Flexibility vs. rigidity: Does Spain have the worst of both worlds?

In this paper we study the structure of labor market flows in Spain and compare them with France and the US. We characterize a number of empirical regularities and stylized facts. One striking result is that the job finding rate is slightly higher than in France, while the jon loss rate is much higher, putting Spain half-way between France and the US. This suggests that while Spain has borne the full cost of its labor market reforms in terms of job precarity, the benefits in terms of job creation have been quite modest. We hypothesize that this has been due to the reform s credibility being imperfect, which leads toexpectation of reversal.

Factor shares, the price markup, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor

[spa] La participación del trabajo en la renta nacional es constante bajo los supuestos de una función de producción Cobb-Douglas y competencia perfecta. En este artículo se relajan estos supuestos y se investiga si el comportamiento no constante de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional se explica por (i) una elasticidad de sustitución entre capital y trabajo no unitaria y (ii) competencia no perfecta en el mercado de producto. Nos centramos en España y los U.S. y estimamos una función de producción con elasticidad de sustitución constante y competencia imperfecta en el mercado de producto. El grado de competencia imperfecta se mide a través del cálculo del price markup basado en laaproximación dual. Mostramos que la elasticidad de sustitución es mayor que uno en España y menor que uno en los US. También mostramos que el price markup aleja la elasticidad de sustitución de uno, lo aumenta en España, lo reduce en los U.S. Estos resultados se utilizan para explicar la senda decreciente de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional, común a ambas economías, y sus contrastadas sendas de capital.

Dynamics of domain walls in pattern formation under traveling-wave forcing

We study dynamics of domain walls in pattern forming systems that are externally forced by a moving space-periodic modulation close to 2:1 spatial resonance. The motion of the forcing induces nongradient dynamics, while the wave number mismatch breaks explicitly the chiral symmetry of the domain walls. The combination of both effects yields an imperfect nonequilibrium Ising-Bloch bifurcation, where all kinks (including the Ising-like one) drift. Kink velocities and interactions are studied within the generic amplitude equation. For nonzero mismatch, a transition to traveling bound kink-antikink pairs and chaotic wave trains occurs.

Hedwig and The Angry Inch: Plato at the Sundance Film Festival

The aim of this article is to show how an ancient myth, that of the three genres, also known as the myth of the androgynous by Aristophanes in Plato¿s Symposium, becomes for John Cameron Mitchell the suitable image in order to explain the peculiar personality of a man, Hedwig, who by means of a surgical operation becomes in his turn an imperfect androgynous but symbolises the need of a sole mankind or the unity of different worlds, just as he belonged to both Berlins divided by an already fallen wall, which permitted their inhabitants to recover their lost unity and identity.

Factor shares, the price markup, and the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor

[spa] La participación del trabajo en la renta nacional es constante bajo los supuestos de una función de producción Cobb-Douglas y competencia perfecta. En este artículo se relajan estos supuestos y se investiga si el comportamiento no constante de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional se explica por (i) una elasticidad de sustitución entre capital y trabajo no unitaria y (ii) competencia no perfecta en el mercado de producto. Nos centramos en España y los U.S. y estimamos una función de producción con elasticidad de sustitución constante y competencia imperfecta en el mercado de producto. El grado de competencia imperfecta se mide a través del cálculo del price markup basado en laaproximación dual. Mostramos que la elasticidad de sustitución es mayor que uno en España y menor que uno en los US. También mostramos que el price markup aleja la elasticidad de sustitución de uno, lo aumenta en España, lo reduce en los U.S. Estos resultados se utilizan para explicar la senda decreciente de la participación del trabajo en la renta nacional, común a ambas economías, y sus contrastadas sendas de capital.

Shrouded costs of government: The political economy of state and local public pensions

Why do public-sector workers receive so much of their compensation in the formof pensions and other benefits? This paper presents a political economy model inwhich politicians compete for taxpayers' and government employees' votes by promising compensation packages, but some voters cannot evaluate every aspect of promisedcompensation. If pension packages are "shrouded", so that public-sector workers better understand their value than ordinary taxpayers, then compensation will be highlyback-loaded. In equilibrium, the welfare of public-sector workers could be improved,holding total public-sector costs constant, if they received higher wages and lowerpensions. Centralizing pension determination has two offsetting effects on generosity:more state-level media attention helps taxpayers better understand pension costs, andthat reduces pension generosity; but a larger share of public-sector workers will votewithin the jurisdiction, which increases pension generosity. A short discussion of pensions in two decentralized states (California and Pennsylvania) and two centralizedstates (Massachusetts and Ohio) suggests that centralization appears to have modestlyreduced pensions, but, as the model suggests, this is unlikely to be universal.

