The effects of poor financial information systems on the long term sustainability of local public services. Empirical evidence from the Catalan Municipalities

In this paper we describe the existence of financial illusion in public accountingand we comment on its effects for the future sustainability of local publicservices. We relate these features to the lack of incentives amongst publicmanagers for improving the financial reporting and thus management of publicassets. Financial illusion pays off for politicians and managers since it allowsfor larger public expenditure increases and managerial slack, these beingarguments in their utility functions. This preference is strengthen by the shorttime perspective of politically appointed public managers. Both factors runagainst public accountability. This hypothesis is tested for Spain by using anunique sample. We take data from around forty Catalan local authorities withpopulation above 20,000 for the financial years 1993-98. We build this databasis from the Catalan Auditing Office Reports in a way that it can be linkedto some other local social and economic variables in order to test ourassumptions. The results confirm that there is a statistical relationship between the financialillusion index (FI as constructed in the paper) and higher current expenditure.This reflects on important overruns and increases of the delay in payingsuppliers, as well as on a higher difficulties to face capital finance. Mechanismsfor FI creation have to do among other factors, with delays in paying suppliers(and thereafter higher future financial costs per unit of service), no adequateprovision for bad debts and lack of appropriate capital funding either forreposition or for new equipments. For this, it is crucial to monitor the way inwhich capital transfers are accounted in local public sheet balances. As a result,for most of the Municipalities we analyse, the funds for guaranteeing continuityand sustainability of public services provision are today at risk.Given managerial incentives at present in public institutions, we conclude thatpublic regulation recently enforced for assuring better information systems inlocal public management may not be enough to change the current state of affairs.

On the throughput-WIP trade-off in queueing systems, diminishing returns and the threshold property: A linear programming approach

We present a new unifying framework for investigating throughput-WIP(Work-in-Process) optimal control problems in queueing systems,based on reformulating them as linear programming (LP) problems withspecial structure: We show that if a throughput-WIP performance pairin a stochastic system satisfies the Threshold Property we introducein this paper, then we can reformulate the problem of optimizing alinear objective of throughput-WIP performance as a (semi-infinite)LP problem over a polygon with special structure (a thresholdpolygon). The strong structural properties of such polygones explainthe optimality of threshold policies for optimizing linearperformance objectives: their vertices correspond to the performancepairs of threshold policies. We analyze in this framework theversatile input-output queueing intensity control model introduced byChen and Yao (1990), obtaining a variety of new results, including (a)an exact reformulation of the control problem as an LP problem over athreshold polygon; (b) an analytical characterization of the Min WIPfunction (giving the minimum WIP level required to attain a targetthroughput level); (c) an LP Value Decomposition Theorem that relatesthe objective value under an arbitrary policy with that of a giventhreshold policy (thus revealing the LP interpretation of Chen andYao's optimality conditions); (d) diminishing returns and invarianceproperties of throughput-WIP performance, which underlie thresholdoptimality; (e) a unified treatment of the time-discounted andtime-average cases.

A consistency test of the time trade-off

This paper tests the internal consistency of time trade-off utilities.We find significant violations of consistency in the direction predictedby loss aversion. The violations disappear for higher gauge durations.We show that loss aversion can also explain that for short gaugedurations time trade-off utilities exceed standard gamble utilities. Ourresults suggest that time trade-off measurements that use relativelyshort gauge durations, like the widely used EuroQol algorithm(Dolan 1997), are affected by loss aversion and lead to utilities thatare too high.

A test of the predictive validity of non-linear QALY models using time trade-off utilities

This paper presents a test of the predictive validity of various classes ofQALY models (i.e., linear, power and exponential models). We first estimatedTTO utilities for 43 EQ-5D chronic health states and next these states wereembedded in health profiles. The chronic TTO utilities were then used topredict the responses to TTO questions with health profiles. We find that thepower QALY model clearly outperforms linear and exponential QALY models.Optimal power coefficient is 0.65. Our results suggest that TTO-based QALYcalculations may be biased. This bias can be avoided using a power QALY model.

Trade-off between formal and informal care in Spain

The remarkable growth of older population has moved long term care to the front ranks of the social policy agenda. Understanding the factors that determine the type and amount of formal care is important for predicting use in the future and developing long-term policy. In this context we jointly analyze the choice of care (formal, informal, both together or none) as well as the number of hours of care received. Given that the number of hours of care is not independent of the type of care received, we estimate, for the first time in this area of research, a sample selection model with the particularity that the first step is a multinomial logit model. With regard to the debate about complementarity or substitutability between formal and informal care, our results indicate that formal care acts as a reinforcement of the family care in certain cases: for very old care receivers, in those cases in which the individual has multiple disabilities, when many care hours are provided, and in case of mental illness and/or dementia. There exist substantial differences in long term care addressed to younger and older dependent people and dependent women are in risk of becoming more vulnerable to the shortage of informal caregivers in the future. Finally, we have documented that there are great disparities in the availability of public social care across regions.

Killing by lung cancer or by diabetes? The trade-off between smoking and obesity

As the prevalence of smoking has decreased to below 20%, health practitioners interest has shifted towards theprevalence of obesity, and reducing it is one of the major health challenges in decades to come. In this paper westudy the impact that the final product of the anti-smoking campaign, that is, smokers quitting the habit, had onaverage weight in the population. To these ends, we use data from the Behavioral Risk Factors Surveillance System,a large series of independent representative cross-sectional surveys. We construct a synthetic panel that allows us tocontrol for unobserved heterogeneity and we exploit the exogenous changes in taxes and regulations to instrumentthe endogenous decision to give up the habit of smoking. Our estimates, are very close to estimates issued in the 90sby the US Department of Health, and indicate that a 10% decrease in the incidence of smoking leads to an averageweight increase of 2.2 to 3 pounds, depending on choice of specification. In addition, we find evidence that the effectovershoots in the short run, although a significant part remains even after two years. However, when we split thesample between men and women, we only find a significant effect for men. Finally, the implicit elasticity of quittingsmoking to the probability of becoming obese is calculated at 0.58. This implies that the net benefit from reducingthe incidence of smoking by 1% is positive even though the cost to society is $0.6 billions.