Linkages of dietary patterns, international trade and land use: the case of olive oil in the European Union

Within only two decades olive oil developed from a niche product which could hardly be found in food stores outside the producing regions towards an integrated component in the diets of industrial countries. This paper discusses the impacts of the promotion of the “healthy Mediterranean diet” on land use and agro-ecosystems in the producing countries. It examines the dynamics of olive oil production, trade and consumption in the EU15 in the period 1972 to 2003 and the links between dietary patterns, trade and land use. It analyses the underlying socio-economic driving forces behind the increasing spatial disconnect between production and consumption of olive oil in the EU15 and in particular in Spain, the world largest producer during the last three decades. In the observed period olive oil consumption increased 16 fold in the non-producing EU15 countries. In the geographically limited producing regions like Spain, the 5 fold increase in export production was associated with the rapid industrialization of olive production, the conversion of vast Mediterranean landscapes to olive monocultures and a range of environmental pressures. High amounts of subsidies of the European Common Agricultural Policy and feedback loops within production and consumption systems were driving the transformation of the olive oil system. Our analysis indicates the process of change was not immediately driven by increases in demand for olive oil in non-producing countries, but rather by the institutional setting of the European Union and by concerted political interventions.

The Impact of democratization: a preliminary investigation on social policies and political violence in Latin America

The recent strides of democracy in Latin America have been associated to conflicting outcomes. The expectation that democracy would bring about peace and prosperity have been only partly satisfied. While political violence has been by and large eradicated from the sub-continent, poverty and social injustice still prevail and hold sway. Our study argues that democracy matters for inequality through the growing strength of center left and left parties and by making political leaders in general more responsive to the underprivileged. Furthermore, although the pension reforms recently enacted in the region generated overall regressive outcomes on income distribution, democratic countries still benefit from their political past: where democratic tradition was stronger, such outcomes have been milder. Democratic tradition and the specific ideological connotations of the parties in power, on the other hand, did not play an equally crucial role in securing lower levels of political violence: during the last wave of democratizations in Latin America, domestic peace was rather an outcome of political and social concessions to those in distress. In sum, together with other factors and especially economic ones, the reason why recent democratizations have provided domestic peace in most cases, but have been unable so far to solve the problem of poverty and inequality, is that democratic traditions in the subcontinent have been relatively weak and, more specifically, that this weakness has undermined the growth of left and progressive parties, acting as an obstacle to redistribution. Such weakness, on the other hand, has not prevented the drastic reduction of domestic political violence, since what mattered in this case was a combination of symbolic or material concessions and political agreements among powerful élites and counter-élites.

Lessons of peace in Aceh: administrative decentralization and political freedom as a strategy of pacification in Aceh

This working paper shows the evolution of the Aceh conflict until its peaceful resolution in 2005. The key factors in the success of this peace process have been the confluence of several factors related to the internal and external dynamics of the country, including the new political leadership, the decreasing role of the military power, the international support and the meeting of the objectives of both groups, and so on. The end of the conflict in Aceh shows that the administrative decentralization and the promotion of the political participation of the main actors involved have made possible the development of a solid alternative to the arms strategy of conflict resolution used for years in Indonesia.

La figura di Nikola Tesla (1856-1943) in Tajna Nikole Tesle (1980)

Nikola Tesla è considerato, dai divulgatori scientifici che di lui si occupano, una figura chiave nella storia della scienza moderna e contemporanea, per l’importanza che hanno avuto le sue ricerche nello sviluppo di tecnologie del XX e XXI secolo. La sua attuale scarsa fama nel piano accademico contrasta con un’abbondante presenza di un Nikola Tesla come personaggio di finzione nelle arti popolari. Questa ricezione ambigua di Tesla potrebbe essere di fatto relazionata con il carattere utopico e visionario delle sue speranze nella scienza come mezzo di conoscenza per il miglioramento della società umana. Questo breve saggio si propone di analizzare come venga presentato il personaggio di Nikola Tesla nel lungometraggio jugoslavo Tajna Nikole Tesle, contribuendo così alla comprensione di come la narrativa di finzione possa sfruttare l’immagine di uno scienziato relativamente agli interessi politici legati a specifici contesti socio-storici.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

The Political cost of reforms

This paper formalizes in a fully-rational model the popular idea that politicians perceive an electoral cost in adopting costly reforms with future benefits and reconciles it with the evidence that reformist governments are not punished by voters. To do so, it proposes a model of elections where political ability is ex-ante unknown and investment in reforms is unobservable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians make too little reforms in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reappointment probability. Although in a rational expectation equilibrium voters cannot be fooled and hence reelection does not depend on reforms, the strategy of underinvesting in reforms is nonetheless sustained by out-of-equilibrium beliefs. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty makes reforms more politically viable and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. The model is then used to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximize social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of this theory are consistent with a number of empirical regularities on the determinants of reforms and reelection. They are also consistent with a new stylized fact documented in this paper: economic uncertainty is associated to more reforms in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Political Competition in Hard Times

This paper analyzes a spatial model of political competition between two policy- motivated parties in hard times of crisis. Hard times are modeled in terms of policy- making costs carried by a newly elected party. The results predict policy divergence in equilibrium. If the ideological preferences of parties are quite diverse and extreme, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce symmetric platforms and each party wins with probability one half. If one party is extreme while the other is more moderate, there is a unique equilibrium in which the parties announce asymmetric platforms. If the preferred policies of the parties are not very distinct, there are two equilibria with asymmetric platforms. An important property of equilibrium with asymmetric platforms is that a winning party necessarily announces its most preferred policy as a platform. JEL classification: D72. Keywords: Spatial model; Political competition; Two-party system; Policy-motivated parties; Hard times; Crisis.

