Country asymmetries, endogenous product choice and the speed of trade liberalization

In a world with two countries which differ in size, we study theimpact of (the speed of) trade liberalization on firms' profitsand total welfare of the countries involved. Firms correctlyanticipate the pace of trade liberalization and take it intoaccount when deciding on their product choices, which areendogenously determined at the beginning of the game. Competitionin the marketplace then occurs either on quantities or on prices.As long as the autarkic phase continues, local firms are nationalmonopolists. When trade liberalization occurs, firms compete in aninternational duopoly. We analyze trade effects by using twodifferent models of product differentiation. Across all thespecifications adopted (and independently of the price v. quantitycompetition hypothesis), total welfare always unambiguously riseswith the speed of trade liberalization: Possible losses by firmsare always outweighed by consumers' gains, which come under theform of lower prices, enlarged variety of higher average qualitiesavailable. The effect on profits depends on the type of industryanalyzed. Two results in particular seem to be worth of mention.With vertical product differentiation and fixed costs of qualityimprovements, the expected size of the market faced by the firmsdetermines the incentive to invest in quality. The longer the periodof autarky, the lower the possibility that the firm from the smallcountry would be producing the high quality and be the leader in theinternational market when it opens. On the contrary, when trade opensimmediately, national markets do not play any role and firms fromdifferent countries have the same opportunity to become the leader.Hence, immediate trade liberalization might be in the interest ofproducers in the small country. In general, the lower the size of thesmall country, the more likely its firm will gain from tradeliberalization. Losses from the small country firm can arise when itis relegated to low quality good production and the domestic marketsize is not very small. With horizontal product differentiation (thehomogeneous good case being a limit case of it when costs ofdifferentiation tend to infinity), investments in differentiationbenefit both firms in equal manner. Firms from the small country do notrun the risk of being relegated to a lower competitive position undertrade. As a result, they would never lose from it. Instead, firms fromthe large country may still incur losses from the opening of trade whenthe market expansion effect is low (i.e. when the country is very largerelative to the other).

Speculative dynamics in the term structure of interest rates

When long maturity bonds are traded frequently and traders have non-nestedinformation sets, speculative behavior in the sense of Harrison and Kreps (1978) arises.Using a term structure model displaying such speculative behavior, this paper proposesa conceptually and observationally distinct new mechanism generating time varying predictableexcess returns. It is demonstrated that (i) dispersion of expectations about futureshort rates is sufficient for individual traders to systematically predict excess returns and(ii) the new term structure dynamics driven by speculative trade is orthogonal to publicinformation in real time, but (iii) can nevertheless be quantified using only publicly availableyield data. The model is estimated using monthly data on US short to medium termTreasuries from 1964 to 2007 and it provides a good fit of the data. Speculative dynamicsare found to be quantitatively important, potentially accounting for a substantial fractionof the variation of bond yields and appears to be more important at long maturities.

Interbank comptetition with costly screening

We analyse credit market equilibrium when banks screen loan applicants. When banks have a convex cost function of screening, a pure strategy equilibrium exists where banks optimally set interest rates at the same level as their competitors. This result complements Broecker s (1990) analysis, where he demonstrates that no pure strategy equilibrium exists when banks have zero screening costs. In our set up we show that interest rate on loansare largely independent of marginal costs, a feature consistent with the extant empirical evidence. In equilibrium, banks make positive profits in our model in spite of the threat of entry by inactive banks. Moreover, an increase in the number of active banks increases credit risk and so does not improve credit market effciency: this point has important regulatory implications. Finally, we extend our analysis to the case where banks havediffering screening abilities.

Interest rate restrictions in a natural experiment: loan allocation and the change in the usury laws in 1714

This article studies the effects of interest rate restrictions on loan allocation. The British governmenttightened the usury laws in 1714, reducing the maximum permissible interest rate from 6% to5%. A sample of individual loan transactions reveals that average loan size and minimum loan sizeincreased strongly, while access to credit worsened for those with little social capital. Collateralisedcredits, which had accounted for a declining share of total lending, returned to their former role ofprominence. Our results suggest that the usury laws distorted credit markets significantly; we findno evidence that they offered a form of Pareto-improving social insurance.

