Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.

Long-run selection and the work ethic

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Adaptive model selection using empirical complexities

Given $n$ independent replicates of a jointly distributed pair $(X,Y)\in {\cal R}^d \times {\cal R}$, we wish to select from a fixed sequence of model classes ${\cal F}_1, {\cal F}_2, \ldots$ a deterministic prediction rule $f: {\cal R}^d \to {\cal R}$ whose risk is small. We investigate the possibility of empirically assessingthe {\em complexity} of each model class, that is, the actual difficulty of the estimation problem within each class. The estimated complexities are in turn used to define an adaptive model selection procedure, which is based on complexity penalized empirical risk.The available data are divided into two parts. The first is used to form an empirical cover of each model class, and the second is used to select a candidate rule from each cover based on empirical risk. The covering radii are determined empirically to optimize a tight upper bound on the estimation error. An estimate is chosen from the list of candidates in order to minimize the sum of class complexity and empirical risk. A distinguishing feature of the approach is that the complexity of each model class is assessed empirically, based on the size of its empirical cover.Finite sample performance bounds are established for the estimates, and these bounds are applied to several non-parametric estimation problems. The estimates are shown to achieve a favorable tradeoff between approximation and estimation error, and to perform as well as if the distribution-dependent complexities of the model classes were known beforehand. In addition, it is shown that the estimate can be consistent,and even possess near optimal rates of convergence, when each model class has an infinite VC or pseudo dimension.For regression estimation with squared loss we modify our estimate to achieve a faster rate of convergence.

Revealed preference and indifferent selection

It is shown that preferences can be constructed from observed choice behavior in a way that is robust to indifferent selection (i.e., the agent is indifferent between two alternatives but, nevertheless, is only observed selecting one of them). More precisely, a suggestion by Savage (1954) to reveal indifferent selection by considering small monetary perturbations of alternatives is formalized and generalized to a purely topological framework: references over an arbitrary topological space can be uniquely derived from observed behavior under the assumptions that they are continuous and nonsatiated and that a strictly preferred alternative is always chosen, and indifferent selection is then characterized by discontinuity in choice behavior. Two particular cases are then analyzed: monotonic preferences over a partially ordered set, and preferences representable by a continuous pseudo-utility function.

A model of collateral, investment and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investmentunder adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not bemonotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in whichinvestment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurialwealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing inentrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively highand; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuousfall in investment.

Model selection and error estimation

We study model selection strategies based on penalized empirical loss minimization. We point out a tight relationship between error estimation and data-based complexity penalization: any good error estimate may be converted into a data-based penalty function and the performance of the estimate is governed by the quality of the error estimate. We consider several penalty functions, involving error estimates on independent test data, empirical {\sc vc} dimension, empirical {\sc vc} entropy, andmargin-based quantities. We also consider the maximal difference between the error on the first half of the training data and the second half, and the expected maximal discrepancy, a closely related capacity estimate that can be calculated by Monte Carlo integration. Maximal discrepancy penalty functions are appealing for pattern classification problems, since their computation is equivalent to empirical risk minimization over the training data with some labels flipped.

Revised NEO personality inventory normative data for catalan police officer selection: preliminary study

El Servei d'Avaluació, Seguiment i Selecció de l'ISPC han elaborat un estudi sobre el perfil de personalitat dels aspirants al Curs de Formació bàsica per policies, que es va presentar a l'International Society for the Study of Individual Differences Meeting celebrat al CosmoCaixa de Barcelona i que organitzen conjuntament l’Associació Iberoamericana per a la recerca de les diferències individuals i la Universitat de Barcelona. L’estudi, titulat Revised NEO Personality Inventory Normative Data for Catalan police officer selection: A preliminary study, té com a objectiu comparar els perfils de personalitat d’una mostra d’aspirants de l’ISPC amb els resultats d’una mostra d’aspirants a policia dels EUA, publicada en una revista científica de prestigi el mes de febrer passat. Els resultats mostren que els aspirants catalans destaquen per obtenir millors puntuacions en les dimensions de responsabilitat i amabilitat, cosa que indicaria que aquest tret es valora especialment durant el procés de selecció de la policia de Catalunya; en altres característiques de la personalitat les dues mostres obtenen resultats similars. Els trets característics del perfil del policia català seria el de persones estables emocionalment, poc impulsives, amb capacitat per gestionar l’estrés, orientades a les persones, agradables, sociables, responsables, disciplinades i cauteloses. Enllaç a: International Society for the Study of Individual Differences Meeting :http://www.issid.org/conferences/ISSID2013/ISSIDconference2013.html

