Educational opportunity and the college premium

Since World War II, the United States government has made improved accessto higher education a priority. This e¤ort has substantially increasedthe number of people who complete college. We show that by reducing theeffective interest rate on borrowing for education, such policies canactually increase the gap in wages between those with a college educationand those without. The mechanism that drives our results is the signaling role of education first explored by Spence (1973). We argue that financialconstraints on education reduce the value of education as a signal. Wesolve for the reduced form relationship between the interest rate and thewage premium in the steady state of a dynamic asymmetric information model.In addition, we discuss evidence of decreases in borrowing costs for educationfinancing in the U.S.

How well do individuals predict the selling prices of their homes?

Self-reported home values are widely used as a measure of housing wealth by researchers employing a variety of data sets and studying a number of different individual and household level decisions. The accuracy of this measure is an open empirical question, and requires some type of market assessment of the values reported. In this research, we study the predictive power of self-reported housing wealth when estimating sales prices utilizing the Health and Retirement Study. We find that homeowners, on average, overestimate the value of their properties by between 5% and 10%. More importantly, we are the first to document a strong correlation between accuracy and the economic conditions at the time of the purchase of the property (measured by the prevalent interest rate, the growth of household income, and the growth of median housing prices). While most individuals overestimate the value of their properties, those who bought during more difficult economic times tend to be more accurate, and in some cases even underestimate the value of their house. These results establish a surprisingly strong, likely permanent, and in many cases long-lived, effect of the initial conditions surrounding the purchases of properties, on how individuals value them. This cyclicality of the overestimation of house prices can provide some explanations for the difficulties currently faced by many homeowners, who were expecting large appreciations in home value to rescue them in case of increases in interest rates which could jeopardize their ability to live up to their financial commitments.

The new Keynesian approach to monetary policy analysis: Lessons and new directions

I discuss several lessons regarding the design and conduct of monetary policy that have emerged out of the New Keynesian research program. Those lessons include the bene.ts of price stability, the gains from commitment about future policies, the importance of nat-ural variables as benchmarks for policy, and the bene.ts of a credible anti-inflationary stance. I also point to one challenge facing NK modelling efforts: the need to come up with relevant sources of policy tradeoffs. A potentially useful approach to meeting that challenge, based on the introduction of real imperfections, is presented.

The variability of money velocity in a generalized cash-in-advance model

This paper presents a general equilibrium model of money demand wherethe velocity of money changes in response to endogenous fluctuations in the interest rate. The parameter space can be divided into two subsets: one where velocity is constant and equal to one as in cash-in-advance models, and another one where velocity fluctuates as in Baumol (1952). Despite its simplicity, in terms of paramaters to calibrate, the model performs surprisingly well. In particular, it approximates the variability of money velocity observed in the U.S. for the post-war period. The model is then used to analyze the welfare costs of inflation under uncertainty. This application calculates the errors derived from computing the costs of inflation with deterministic models. It turns out that the size of this difference is small, at least for the levels of uncertainty estimated for the U.S. economy.

International capital flows and credit market imperfections: A tale of two frictions

The financial crisis of 2007-08 has underscored the importance of adverse selection in financialmarkets. This friction has been mostly neglected by macroeconomic models of financialimperfections, however, which have focused almost exclusively on the effects of limited pledgeability.In this paper, we fill this gap by developing a standard growth model with adverseselection. Our main results are that, by fostering unproductive investment, adverse selection:(i) leads to an increase in the economy s equilibrium interest rate, and; (ii) it generates a negativewedge between the marginal return to investment and the equilibrium interest rate. Underfinancial integration, we show how this translates into excessive capital inflows and endogenouscycles. We also extend our model to the more general case in which adverse selection and limitedpledgeability coexist. We conclude that both frictions complement one another and show thatlimited pledgeability exacerbates the effects of adverse selection.

A model of collateral, investment and adverse selection

This paper characterizes the relationship between entrepreneurial wealth and aggregate investmentunder adverse selection. Its main finding is that such a relationship need not bemonotonic. In particular, three results emerge from the analysis: (i) pooling equilibria, in whichinvestment is independent of entrepreneurial wealth, are more likely to arise when entrepreneurialwealth is relatively low; (ii) separating equilibria, in which investment is increasing inentrepreneurial wealth, are most likely to arise when entrepreneurial wealth is relatively highand; (iii) for a given interest rate, an increase in entrepreneurial wealth may generate a discontinuousfall in investment.

