115 resultados para Adaptive learning, Sticky information, Inflation dynamics, Nonlinearities
Resumo:
This paper presents a first approach of Evaluation Engine Architecture (EEA) as proposal to support adaptive integral assessment, in the context of a virtual learning environment. The goal of our research is design an evaluation engine tool to assist in the whole assessment process within the A2UN@ project, linking that tool with the other key elements of a learning design (learning task, learning resources and learning support). The teachers would define the relation between knowledge, competencies, activities, resources and type of assessment. Providing this relation is possible obtain more accurate estimations of student's knowledge for adaptive evaluations and future recommendations. The process is supported by usage of educational standards and specifications and for an integral user modelling
Resumo:
Objective: The importance of hemodynamics in the etiopathogenesis of intracranial aneurysms (IAs) is widely accepted.Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) is being used increasingly for hemodynamic predictions. However, alogn with thecontinuing development and validation of these tools, it is imperative to collect the opinion of the clinicians. Methods: A workshopon CFD was conducted during the European Society of Minimally Invasive Neurological Therapy (ESMINT) Teaching Course,Lisbon, Portugal. 36 delegates, mostly clinicians, performed supervised CFD analysis for an IA, using the @neuFuse softwaredeveloped within the European project @neurIST. Feedback on the workshop was collected and analyzed. The performancewas assessed on a scale of 1 to 4 and, compared with experts’ performance. Results: Current dilemmas in the management ofunruptured IAs remained the most important motivating factor to attend the workshop and majority of participants showedinterest in participating in a multicentric trial. The participants achieved an average score of 2.52 (range 0–4) which was 63% (range 0–100%) of an expert user. Conclusions: Although participants showed a manifest interest in CFD, there was a clear lack ofawareness concerning the role of hemodynamics in the etiopathogenesis of IAs and the use of CFD in this context. More effortstherefore are required to enhance understanding of the clinicians in the subject.
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One of the most relevant difficulties faced by first-year undergraduate students is to settle into the educational environment of universities. This paper presents a case study that proposes a computer-assisted collaborative experience designed to help students in their transition from high school to university. This is done by facilitating their first contact with the campus and its services, the university community, methodologies and activities. The experience combines individual and collaborative activities, conducted in and out of the classroom, structured following the Jigsaw Collaborative Learning Flow Pattern. A specific environment including portable technologies with network and computer applications has been developed to support and facilitate the orchestration of a flow of learning activities into a single integrated learning setting. The result is a Computer-Supported Collaborative Blended Learning scenario, which has been evaluated with first-year university students of the degrees of Software and Audiovisual Engineering within the subject Introduction to Information and Communications Technologies. The findings reveal that the scenario improves significantly students’ interest in their studies and their understanding about the campus and services provided. The environment is also an innovative approach to successfully support the heterogeneous activities conducted by both teachers and students during the scenario. This paper introduces the goals and context of the case study, describes how the technology was employed to conduct the learning scenario, the evaluation methods and the main results of the experience.
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For single-user MIMO communication with uncoded and coded QAM signals, we propose bit and power loading schemes that rely only on channel distribution information at the transmitter. To that end, we develop the relationship between the average bit error probability at the output of a ZF linear receiver and the bit rates and powers allocated at the transmitter. This relationship, and the fact that a ZF receiver decouples the MIMO parallel channels, allow leveraging bit loading algorithms already existing in the literature. We solve dual bit rate maximization and power minimization problems and present performance resultsthat illustrate the gains of the proposed scheme with respect toa non-optimized transmission.
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Utilizing the well-known Ultimatum Game, this note presents the following phenomenon. If we start with simple stimulus-response agents, learning through naive reinforcement, and then grant them some introspective capabilities, we get outcomes that are not closer but farther away from the fully introspective game-theoretic approach. The cause of this is the following: there is an asymmetry in the information that agents can deduce from their experience, and this leads to a bias in their learning process.
Resumo:
According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest rate rules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.
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Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.
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This paper analyzes the behavior of international capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents, especially during financial crises. We show that gross capital flows by foreigners and domestic agents are very large and volatile, especially relative to net capital flows. This is because when foreigners invest in a country domestic agents tend to invest abroad and vice versa. Gross capital flows are also pro-cyclical. During expansions, foreigners tend to bring in more capital and domestic agents tend to invest more abroad. During crises, there is retrenchment, i.e. a reduction in capital inflows by foreigners and an increase in capital inflows by domestic agents. This is especially true during severe crises and during systemic crises. The evidence can shed light on the nature of shocks driving international capital flows. It seems to favor shocks that affect foreigners and domestic agents asymmetrically -e.g. sovereign risk and asymmetric information- over productivity shocks.
Resumo:
Utilizing the well-known Ultimatum Game, this note presents the following phenomenon. If we start with simple stimulus-response agents,learning through naive reinforcement, and then grant them some introspective capabilities, we get outcomes that are not closer but farther away from the fully introspective game-theoretic approach. The cause of this is the following: there is an asymmetry in the information that agents can deduce from their experience, and this leads to a bias in their learning process.
Resumo:
According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest raterules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.
Resumo:
We formulate an evolutionary learning process in the spirit ofYoung (1993a) for games of incomplete information. The process involves trembles. For many games, if the amount of trembling is small, play will be in accordance with the games' (semi-strict) Bayesian equilibria most of the time. This supports the notion of Bayesian equilibrium. Further, often play will most of the time be in accordance with exactly one Bayesian equilibrium. This gives a selection among the Bayesian equilibria. For two specific games of economic interest wecharacterize this selection. The first is an extension to incomplete information of the prototype strategic conflict known as Chicken. The second is an incomplete information bilateral monopoly, which is also an extension to incompleteinformation of Nash's demand game, or a simple version ofthe so-called sealed bid double auction. For both gamesselection by evolutionary learning is in favor of Bayesianequilibria where some types of players fail to coordinate, such that the outcome is inefficient.
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This paper analyses the empirical interdependences among assetreturns, real activity and inflation from a multicountry and internationalpoint of view. We find that nominal stock returns are significantly relatedto inflation only in the US, that the US term structure of interest ratespredicts both domestic and foreign inflation rates while foreign termstructures do not have this predictive power and that innovations in inflationand exchange rates induce insignificant responses of real and financialvariables. An interpretation of the dynamics and some policy implicationsof the results are provided.
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This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implementsocial choice functions in the traditional sense. Will agents actually playthe equilibrium assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study theconvergence and stability properties of Sj\"ostr\"om's (1994) mechanism, onthe assumption that boundedly rational players find their way to equilibriumusing monotonic learning dynamics and also with fictitious play. Thismechanism implements most social choice functions in economic environmentsusing as a solution concept the iterated elimination of weakly dominatedstrategies (only one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies isneeded). There are, however, many sets of Nash equilibria whose payoffs maybe very different from those desired by the social choice function. Withmonotonic dynamics we show that many equilibria in all the sets ofequilibria we describe are the limit points of trajectories that havecompletely mixed initial conditions. The initial conditions that lead tothese equilibria need not be very close to the limiting point. Furthermore,even if the dynamics converge to the ``right'' set of equilibria, it stillcan converge to quite a poor outcome in welfare terms. With fictitious play,if the agents have completely mixed prior beliefs, beliefs and play convergeto the outcome the planner wants to implement.
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We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).
Resumo:
This paper studies the short run correlation of inflation and money growth. We study whether a model of learning can do better than a model of rational expectations, we focus our study on countries of high inflation. We take the money process as an exogenous variable, estimated from the data through a switching regime process. We findthat the rational expectations model and the model of learning both offer very good explanations for the joint behavior of money and prices.