Productivity and the welfare of nations

We show that the welfare of a representative consumer can be related to observable aggregatedata. To a first order, the change in welfare is summarized by (the present value of) the Solowproductivity residual and by the growth rate of the capital stock per capita. We also show thatproductivity and the capital stock suffice to calculate differences in welfare across countries, withboth variables computed as log level deviations from a reference country. These results hold forarbitrary production technology, regardless of the degree of product market competition, and applyto open economies as well if TFP is constructed using absorption rather than GDP as the measureof output. They require that TFP be constructed using prices and quantities as perceived byconsumers. Thus, factor shares need to be calculated using after-tax wages and rental rates, andwill typically sum to less than one. We apply these results to calculate welfare gaps and growthrates in a sample of developed countries for which high-quality TFP and capital data are available.We find that under realistic scenarios the United Kingdom and Spain had the highest growth ratesof welfare over our sample period of 1985-2005, but the United States had the highest level ofwelfare.

Oil price shocks, income and democracy

We examine the effect of oil price fluctuations ondemocratic institutions over the 1960-2007 period. We also exploitthe very persistent response of income to oil price fluctuations tostudy the effect of persistent (oil price-driven) income shocks ondemocracy. Our results indicate that countries with greater net oilexports over GDP see improvements in democratic institutionsfollowing upturns in international oil prices. We estimate that a 1percentage point increase in per capita GDP growth due to apositive oil price shock increases the Polity democracy score byaround 0.2 percentage points on impact and by around 2 percentagepoints in the long run. The effect on the probability of a democratictransition is around 0.4 percentage points.

Testing I(1) against I(d) alternatives in the presence of deteministic components

This paper discusses the role of deterministic components in the DGP and in the auxiliaryregression model which underlies the implementation of the Fractional Dickey-Fuller (FDF) test for I(1) against I(d) processes with d [0, 1). This is an important test in many economic applications because I(d) processess with d < 1 are mean-reverting although, when 0.5 = d < 1, like I(1) processes, they are nonstationary. We show how simple is the implementation of the FDF in these situations, and argue that it has better properties than LM tests. A simple testing strategy entailing only asymptotically normally distributedtests is also proposed. Finally, an empirical application is provided where the FDF test allowing for deterministic components is used to test for long-memory in the per capita GDP of several OECD countries, an issue that has important consequences to discriminate between growth theories, and on which there is some controversy.

Noise and aggregation of information in large markets

We study a novel class of noisy rational expectations equilibria in markets with largenumber of agents. We show that, as long as noise increases with the number of agents inthe economy, the limiting competitive equilibrium is well-defined and leads to non-trivialinformation acquisition, perfect information aggregation, and partially revealing prices,even if per capita noise tends to zero. We find that in such equilibrium risk sharing and price revelation play dierent roles than in the standard limiting economy in which per capita noise is not negligible. We apply our model to study information sales by a monopolist, information acquisition in multi-asset markets, and derivatives trading. Thelimiting equilibria are shown to be perfectly competitive, even when a strategic solutionconcept is used.

Crises and growth: A re-evaluation

We address the question of whether growth and welfare can be higher in crisis prone economies. First, we show that there is a robust empirical link between per-capita GDP growth and negative skewness of credit growth across countries with active financial markets. That is, countries that have experienced occasional crises have grown on average faster than countries with smooth credit conditions. We then present a two-sector endogenous growth model in which financial crises can occur, and analyze the relationship between financial fragility and growth. The underlying credit market imperfections generateborrowing constraints, bottlenecks and low growth. We show that under certain conditions endogenous real exchange rate risk arises and firms find it optimal to take on credit risk in the form of currency mismatch. Along such a risky path average growth is higher, but self-fulfilling crises occur occasionally. Furthermore, we establish conditions under which the adoption of credit risk is welfare improving and brings the allocation nearer to the Pareto optimal level. The design of the model is motivated by several features of recent crises: credit risk in the form of foreign currency denominated debt; costly crises that generate firesales and widespread bankruptcies; and asymmetric sectorial responses, wherethe nontradables sector falls more than the tradables sector in the wake of crises.

The macroeconomic effects of German unification: Real adjustments and the welfare state

We study the effects of German unification in a model with capital accumulation, skill differences and a welfare state. We argue that this event is similar to a mass migration of low-skilled agents holding no capital into a foreign country. Absent a welfare state, we observe an investment boom, depressed output and employment conditions. Capital owners and high-skilled agents are willing to give up to 4% of per-capita consumption to favor unification. When a welfare state exists the investment boom disappears and the recession is prolonged. Now, with unification, capital owners and high-skilled agents lose 4% of per-capita consumption.

Social security and democracy

Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.

It's still 2%: evidence on convergence from 116 years of the US States panel data

A new debate over the speed of convergence in per capita income across economies is going on. Cross sectional estimates support the idea of slow convergence of about two percent per year. Panel data estimates support the idea of fast convergence of five, ten or even twenty percent per year. This paper shows that, if you ``do it right'', even the panel data estimation method yields the result of slow convergence of about two percent per year.

