153 resultados para COORDINATION NETWORKS
Resumo:
We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.
Resumo:
We analyze the role of commitment in pre-play communication for ensuringefficient evolutionarily stable outcomes in coordination games. All players are a priori identical as they are drawn from the same population. In games where efficient outcomes can be reached by players coordinating on the same action we find commitment to be necessary to enforce efficiency. In games where efficienct outcomes only result from play of different actions, communication without commitment is most effective although efficiency can no longer be guaranteed. Only when there are many messages then inefficient outcomes are negligible as their basins of attraction become very small.
Resumo:
We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).
Resumo:
This paper considers a general and informationally efficient approach to determine the optimal access pricing rule for interconnected networks. It shows that there exists a simple rule that achieves the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium when networks compete in linear prices without network-based price discrimination. The approach is informationally efficient in the sense that the regulator is required to know only the marginal cost structure, i.e. the marginal cost of making and terminating a call. The approach is general in that access prices can depend not only on the marginal costs but also on the retail prices, which can be observed by consumers and therefore by the regulator as well. In particular, I consider the set of linear access pricing rules which includes any fixed access price, the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Modified ECPR as special cases. I show that in this set, there is a unique rule that implements the Ramsey outcome as the unique equilibrium independently of the underlying demand conditions.
Resumo:
While markets are often decentralized, in many other cases agents in one role can only negotiate with a proper subset of the agents in the complementary role. There may be proximity issues or restricted communication flows. For example, information may be transmitted only through word-of-mouth, as is often the case for job openings, business opportunities, and confidential transactions. Bargaining can be considered to occur over a network that summarizes the structure of linkages among people. We conduct an alternating-offer bargaining experiment using separate simple networks, which are then joined during the session by an additional link. The results diverge sharply depending on how this connection is made. Payoffs can be systematically affected even for agents who are not connected by the new link. We use a graph-theoretic analysis to show that any two-sided network can be decomposed into simple networks of three types, so that our result can be generalized to more complex bargaining environments. Participants appear to grasp the essential characteristics of the networks and we observe a rather consistently high level of bargaining efficiency.
Resumo:
Spanish banking historiography asserts that the largest banks performed in the twentieth century as though they constituted a monopoly. One of their main coordination schemes would have been a network of interlocking bank directors that would include most of the financial firms. Evidence available for the 1920s and 1960s seems to confirm the veracity of this hypothesis. In this paper, more systematic evidence is presented to cover the whole twentieth century with the aim of checking whether these networks persisted over the entire period or they were by-products of temporary situations. Our results show that no general network remained for more than a decade. Therefore, it should be ruled out that interlocking directorates worked as a coordination device of an alleged banking cartel.
Resumo:
We address the performance optimization problem in a single-stationmulticlass queueing network with changeover times by means of theachievable region approach. This approach seeks to obtainperformance bounds and scheduling policies from the solution of amathematical program over a relaxation of the system's performanceregion. Relaxed formulations (including linear, convex, nonconvexand positive semidefinite constraints) of this region are developedby formulating equilibrium relations satisfied by the system, withthe help of Palm calculus. Our contributions include: (1) newconstraints formulating equilibrium relations on server dynamics;(2) a flow conservation interpretation of the constraintspreviously derived by the potential function method; (3) newpositive semidefinite constraints; (4) new work decomposition lawsfor single-station multiclass queueing networks, which yield newconvex constraints; (5) a unified buffer occupancy method ofperformance analysis obtained from the constraints; (6) heuristicscheduling policies from the solution of the relaxations.
Resumo:
We address the problem of scheduling a multi-station multiclassqueueing network (MQNET) with server changeover times to minimizesteady-state mean job holding costs. We present new lower boundson the best achievable cost that emerge as the values ofmathematical programming problems (linear, semidefinite, andconvex) over relaxed formulations of the system's achievableperformance region. The constraints on achievable performancedefining these formulations are obtained by formulatingsystem's equilibrium relations. Our contributions include: (1) aflow conservation interpretation and closed formulae for theconstraints previously derived by the potential function method;(2) new work decomposition laws for MQNETs; (3) new constraints(linear, convex, and semidefinite) on the performance region offirst and second moments of queue lengths for MQNETs; (4) a fastbound for a MQNET with N customer classes computed in N steps; (5)two heuristic scheduling policies: a priority-index policy, anda policy extracted from the solution of a linear programmingrelaxation.
Resumo:
We formulate a knowlegde--based model of direct investment through mergers and acquisitions. M&As are realized to create comparative advantages by exploiting international synergies and appropriating local technology spillovers requiring geographical proximity, but can also represent a strategic response to the presence of a multinational rival. The takeover fee paid tends to increase with the strength of local spillovers which can thus work against multinationalization. Seller's bargaining power increases the takeover fee, but does not influence the investment decision. We characterize losers and winners from multinationalization, and show that foreign investment stimulates research but could result in a synergy trap reducing multinationals' profits.
Resumo:
This paper describes an optimized model to support QoS by mean of Congestion minimization on LSPs (Label Switching Path). In order to perform this model, we start from a CFA (Capacity and Flow Allocation) model. As this model does not consider the buffer size to calculate the capacity cost, our model- named BCA (Buffer Capacity Allocation)- take into account this issue and it improve the CFA performance. To test our proposal, we perform several simulations; results show that BCA model minimizes LSP congestion and uniformly distributes flows on the network
Resumo:
Considering a pure coordination game with a large number of equivalentequilibria, we argue, first, that a focal point that is itself not a Nash equilibriumand is Pareto dominated by all Nash equilibria, may attract the players'choices. Second, we argue that such a non-equilibrium focal point may act asan equilibrium selection device that the players use to coordinate on a closelyrelated small subset of Nash equilibria. We present theoretical as well asexperimental support for these two new roles of focal points as coordinationdevices.
Resumo:
Capital intensive industries in specialized niches of production have constituted solid ground for family firms in Spain , as evidenced by the experience of the iron and steel wire industries between 1870 and 2000. The embeddedness of these firms in their local and regional environments have allowed the creation of networks that, together with favourable institutional conditions, significantly explain the dominance of family entrepreneurship in iron and steel wire manufacturing in Spain, until the end of the 20 th century. Dominance of family firms at the regional level has not been not an obstacle for innovation in wire manufacturing in Spain, which has taken place even when institutional conditions blocked innovation and traditional networking. Therefore, economic theories about the difficulties dynastic family firms may have to perform appropriately in science-based industries must be questioned
Resumo:
We present a simple model of communication in networks with hierarchical branching. We analyze the behavior of the model from the viewpoint of critical systems under different situations. For certain values of the parameters, a continuous phase transition between a sparse and a congested regime is observed and accurately described by an order parameter and the power spectra. At the critical point the behavior of the model is totally independent of the number of hierarchical levels. Also scaling properties are observed when the size of the system varies. The presence of noise in the communication is shown to break the transition. The analytical results are a useful guide to forecasting the main features of real networks.
Resumo:
Random scale-free networks have the peculiar property of being prone to the spreading of infections. Here we provide for the susceptible-infected-susceptible model an exact result showing that a scale-free degree distribution with diverging second moment is a sufficient condition to have null epidemic threshold in unstructured networks with either assortative or disassortative mixing. Degree correlations result therefore irrelevant for the epidemic spreading picture in these scale-free networks. The present result is related to the divergence of the average nearest neighbors degree, enforced by the degree detailed balance condition.