Regional integration and specialisation patterns in Spain

The aim of this paper is to analyse how economic integration in Europe has affected industrial geographical concentration in Spain and explain what the driving forces behind industry location are. Firstly, we construct regional specialisation and geographical concentration indices for Spanish 50 provinces and 30 industrial sectors in 1979, 1986 and 1992. Secondly, we carry out an econometric analysis of the determinants of geographical concentration of industries. Our main conclusion is that there is no evidence of increasing specialisation in Spain between 1979 and 1992 and that the most important determinant of Spain¿s economic geography is scale economies. Furthermore, traditional trade theory has no effects in explaining the pattern of industrial concentration

An investment social network beside the Banco de Barcelona, an unusual case?

[cat] L’extensió de les activitats bancàries al segle XIX va ser liderat per alguns grups socials connectats amb el comerç, que van treure profit de la seva experiència i coneixement per estendre la seva influència al voltant del món del crèdit. A la historiografia espanyola, hi ha un conjunt de treballs que s’han centrat en aquesta gent, però en molts pocs casos s’ha fet una classificació que permeti detectar el conjunt de grups econòmics que han liderat el procés de modernització financera de l’Espanya de mitjans del segle XIX. El principal objectiu del treball és l’anàlisi dels grups socials que van formar el Banco de Barcelona entre 1844 i 1854. Aquesta institució va ser important per a la història financera i bancària d’Espanya per ser pionera en la seva activitat creditícia i d’emissió: a més, la seva experiència va servir com a base en la constitució d’un sistema financer modern a Espanya. En una societat com la catalana de mitjans del segle XIX, la confiança era un factor important per explicar la decisió d’invertir. L’aparició de noves companyies i les seves necessitats d’inversió van transformar el comportaments previs. Quin va ser el comportament dels inversors potencials? Va ser el grup que hi havia al voltant del banc el que va ascendir econòmicament en els anys centrals del segle XIX? La resposta és prou clara, els membres del consell d’administració del Banc de Barcelona formaven un grup apart dins dels grups que sorgeixen a l’economia catalana en el seu conjunt.

Regular population monotonic allocation schemes and the core

A subclass of games with population monotonic allocation schemes is studied, namelygames with regular population monotonic allocation schemes (rpmas). We focus on theproperties of these games and we prove the coincidence between the core and both theDavis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set

Modelos de tasas de interes en Chile: una revisión

Con este trabajo revisamos los Modelos de niveles de las tasas de intereses en Chile. Además de los Modelos de Nivel tradicionales por Chan, Karoly, Longstaff y Lijadoras (1992) en EE. UU, y Parisi (1998) en Chile, por el método de Probabilidad Maximun permitimos que la volatilidad condicional también incluya los procesos inesperados de la información (el modelo GARCH ) y también que la volatilidad sea la función del nivel de la tasa de intereses (modelo TVP-NIVELE) como en Brenner, Harjes y la Crona (1996). Para esto usamos producciones de mercado de bonos de reconocimiento, en cambio las producciones mensuales medias de subasta PDBC, y la ampliación del tamaño y la frecuencia de la muestra a 4 producciones semanales con términos(condiciones) diferentes a la madurez: 1 año, 5 años, 10 años y 15 años. Los resultados principales del estudio pueden ser resumidos en esto: la volatilidad de los cambios inesperados de las tarifas depende positivamente del nivel de las tarifas, sobre todo en el modelo de TVP-NIVEL. Obtenemos pruebas de reversión tacañas, tal que los incrementos en las tasas de intereses no eran independientes, contrariamente a lo obtenido por Brenner. en EE. UU. Los modelos de NIVELES no son capaces de ajustar apropiadamente la volatilidad en comparación con un modelo GARCH (1,1), y finalmente, el modelo de TVP-NIVEL no vence los resultados del modelo GARCH (1,1)

A Note on Shapley's convex measure games

L. S. Shapley, in his paper 'Cores of Convex Games', introduces Convex Measure Games, those that are induced by a convex function on R, acting over a measure on the coalitions. But in a note he states that if this function is a function of several variables, then convexity for the function does not imply convexity of the game or even superadditivity. We prove that if the function is directionally convex, the game is convex, and conversely, any convex game can be induced by a directionally convex function acting over measures on the coalitions, with as many measures as players

Security strategies and equilibria in multiobjetives matrix games

Multiobjective matrix games have been traditionally analyzed from two different points of view: equiibrium concepts and security strategies. This paper is based upon the idea that both players try to reach equilibrium points playing pairs of security strategies, as it happens in scalar matrix games. We show conditions guaranteeing the existence of equilibria in security strategies, named security equilibria

The set of undominated imputations and the core: an axiomatic approach

This paper provides an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core (the set of undominatedimputations) and the core of a cooperative game with transferable utility. Theorem1 states that the D-core is the only solution satisfying projection consistency, reasonableness (from above), (*)-antimonotonicity, and modularity. Theorem 2 characterizes the core replacing (*)-antimonotonicity by antimonotonicity. Moreover, these axioms alsocharacterize the core on the domain of convex games, totally balanced games, balancedgames, and superadditive games

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Sequential decisions in allocation problems

[eng] In the context of cooperative TU-games, and given an order of players, we consider the problem of distributing the worth of the grand coalition as a sequentia decision problem. In each step of process, upper and lower bounds for the payoff of the players are required related to successive reduced games. Sequentially compatible payoffs are defined as those allocation vectors that meet these recursive bounds. The core of the game is reinterpreted as a set of sequentally compatible payoffs when the Davis-Maschler reduced game is considered (Th.1). Independently of the reduction, the core turns out to be the intersections of the family of the sets of sequentially compatible payoffs corresponding to the different possible orderings (Th.2), so it is in some sense order-independent. Finally, we analyze advantagenous properties for the first player

Max-convex decompositions for cooperative TU games

We show that any cooperative TU game is the maximum of a finite collection of convex games. This max-convex decomposition can be refined by using convex games with non-negative dividends for all coalitions of at least two players. As a consequence of the above results we show that the class of modular games is a set of generators of the distributive lattice of all cooperative TU games. Finally, we characterize zero-monotonic games using a strong max-convex decomposition

On the monotonic core

The monotonic core of a cooperative game with transferable utility (T.U.-game) is the set formed by all its Population Monotonic Allocation Schemes. In this paper we show that this set always coincides with the core of a certain game associated to the initial game.

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Single-valued solutions for the Böhm-Bawerk horse market game

Single-valued solutions for the case of two-sided market games without product differentiation, also known as Böhm-Bawerk horse market games, are analyzed. The nucleolus is proved to coincide with the tau-value, and is thus the midpoint of the core. Moreover a characterization of this setof games in terms of the assignment matrix is provided.