Strategic behavior and price discovery

The paper analyzes the effects of strategic behavior by an insider in a price discovery process, akin to an information tatonnement, in the presence of a competitive informed sector. Such processes are used in the preopening period of continuous trading systems in several exchanges. It is found that the insider manipulates the market using a contrarian strategy in order to neutralize the effect of the trades of competitive informed agents. Furthermore, consistently with the empirical evidence available, we find that information revelation accelerates close to the opening, that the market price does not converge to the fundamental value no matter how many rounds the tatonnement has, and that the expected trading volume displays a U-shaped pattern. We also find that a market with a larger competitive sector (smaller insider) has an improved informational efficiency and an increased trading volume. The insider provides a public good (a lower informativeness of the price) for the competitive informed sector.

Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty

This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).

Does foreign direct investment crowd out domestic entrepreneurship?

In analyzing firm entry and exit across Belgian manufacturing industries,this paper presents evidence that import competition and foreign directinvestment discourage entry and stimulate exit of domestic entrepreneurs.These results are in line with theoretical occupational choice modelsthat predict foreign direct investment would crowd out domesticentrepreneurs through their selections in product and labor markets.However, the empirical results also suggest that this crowding out effectmay be moderated or even reversed in the long-run due to the long termpositive effects of FDI on domestic entrpreneurship as a result oflearning, demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreignand domestic firms.

Financing constraints, irreversibility and investment dynamics

We develop a model of an industry with many heterogeneous firms that face both financingconstraints and irreversibility constraints. The financing constraint implies that firmscannot borrow unless the debt is secured by collateral; the irreversibility constraint thatthey can only sell their fixed capital by selling their business. We use this model to examinethe cyclical behavior of aggregate fixed investment, variable capital investment, and outputin the presence of persistent idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Our model yields threemain results. First, the effect of the irreversibility constraint on fixed capital investmentis reinforced by the financing constraint. Second, the effect of the financing constraint onvariable capital investment is reinforced by the irreversibility constraint. Finally, the interactionbetween the two constraints is key for explaining why input inventories and materialdeliveries of US manufacturing firms are so volatile and procyclical, and also why they arehighly asymmetrical over the business cycle.

Testing financing constraints on firm investment using variable capital

We consider a dynamic multifactor model of investment with financing imperfections,adjustment costs and fixed and variable capital. We use the model to derive a test offinancing constraints based on a reduced form variable capital equation. Simulation resultsshow that this test correctly identifies financially constrained firms even when the estimationof firms investment opportunities is very noisy. In addition, the test is well specified inthe presence of both concave and convex adjustment costs of fixed capital. We confirmempirically the validity of this test on a sample of small Italian manufacturing companies.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Firm-specific investment, sticky prices and the Taylor principle

According to the Taylor principle a central bank should adjust the nominal interest rate by more than one-for-one in response to changes in current inflation. Most of the existing literature supports the view that by following this simple recommendation a central bank can avoid being a source of unnecessary fluctuations in economic activity. The present paper shows that this conclusion is not robust with respect to the modelling of capital accumulation. We use our insights to discuss the desirability of alternative interest raterules. Our results suggest a reinterpretation of monetary policy under Volcker and Greenspan: The empirically plausible characterization of monetary policy can explain the stabilization of macroeconomic outcomes observed in the early eighties for the US economy. The Taylor principle in itself cannot.

Strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Many have observed that political candidates running for election areoften purposefully expressing themselves in vague and ambiguous terms. In thispaper we provide a simple formal model of this phenomenon. We model theelectoral competition between two candidates as a two--stage game. In thefirst stage of the game two candidates simultaneously choose their ideologies,and in the second stage they simultaneously choose their level of ambiguity.Our results show that ambiguity, although disliked by voters, may be sustainedin equilibrium. The introduction of ambiguity as a strategic choice variablefor the candidates can also serve to explain why candidates with the sameelectoral objectives end up ``separating'', that is, assuming different ideological positions.

On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability

We analyze which normal form solution concepts capture the notion offorward induction, as defined by van Damme (JET, 1989) in the classof generic two player normal form games preceded by an outsideoption. We find that none of the known strategic stability concepts(including Mertens stable sets and hyperstable sets) captures this form of forward induction. On the other hand, we show that the evolutionary concept of EES set (Swinkels, JET, 1992) is always consistent with forward induction.

Health investment complementarities under competing risks

Applying the competing--risks model to multi--cause mortality,this paper provides a theoretical and empirical investigation of the positive complementarities that occur between disease--specific policy interventions. We argue that since an individual cannot die twice, competing risks imply that individuals will not waste resources on causes that are not the most immediate, but will make health investments so as to equalize cause--specific mortality. However, equal mortality risk from a variety of diseases does not imply that disease--specific public health interventions are a waste. Rather, a cause--specific intervention produces spillovers to other disease risks, so that the overall reduction in mortality will generally be larger than the direct effect measured on the targeted disease. The assumption that mortality from non--targeted diseases remains the same after a cause--specific intervention under--estimates the true effect of such programs, since the background mortality is also altered as a result of intervention. Analyzing data from one of the most important public health programs ever introduced, the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) of the United Nations, we find evidence for the existence of such complementarities, involving causes that are not biomedically, but behaviorally, linked.