Retos para la integración e intercambio de información : aprendiendo de NEEO

Aquesta presentació il·lustra com les limitacions de l'estàndard Dublin Core i OAI-PMH, són superades pels estàndards DIDL-MODS i SwUP. Recentment, 24 institucions europees líders en les àrees econòmiques i membres del consorci Nereus, han adoptat aquests estàndards per a proveir continguts i dades d'ús al portal Economist Online en el context del projecte NEEO (Network of European Economists Online).Com a soci del projecte NEEO, la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, amb la col·laboració de @mire, empresa de serveis especialitzada en el programari DSpace, ha realitzat la implementació d'aquests estàndards en el seu dipòsit E-Arxiu, proveïdor de dades de Economist Online.

Violence and Political Institutions in the Basque Country

A credible analysis or proposal to solve the problem of the treatment of violence in divided societies has to based in a good understanding of the micro-foundations of the political mobilization in these societies. Much of the engineering models seem to have been based on rather strong simplifications of the electoral behaviour of the citizens. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of the underlying political competition in divided societies with a neo-downsian model of party competition that is based on the interpretation of Tsebelis (1991) of the consociationalism.

Do Fiscal and Political Decentralization Raise Students’ Performance? A Cross-Country Analysis

The low quality of education is a persistent problem in many developed countries. Parallel to in the last decades exists a tendency towards decentralization in many developed and developing countries. Using micro data from the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) referred to 22 countries, we test whether there exists an impact of fiscal and political decentralization on student performance in the areas of mathematics, reading skills and science. We observe that fiscal decentralization exerts an unequivocal positive effect on students’ outcomes in all areas, while the effect of political decentralization is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the capacity of the subnational governments to rule on its region has a positive effect on students’ performance in mathematics. On the other hand, the capacity to influence the country as a whole has a negative impact on mathematics achievement. As a general result, we observe that students’ performance in Mathematics is more sensible to these exogenous variations than in Sciences and reading skills. Keywords: School outcomes, PISA, fiscal decentralization, political decentralization JEL codes: H11, H77, I21

An Inquiry into the use of illegal electoral practices and effects of political violence

This article investigates whether vote-buying and the instigation of violence in the disputed 2007 Kenyan elections were strategically motivated, and whether those affected by electoral violence changed their views towards ethno-politics and the use of violence. To answer these questions, a panel survey conducted before and after the elections is combined with external indicators of electoral violence. We find that political parties targeted vote-buying towards specific groups to weaken the support of their political rivals and to mobilize their own supporters. Furthermore, parties instigated violence strategically in areas where they were less likely to win. Although the victims of violence would prefer that parties are no longer allowed to organize in ethnic or religious lines, they are more likely to identify in ethnic terms, support the use of violence and avoid relying on the police to resolve disputes. The overall findings suggest an increased risk of electoral-violence reoccurring.

Uncertainty, electoral Incentives and political myopia

In this paper, we study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability where the key elements are informational frictions and uncertainty. We build a framework where political ability is ex-ante unknown and policy choices are not perfectly observable. On the one hand, elections improve accountability and allow to keep well-performing incumbents. On the other, politicians invest too little in costly policies with future returns in an attempt to signal high ability and increase their reelection probability. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may, under some conditions, increase social welfare. We use the model to study how political rewards can be set so as to maximise social welfare and the desirability of imposing a one-term limit to governments. The predictions of our theory are consistent with a number of stylised facts and with a new empirical observation documented in this paper: aggregate uncertainty, measured by economic volatility, is associated to better ...scal discipline in a panel of 20 OECD countries.

Globalization and the Symphony of the New (Post-modern) World: From Westphalia to Maastricht…passing by Washington DC

Taking on the challenge of understanding and explaining the Symphony of (today’s) New World in realistic terms (not realist), this essay aims to analyse the Post-Cold war era by devising a multi-conceptual framework that combines different theoretical contributions not yet linked in a fully explanatory way. This paper suggests two inter-related analytical contexts (or background melodies) to understand Dvorak´s "New World”. First, the socio-economic structural context that falls under the controversial category of Globalization and, second, the post-modern political structural context that is built on Robert Cooper’s threefold analysis (Pre-modern, Modern and Post-modern) of today’s world [Cooper, R: 1997, 1999]. Lastly, the closing movement (allegro con fuoco) enters the normative arena to assess American foreign policy options in the light of the theoretical framework devised in the first part of the essay.