Habitat selection by grey mullets (Osteichthyes: Mugilidae) in Mediterranean estuaries: the role of salinity.

A stratified study of microhabitat use by grey mullet on the island of Minorca (Balearic archipelago, western Mediterranean) showed that the distribution of all the species was dramatically affected by salinity. Sites with a salinity level under 15 were positively selected in spring and summer by those species whose growth performance was the best in oligomesohaline water (Liza ramado and Mugil cephalus) but also by a species whose growth was not affected by salinity (Chelon labrosus). Liza aurata concentrated in polyhaline and euhaline sites, where growth was improved, a pattern also exhibited by Liza saliens. Both species avoided fresh water sites all year round. As a consequence, community structure was correlated with salinity. The above reported electivity patterns often disappeared in autumn, when most grey mullets migrate off-shore.

Fine-Tuning Translation Kinetics Selection as the Driving Force of Codon Usage Bias in the Hepatitis A Virus Capsid

Hepatitis A virus (HAV), the prototype of genus Hepatovirus, has several unique biological characteristics that distinguish it from other members of the Picornaviridae family. Among these, the need for an intact eIF4G factor for the initiation of translation results in an inability to shut down host protein synthesis by a mechanism similar to that of other picornaviruses. Consequently, HAV must inefficiently compete for the cellular translational machinery and this may explain its poor growth in cell culture. In this context of virus/cell competition, HAV has strategically adopted a naturally highly deoptimized codon usage with respect to that of its cellular host. With the aim to optimize its codon usage the virus was adapted to propagate in cells with impaired protein synthesis, in order to make tRNA pools more available for the virus. A significant loss of fitness was the immediate response to the adaptation process that was, however, later on recovered and more associated to a re-deoptimization rather than to an optimization of the codon usage specifically in the capsid coding region. These results exclude translation selection and instead suggest fine-tuning translation kinetics selection as the underlying mechanism of the codon usage bias in this specific genome region. Additionally, the results provide clear evidence of the Red Queen dynamics of evolution since the virus has very much evolved to re-adapt its codon usage to the environmental cellular changing conditions in order to recover the original fitness.

Comment on "Selection of the Saffman-Taylor finger width in the absence of surface tension: an exact result"

A Comment on the Letter by Mark Mineev-Weinstein, Phys. Rev. Lett. 80, 2113 (1998). The authors of the Letter offer a Reply.

Selection, shape and relaxation of fronts: A numerical study of the effects of inertia.

We study the problem of front propagation in the presence of inertia. We extend the analytical approach for the overdamped problem to this case, and present numerical results to support our theoretical predictions. Specifically, we conclude that the velocity and shape selection problem can still be described in terms of the metastable, nonlinear, and linear overdamped regimes. We study the characteristic relaxation dynamics of these three regimes, and the existence of degenerate (¿quenched¿) solutions.

Reply to Comment on 'Two-finger selection theory in the Saffman-Taylor problem

We clarify the meaning of the results of Phys. Rev. E 60, R5013 (1999). We discuss the use and implications of periodic boundary conditions, as opposed to rigid-wall ones. We briefly argue that the solutions of the paper above are physically relevant as part of a more general issue, namely the possible generalization to dynamics, of the microscopic solvability scenario of selection.