Pitfalls in the modeling of forward-looking price setting and investment decisions

The present paper makes progress in explaining the role of capital for inflation and output dynamics. We followWoodford (2003, Ch. 5) in assuming Calvo pricing combined with a convex capital adjustment cost at the firm level. Our main result is that capital accumulation affects inflation dynamics primarily through its impact on the marginal cost. This mechanism is much simpler than the one implied by the analysis in Woodford's text. The reason is that his analysis suffers from a conceptual mistake, as we show. The latter obscures the economic mechanism through which capital affects inflation and output dynamics in the Calvo model, as discussed in Woodford (2004).

Credit constraints, firms' precautionary investment and the business cycle

This paper studies the macroeconomic implications of firms' investment composition choices in the presence of credit constraints. Following a negative andpersistent aggregate productivity shock, firms shift into short-term investments because they produce more pledgeable output and because they help alleviate futureborrowing constraints. This produces a short-run dampening of the effects of theshock, at the expense of lower long-term investment and future output, relativeto an economy with no credit market imperfections. The effects are exacerbatedby a steepening of the term structure of interest rates that further encourages ashift towards short-term investments in the short-run. Small temporary shocks tothe severity of financing frictions generate large and long-lasting effects on outputthrough their impact on the composition of investment. A positive financial shockproduces much stronger effects than an identical negative shock, while the responsesto positive and negative shocks to aggregate productivity are roughly symmetric.Finally, the paper introduces a novel explanation for the countercyclicality of financing constraints of firms.

Firm investment in imperfect capital markets: A structural estimation

We set up a dynamic model of firm investment in which liquidity constraintsenter explicity into the firm's maximization problem. The optimal policyrules are incorporated into a maximum likelihood procedure which estimatesthe structural parameters of the model. Investment is positively related tothe firm's internal financial position when the firm is relatively poor. This relationship disappears for wealthy firms, which can reach theirdesired level of investment. Borrowing is an increasing function of financial position for poor firms. This relationship is reversed as a firm's financial position improves, and large firms hold little debt.Liquidity constrained firms may be unused credits lines and the capacity toinvest further if they desire. However the fear that liquidity constraintswill become binding in the future induces them to invest only when internalresources increase.We estimate the structural parameters of the model and use them to quantifythe importance of liquidity constraints on firms' investment. We find thatliquidity constraints matter significantly for the investment decisions of firms. If firms can finance investment by issuing fresh equity, rather than with internal funds or debt, average capital stock is almost 35% higher overa period of 20 years. Transitory shocks to internal funds have a sustained effect on the capital stock. This effect lasts for several periods and ismore persistent for small firms than for large firms. A 10% negative shock to firm fundamentals reduces the capital stock of firms which face liquidityconstraints by almost 8% over a period as opposed to only 3.5% for firms which do not face these constraints.

Entrepreneurial risk, investment and innovation

In this paper I develop a general equilibrium model with risk averse entrepreneurialfirms and with public firms. The model predicts that an increase in uncertainty reducesthe propensity of entrepreneurial firms to innovate, while it does not affect thepropensity of public firms to innovate. Furthermore, it predicts that the negativeeffect of uncertainty on innovation is stronger for the less diversified entrepreneurialfirms, and is stronger in the absence of financing frictions in the economy. In thesecond part of the paper I test these predictions on a dataset of small and mediumItalian manufacturing firms.

Endogeneizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments

In this paper we carefully link knowledge flows to and from a firm s innovation process with this firm s investment decisions. Three types of investments are considered: investments in applied research, investments in basic research, and investments in intellectual property protection. Only when basic research is performed, can the firm effectively access incoming knowledge flows and these incoming spillovers serve to increase the efficiency of own applied research. The firm can at the same time influence outgoing knowledge flows, improving appropriability of its innovations, by investing in protection. Our results indicate that firms with small budgets for innovation will not invest in basic research. This occurs in the short run, when the budget for know-how creation is restricted, or in the long-run, when market opportunities are low, when legal protection is not very important, or, when the pool of accessible and relevant external know-how is limited. The ratio of basic to applied research is non-decreasing in the size of the pool of accessible external know-how, the size and opportunity of the market, and, the effectiveness of intellectual property rights protection. This indicates the existence of economies of scale in basic research due to external market related factors. Empirical evidence from a sample of innovative manufacturing firms in Belgium confirms the economies of scale in basic research as a consequence of the firm s capacity to access external knowledge flows and to protectintellectual property, as well as the complementarity between legal and strategic investments.