuller (FDF) test for I(1) against I(d) processes with d [0, 1). This is an important test in many economic applications because I(d) processess with d < 1 are mean-reverting although, when 0.5 = d < 1, like I(1) processes, they are nonstationary. We show how simple is the implementation of the FDF in these situations, and argue that it has better properties than LM tests. A simple testing strategy entailing only asymptotically normally distributedtests is also proposed. Finally, an empirical application is provided where the FDF test allowing for deterministic components is used to test for long-memory in the per capita GDP of several OECD countries, an issue that has important consequences to discriminate between growth theories, and on which there is some controversy.

Choice of partners in multiple two-person prisoner's dilemma games: An experimental study

We examine the effect of unilateral and mutual partner selection in the context of prisoner's dilemmas experimentally. Subjects play simultaneously several finitely repeated two-person prisoner's dilemma games. We find that unilateral choice is the best system. It leads to low defection and fewer singles than with mutual choice. Furthermore, with the unilateral choice setup we are able to show that intendingdefectors are more likely to try to avoid a match than intending cooperators. We compare our results of multiple games with single game PD-experiments and find no difference in aggregate behavior. Hence the multiple game technique is robust and might therefore be an important tool in the future for testing the use of mixed strategies.

An experimental study of adaptive behavior in an oligopolistic market game

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firm in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well--specified model of their environment. Our main objective is to characterize the adaptive behavior of the players in such a situation.

Testing for convergence clubs in income per-capita: A predictive density approach

The paper proposes a technique to jointly test for groupings of unknown size in the cross sectional dimension of a panel and estimates the parameters of each group, and applies it to identifying convergence clubs in income per-capita. The approach uses the predictive density of the data, conditional on the parameters of the model. The steady state distribution of European regional data clusters around four poles of attraction with different economic features. The distribution of incomeper-capita of OECD countries has two poles of attraction and each grouphas clearly identifiable economic characteristics.

Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies

The origins of electoral systems have received scant attention in the literature. Looking at the history of electoral rules in the advanced world in the last century, this paper shows that the existing wide variation in electoral rules across nations can be traced to the strategic decisions that the current ruling parties, anticipating the coordinating consequences of different electoral regimes, make to maximize their representation according to the following conditions. On the one hand, as long as the electoral arena does not change substantially and the current electoral regime serves the ruling parties well, the latter have no incentives to modify the electoral regime. On the other hand, as soon as the electoral arena changes (due to the entry of new voters or a change in their preferences), the ruling parties will entertain changing the electoral system, depending on two main conditions: the emergence of new parties and the coordinating capacities of the old ruling parties. Accordingly, if the new parties are strong, the old parties shift from plurality/majority rules to proportional representation (PR) only if the latter are locked into a 'non-Duvergerian' equilibrium; i.e. if no old party enjoys a dominant position (the case of most small European states)--conversely, they do not if a Duvergerian equilibrium exists (the case of Great Britain). Similarly, whenever the new entrants are weak, a non-PR system is maintained, regardless of the structure of the old party system (the case of the USA). The paper discusses as well the role of trade and ethnic and religious heterogeneity in the adoption of PR rules.