A global view of cross-border migration

This paper evaluates the global welfare impact of observed levels of migration using a quantitativemulti-sector model of the world economy calibrated to aggregate and firm-level data.Our framework features cross-country labor productivity differences, international trade, remittances,and a heterogeneous workforce. We compare welfare under the observed levels ofmigration to a no-migration counterfactual. In the long run, natives in countries that receiveda lot of migration -such as Canada or Australia- are better o due to greater product varietyavailable in consumption and as intermediate inputs. In the short run the impact of migrationon average welfare in these countries is close to zero, while the skilled and unskilled nativestend to experience welfare changes of opposite signs. The remaining natives in countries withlarge emigration flows -such as Jamaica or El Salvador- are also better off due to migration,but for a different reason: remittances. The welfare impact of observed levels of migration issubstantial, at about 5 to 10% for the main receiving countries and about 10% in countries withlarge incoming remittances. Our results are robust to accounting for imperfect transferabilityof skills, selection into migration, and imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants.

Amplification and displacement of chaotic attractors by means of unidirectional chaotic driving

Chaotic systems, when used to drive copies of themselves (or parts of themselves) may induce interesting behaviors in the driven system. In case the later exhibits invariance under amplification or translation, they may show amplification (reduction), or displacement of the attractor. It is shown how the behavior to be obtained is implied by the symmetries involved. Two explicit examples are studied to show how these phenomena manifest themselves under perfect and imperfect coupling.

Political centralization and government accountability

This paper studies fiscal federalism when regions differ in voters' ability to monitor publicofficials. We develop a model of political agency in which rent-seeking politicians providepublic goods to win support from heterogeneously informed voters. In equilibrium, voterinformation increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns. Therefore,political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies acrossregions. It increases welfare as long as the central government is required to provide publicgoods uniformly across regions. The need for uniformity implies an endogenous trade off between reducing rents through centralization and matching idiosyncratic preferences throughdecentralization. We find that a federal structure with overlapping levels of government canbe optimal only if regional differences in accountability are sufficiently large. The modelpredicts that less informed regions should reap greater benefits when the central governmentsets a uniform policy. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical evidence that lessinformed states enjoyed faster declines in pollution after the 1970 Clean Air Act centralizedenvironmental policy at the federal level.

The republican case for workplace democracy

The republican case for workplace democracy (WD) is presented and defended from two alternative means of ensuring freedom from arbitrary interference in the firmnamely, (a) the right to freely exit the firm and (b) workplace regulation. This paper shows, respectively, that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor markets, and that managerial discretion is both desirable and inevitable due to the incompleteness of employment contracts and labor legislation. The paper then shows that WD is necessary, from a republican standpoint, if workers" interests are to be adequately tracked in the exercise of managerial authority. Three important objections are finally addressed (i) that WD is redundant, (ii) that it is unnecessary provided that litigation and unionism can produce similar outcomes, and (iii) that it falls short of ensuring republican freedom compared to self-employment.

Imperfectly informed voters and strategic extremism

We analyze a unidimensional model of two-candidate electoral competition where voters have im- perfect information about the candidates' policy proposals, that is, voters cannot observe the exact policy proposals of the candidates but only which candidate offers the most leftist/rightist platform. We assume that candidates are purely office motivated and that one candidate enjoys a valence advan- tage over the other. We characterize the unique Sequential Equilibrium in very-weakly undominated strategies of the game. In this equilibrium the behavior of the two candidates tends to maximum extremism, due to the voters' lack of information. But it may converge or diverge depending on the size of the advantage. For small values of the advantage candidates converge to the extreme policy most preferred by the median and for large values of the advantage candidates strategies diverge: each candidate specializes in a different extreme policy. These results are robust to the introduction of a proportion of well informed voters. In this case the degree of extremism decreases when the voters become more informed.