Finance versus costs for teaching hospitals in Spain

In this paper we analyse the observed systematic differences incosts for teaching hospitals (THhenceforth) in Spain. Concernhas been voiced regarding the existence of a bias in thefinancing of TH s has been raised once prospective budgets arein the arena for hospital finance, and claims for adjusting totake into account the legitimate extra costs of teaching onhospital expenditure are well grounded. We focus on theestimation of the impact of teaching status on average cost. Weused a version of a multiproduct hospital cost function takinginto account some relevant factors from which to derive theobserved differences. We assume that the relationship betweenthe explanatory and the dependent variables follows a flexibleform for each of the explanatory variables. We also model theunderlying covariance structure of the data. We assumed twoqualitatively different sources of variation: random effects andserial correlation. Random variation refers to both general levelvariation (through the random intercept) and the variationspecifically related to teaching status. We postulate that theimpact of the random effects is predominant over the impact ofthe serial correlation effects. The model is estimated byrestricted maximum likelihood. Our results show that costs are 9%higher (15% in the case of median costs) in teaching than innon-teaching hospitals. That is, teaching status legitimatelyexplains no more than half of the observed difference in actualcosts. The impact on costs of the teaching factor depends on thenumber of residents, with an increase of 51.11% per resident forhospitals with fewer than 204 residents (third quartile of thenumber of residents) and 41.84% for hospitals with more than 204residents. In addition, the estimated dispersion is higher amongteaching hospitals. As a result, due to the considerable observedheterogeneity, results should be interpreted with caution. From apolicy making point of view, we conclude that since a higherrelative burden for medical training is under public hospitalcommand, an explicit adjustment to the extra costs that theteaching factor imposes on hospital finance is needed, beforehospital competition for inpatient services takes place.

Constant interest rate projections without the curse of indeterminacy

Constant interest rate (CIR) projections are often criticized on the grounds that they are inconsistent with the existence of a unique equilibrium in a variety of forward-looking models. This note shows howto construct CIR projections that are not subject to that criticism, using a standard New Keynesian model as a reference framework.

Risk management under a two-factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This paper presents several applications to interest rate risk managementbased on a two-factor continuous-time model of the term structure of interestrates previously presented in Moreno (1996). This model assumes that defaultfree discount bond prices are determined by the time to maturity and twofactors, the long-term interest rate and the spread (difference between thelong-term rate and the short-term (instantaneous) riskless rate). Several newmeasures of ``generalized duration" are presented and applied in differentsituations in order to manage market risk and yield curve risk. By means ofthese measures, we are able to compute the hedging ratios that allows us toimmunize a bond portfolio by means of options on bonds. Focusing on thehedging problem, it is shown that these new measures allow us to immunize abond portfolio against changes (parallel and/or in the slope) in the yieldcurve. Finally, a proposal of solution of the limitations of conventionalduration by means of these new measures is presented and illustratednumerically.

Educational opportunity and the college premium

Since World War II, the United States government has made improved accessto higher education a priority. This e¤ort has substantially increasedthe number of people who complete college. We show that by reducing theeffective interest rate on borrowing for education, such policies canactually increase the gap in wages between those with a college educationand those without. The mechanism that drives our results is the signaling role of education first explored by Spence (1973). We argue that financialconstraints on education reduce the value of education as a signal. Wesolve for the reduced form relationship between the interest rate and thewage premium in the steady state of a dynamic asymmetric information model.In addition, we discuss evidence of decreases in borrowing costs for educationfinancing in the U.S.

On the timing of balance of payments crises: Disaggregated information and interest rate policy

This paper proposes a dynamic framework to study the timing of balance of paymentscrises. The model incorporates two main ingredients: (i) investors have private information; (ii)investors interact in a dynamic setting, weighing the high returns on domestic assets against the incentives to pull out before the devaluation. The model shows that the presence of disaggregated information delays the onset of BOP crises, giving rise to discrete devaluations. It also shows that high interest rates can be eective in delaying and possibly avoiding the abandonment of the peg. The optimal policy is to raise interest rates sharply as fundamentals become very weak. However, this policy is time inconsistent, suggesting a role for commitment devices such as currency boards or IMF pressure.