Further evidence on the statistical properties of real GNP

The well-known lack of power of unit root tests has often been attributed to the shortlength of macroeconomic variables and also to DGP s that depart from the I(1)-I(0)alternatives. This paper shows that by using long spans of annual real GNP and GNPper capita (133 years) high power can be achieved, leading to the rejection of both theunit root and the trend-stationary hypothesis. This suggests that possibly neither modelprovides a good characterization of these data. Next, more flexible representations areconsidered, namely, processes containing structural breaks (SB) and fractional ordersof integration (FI). Economic justification for the presence of these features in GNP isprovided. It is shown that the latter models (FI and SB) are in general preferred to theARIMA (I(1) or I(0)) ones. As a novelty in this literature, new techniques are appliedto discriminate between FI and SB models. It turns out that the FI specification ispreferred, implying that GNP and GNP per capita are non-stationary, highly persistentbut mean-reverting series. Finally, it is shown that the results are robust when breaksin the deterministic component are allowed for in the FI model. Some macroeconomicimplications of these findings are also discussed.

Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities

Does additional government spending improve the electoral chances of incumbent politicalparties? This paper provides the first quasi-experimental evidence on this question. Our researchdesign exploits discontinuities in federal funding to local governments in Brazil around severalpopulation cutoffs over the period 1982-1985. We show that extra fiscal transfers resulted in a20% increase in local government spending per capita, and an increase of about 10 percentagepoints in the re-election probability of local incumbent parties. In the context of an agency modelof electoral accountability, as well as existing results indicating that the revenue jumps studiedhere had positive impacts on education outcomes and earnings, these results suggest that expectedelectoral rewards encouraged incumbents to spend additional funds in ways that were valued byvoters.

Financing local development: Quasi-experimental evidence from municipalities in Brazil, 1980-1991

This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to estimate the impact of additional unrestrictedgrant financing on local public spending, public service provision, schooling, literacy, andincome at the community (municipio) level in Brazil. Additional transfers increased local publicspending per capita by about 20% with no evidence of crowding out own revenue or otherrevenue sources. The additional local spending increased schooling per capita by about 7% andliteracy rates by about 4 percentage points. The implied marginal cost of schooling -accountingfor corruption and other leakages- amounts to about US$ 126, which turns out to be similar tothe average cost of schooling in Brazil in the early 1980s. In line with the effect on human capital,the poverty rate was reduced by about 4 percentage points, while income per capita gains werepositive but not statistically significant. Results also suggest that additional public spending hadstronger effects on schooling and literacy in less developed parts of Brazil, while poverty reductionwas evenly spread across the country.

The economic tragedy of the XXth Century: Growth in Africa

The dismal growth performance of Africa is the worst economic tragedy ofthe XXth century. We document the evolution of per capita GDP for thecontinent as a whole and for subset of countries south of the Saharadesert. We document the worsening of various income inequality indexesand we estimate poverty rates and headcounts. We then analyze some ofthe central robust determinants of economic growth reported bySala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer and Miller (2003) and project the annual growthrates Africa would have enjoyed if these key determinants had taken OECDrather than African values. Expensive investment goods, low levels ofeducation, poor health, adverse geography, closed economies, too muchpublic expenditure and too many military conflicts are seen as keyexplanations of the economic tragedy.

Wealth, financial intermediation and growth

This paper presents empirical support for the existence of wealth effects in the contribution of financial intermediation to economic growth, and offers a theoretical explanation for these effects. Using GMM dynamic panel data techniques applied to study the growth-promoting effects of financial intermediation, we show that the exogenous contribution of financial development on economic growth has different effects for different levels of income per capita. We find that this contribution is generally increasing with thelevel of income per capita of the economy, up to a relatively high level of income. This contribution is consistently lower for poor countries; and for some low levels of income per capita it can be negative. We provide a model to account for these wealth effects. The model is a overlapping generations growth model where financial intermediaries implement liquidity risk sharing among depositors. We show that at early stages of economic development, a bank can increase welfare of its depositors only at the cost of lowering investment and growth. However, once the economy has crossed certain wealth threshold, the liquidity role of banks becomes unambiguously growth enhancing. As wealth increases, banks offer improving liquidity insurance, and higher growth; however, for high levels of wealth, growth generated byfinancial intermediation declines as the economy attains the optimal level of consumption risk sharing.

Human capital distribution, growth and convergence

This paper studies the dynamic relationship between distribution and endogenous growth in an overlapping generations model with accumulation of human and physical capital. It is shown how human capital can determine a relationship between per capita growth rates and inequality in the distribution of income. Family background effects and spillovers in the transmission of human capital generate a dynamics in which aggregate variables depend not only on the stock, but also on the distribution of human capital. The evolution of this distribution over time is then characterized under different assumptions on private returns and the form of the externality in the technology for humancapital. Conditions for existence, uniqueness and stability of a constant growth equilibrium with a stationary distribution are derived. Increasing returns, idiosyncratic abilities and the possibility of poverty traps are explicitely characterized in a closed form solution of the equilibrium dynamics, showing the role played by technology and preferences parameters.

Protectionist but globalised? Latin American custom duties and trade during the pre-1914 belle époque

While it is true that Latin American republics had no rival on maximising revenues from custom collection during the belle époque, this paper shows that Latin American countries were also generous importers, only behind the larger commercial countries of Western Europe in terms of imports per capita. Latin American citizens were much more linked to international trade than citizens of most regions of the world. Their relation to the world economy was tighter both via their imports and their exports relative to their population and income levels. This paper comes to show that there is no contradiction between the high custom collection by the Latin American republics and their high level of interaction with the global economy in the pre-1914 belle époque, although large country differences can be observed when descending from the regional to the national level.