Modelos de tasas de interes en Chile: una revisión

Con este trabajo revisamos los Modelos de niveles de las tasas de intereses en Chile. Además de los Modelos de Nivel tradicionales por Chan, Karoly, Longstaff y Lijadoras (1992) en EE. UU, y Parisi (1998) en Chile, por el método de Probabilidad Maximun permitimos que la volatilidad condicional también incluya los procesos inesperados de la información (el modelo GARCH ) y también que la volatilidad sea la función del nivel de la tasa de intereses (modelo TVP-NIVELE) como en Brenner, Harjes y la Crona (1996). Para esto usamos producciones de mercado de bonos de reconocimiento, en cambio las producciones mensuales medias de subasta PDBC, y la ampliación del tamaño y la frecuencia de la muestra a 4 producciones semanales con términos(condiciones) diferentes a la madurez: 1 año, 5 años, 10 años y 15 años. Los resultados principales del estudio pueden ser resumidos en esto: la volatilidad de los cambios inesperados de las tarifas depende positivamente del nivel de las tarifas, sobre todo en el modelo de TVP-NIVEL. Obtenemos pruebas de reversión tacañas, tal que los incrementos en las tasas de intereses no eran independientes, contrariamente a lo obtenido por Brenner. en EE. UU. Los modelos de NIVELES no son capaces de ajustar apropiadamente la volatilidad en comparación con un modelo GARCH (1,1), y finalmente, el modelo de TVP-NIVEL no vence los resultados del modelo GARCH (1,1)

Modelos de tasas de interes en Chile: una revisión

Con este trabajo revisamos los Modelos de niveles de las tasas de intereses en Chile. Además de los Modelos de Nivel tradicionales por Chan, Karoly, Longstaff y Lijadoras (1992) en EE. UU, y Parisi (1998) en Chile, por el método de Probabilidad Maximun permitimos que la volatilidad condicional también incluya los procesos inesperados de la información (el modelo GARCH ) y también que la volatilidad sea la función del nivel de la tasa de intereses (modelo TVP-NIVELE) como en Brenner, Harjes y la Crona (1996). Para esto usamos producciones de mercado de bonos de reconocimiento, en cambio las producciones mensuales medias de subasta PDBC, y la ampliación del tamaño y la frecuencia de la muestra a 4 producciones semanales con términos(condiciones) diferentes a la madurez: 1 año, 5 años, 10 años y 15 años. Los resultados principales del estudio pueden ser resumidos en esto: la volatilidad de los cambios inesperados de las tarifas depende positivamente del nivel de las tarifas, sobre todo en el modelo de TVP-NIVEL. Obtenemos pruebas de reversión tacañas, tal que los incrementos en las tasas de intereses no eran independientes, contrariamente a lo obtenido por Brenner. en EE. UU. Los modelos de NIVELES no son capaces de ajustar apropiadamente la volatilidad en comparación con un modelo GARCH (1,1), y finalmente, el modelo de TVP-NIVEL no vence los resultados del modelo GARCH (1,1)

International debt deleveraging

I provide a framework for understanding debt deleveraging in a group of financiallyintegrated countries. During an episode of international deleveraging world consumptiondemand is depressed and the world interest rate is low, reflecting a high propensity to save.If exchange rates are allowed to float, deleveraging countries can depreciate their nominalexchange rate to increase production and mitigate the fall in consumption associatedwith debt reduction. The key insight of the paper is that in a monetary union thischannel of adjustment is shut off, and therefore the falls in consumption demand and inthe world interest rate are amplified. Hence, monetary unions are especially prone tohit the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate and enter a liquidity trap duringdeleveraging. In a liquidity trap deleveraging gives rise to a union-wide recession, which isparticularly severe in high-debt countries. The model suggests several policy interventionsthat mitigate the negative impact of deleveraging on output in monetary unions.