A two-mean reverting-factor model of the term structure of interest rates

This paper presents a two--factor model of the term structure ofinterest rates. We assume that default free discount bond prices aredetermined by the time to maturity and two factors, the long--term interestrate and the spread (difference between the long--term rate and theshort--term (instantaneous) riskless rate). Assuming that both factorsfollow a joint Ornstein--Uhlenbeck process, a general bond pricing equationis derived. We obtain a closed--form expression for bond prices andexamine its implications for the term structure of interest rates. We alsoderive a closed--form solution for interest rate derivatives prices. Thisexpression is applied to price European options on discount bonds andmore complex types of options. Finally, empirical evidence of the model'sperformance is presented.

The impact of firing costs on turnover and unemployment: Evidence from the Colombian labour market reform

Reductions in firing costs are often advocated as a way of increasingthe dynamism of labour markets in both developed and less developed countries. Evidence from Europe and the U.S. on the impact of firing costs has, however, been mixed. Moreover, legislative changes both in Europe and the U.S. have been limited. This paper, instead, examines the impact of the Colombian Labour Market Reform of 1990, which substantially reduced dismissal costs. I estimate the incidence of a reduction in firing costs on worker turnover by exploiting the temporal change in the Colombian labour legislation as well as the variability in coverage between formal and informal sector workers. Using a grouping estimator to control for common aggregate shocks and selection, I find that the exit hazard rates into and out of unemployment increased after the reform by over 1% for formal workers (covered by the legislation) relative to informal workers (uncovered). The increase of the hazards implies a net decrease in unemployment of a third of a percentage point, which accounts for about one quarter of the fall in unemployment during the period of study.

The variability of money velocity in a generalized cash-in-advance model

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of money demand wherethe velocity of money changes in response to endogenous fluctuations in the interest rate. The parameter space can be divided into two subsets: one where velocity is constant and equal to one as in cash-in-advance models, and another one where velocity fluctuates as in Baumol (1952). Despite its simplicity, in terms of paramaters to calibrate, the model performs surprisingly well. In particular, it approximates the variability of money velocity observed in the U.S. for the post-war period. The model is then used to analyze the welfare costs of inflation under uncertainty. This application calculates the errors derived from computing the costs of inflation with deterministic models. It turns out that the size of this difference is small, at least for the levels of uncertainty estimated for the U.S. economy.

Conglomeration with bankruptcy costs: Separate or joint financing?

The paper analyzes the determinants of the optimal scope of incorporation in the presenceof bankruptcy costs. Bankruptcy costs alone generate a non-trivial tradeoff between thebenefit of coinsurance and the cost of risk contamination associated to joint financing corporate projects through debt. This tradeoff is characterized for projects with binary returns,depending on the distributional characteristics of returns (mean, variability, skewness, heterogeneity, correlation, and number of projects), the bankruptcy recovery rate, and the taxrate advantage of debt relative to equity. Our testable predictions are broadly consistentwith existing empirical evidence on conglomerate mergers, spin-offs, project finance, andsecuritization.

Markups, gaps and the welfare costs of business fluctuations

In this paper we present a simple theory-based measure of the variations in aggregate economic efficiency: the gap between the marginal product of labor and the household s consumption/leisure tradeoff. We show that this indicator corresponds to the inverse of the markup of price over social marginal cost, and give some evidence in support of this interpretation. We then show that, with some auxilliary assumptions our gap variable may be used to measure the efficiency costs of business fluctuations. We find that the latter costs are modest on average. However, to the extent the flexible price equilibrium is distorted,the gross efficiency losses from recessions and gains from booms may be large. Indeed, we find that the major recessions involved large efficiency losses. These results hold for reasonable parameterizations of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, and steady state distortions.

Estimates of patient costs related with population morbidity: Can indirect costs affect the results?

A number of health economics works require patient cost estimates as a basic information input.However the accuracy of cost estimates remains in general unspecified. We propose to investigate howthe allocation of indirect costs or overheads can affect the estimation of patient costs in order to allow forimprovements in the analysis of patient costs estimates. Instead of focusing on the costing method, thispaper proposes to highlight changes in variance explained observed when a methodology is chosen. Wecompare three overhead allocation methods for a specific Spanish population adjusted using the ClinicalRisk Groups (CRG), and we obtain different series of full-cost group estimates. As a result, there aresignificant gains in the proportion of the variance explained, depending upon the methodology used.Furthermore, we find that the global amount of variation explained by risk adjustment models dependsmainly on direct costs and is independent of the level of aggregation used in the classification system.