Error en el consentimiento en los contratos de SWAP

Cada cert temps hi ha assumptes d’alt interès social dins de la jurisdicció. En els últims anys, coincidint amb la crisi financera internacional, els assumptes relatius a contractes bancaris complexos, sobretot permutes financeres o swaps, han tingut una gran rellevància. En un context de crisi financera internacional, i també nacional, s'han estès el nombre de demandes dirigides contra bancs i entitats financeres. Són reclamacions en les quals se sol·licita la declaració de nul·litat dels citats contractes, principalment es basa en un error del consentiment, nul·litat que comporta la devolució de les quantitats invertides, de les rentabilitats esperades o de les penalitzacions aplicades davant la resolució anticipada d'us contractes pels clients defraudats en les seves expectatives. Les presents pàgines pretenen un estudi dels litigis sobre SWAPS, principalment dels “Interest Rate Swap”, identificar quins són els contractes bancaris complexes, quines són les normes de consentiment contractual que els regeixen. Respecte dels primers, cal destacar que l'elevat nombre de casos plantejats davant els nostres tribunals no es tradueix en una casuística tan àmplia com seria imaginable. La gran majoria versa sobre les peticions de nul·litat del contracte (total o parcial) realitzades pels clients, al moment en què l'Euribor va descendir, i que allò que molts havien contractat com un segur de cobertura enfront dels elevats tipus d'interès que havien de pagar per les seves hipoteques, veien com conforme als pactes en el contracte, havien de satisfer al seu contrapart (una entitat de crèdit) una liquidació.

Bank liquidity, interbank markets and monetary policy

A major lesson of the recent financial crisis is that the interbank lending marketis crucial for banks facing large uncertainty regarding their liquidity needs. Thispaper studies the efficiency of the interbank lending market in allocating funds. Weconsider two different types of liquidity shocks leading to different implications foroptimal policy by the central bank. We show that, when confronted with a distributional liquidity-shock crisis that causes a large disparity in the liquidity held amongbanks, the central bank should lower the interbank rate. This view implies that thetraditional tenet prescribing the separation between prudential regulation and monetary policy should be abandoned. In addition, we show that, during an aggregateliquidity crisis, central banks should manage the aggregate volume of liquidity. Twodifferent instruments, interest rates and liquidity injection, are therefore required tocope with the two different types of liquidity shocks. Finally, we show that failureto cut interest rates during a crisis erodes financial stability by increasing the riskof bank runs.

The short and long-run determinants of the real exchange rate in Mexico

This paper explores the real exchange rate behavior in Mexico from 1960 until 2005. Since the empirical analysis reveals that the real exchange rate is not mean reverting, we propose that economic fundamental variables affect its evolution in the long-run. Therefore, based on equilibrium exchange rate paradigms, we propose a simple model of real exchange rate determination which includes the relative labor productivity, the real interest rates and the net foreign assets over a long period of time. Our analysis also considers the dynamic adjustment in response to shocks through impulse response functions derived from the multivariate VAR model.

What do outside experts bring to a committee? Evidence from the Bank of England

We test whether outside experts have information not available to insiders by usingthe voting record of the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee. Memberswith more private information should vote more often against conventional wisdom,which we measure as the average belief of market economists about future interest rates. We find evidence that external members indeed have information notavailable to internals, but also use a quasi-natural experiment to show they mayexaggerate their expertise to obtain reappointment. This implies that an optimalcommittee, even outside monetary policy, should potentially include outsiders, butneeds to manage career concerns.

Credit rationing and crowding out during the Industrial Revolution: Evidence from Hoare's Bank, 1702-1862

Crowding-out during the British Industrial Revolution has long been one of the leadingexplanations for slow growth during the Industrial Revolution, but little empirical evidence exists to support it. We argue that examinations of interest rates are fundamentally misguided, and that the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century private loan market balanced through quantity rationing. Using a unique set of observations on lending volume at a London goldsmith bank, Hoare s, we document the impact of wartime financing on private credit markets. We conclude that there is considerable evidence that government borrowing, especially during wartime, crowded out private credit.

Private borrowing during the financial revolution: Hoare’s Bank and its customers, 1702-1724

The financial revolution improved the British government s ability to borrow, andthus its ability to wage war. North andWeingast argued that it also permitted privateparties to borrow more cheaply and widely.We test these inferences with evidencefrom a London bank.We confirm that private bank credit was cheap in the earlyeighteenth century, but we argue that it was not available widely. Importantly, thegovernment reduced the usury rate in 1714, sharply reducing the circle of privateclients that could be served profitably.