Platform for Automatic, Normalized Annotation and Cost-Effective Acquisition of Language Resources for Human Language Technologies: PANACEA

El objetivo de PANACEA es engranar diferentes herramientas avanzadas para construir una fábrica de Recursos Lingüísticos (RL), una línea de producción que automatice los pasos implicados en la adquisición, producción, actualización y mantenimiento de los RL que la Traducción Automática y otras tecnologías lingüísticas, necesitan.

PANACEA (Platform for Automatic, Normalised Annotation and Cost-Effective Acquisition of Language Resources for Human Language Technologies)

The objective of PANACEA is to build a factory of LRs that automates the stages involved in the acquisition, production, updating and maintenance of LRs required by MT systems and by other applications based on language technologies, and simplifies eventual issues regarding intellectual property rights. This automation will cut down the cost, time and human effort significantly. These reductions of costs and time are the only way to guarantee the continuous supply of LRs that MT and other language technologies will be demanding in the multilingual Europe.

Political mobilisation and models of trade unionism : Southern Europe in comparative perspective

The relationship between union membership and political mobilization has been studied under many perspectives, but quantitative cross-national analyses have been hampered by the absence of international comparable survey data until the first round of the European Social Survey (ESS-2002) was made available. Using different national samples from this survey in four moments of time (2002, 2004 and 2006), our paper provides evidence of cross-country divergence in the empirical association between political mobilisation and trade union membership. Cross-national differences in union members’ political mobilization, we argue, can be explained by the existence of models of unionism that in turn differ with respect to two decisive factors: the institutionalisation of trade union activity and the opportunities left-wing parties have available for gaining access to executive power.

Cost del tractament del SIDA i d'Hepatitis C per a l'Estat : Comparació de la despesa d'una persona en llibertat vs. un pres

Un dels principals motius que ens va impulsar en l’elecció del tema és que es tracta d’untema que pot despertar curiositat entre la població.Un altre motiu, es que varem trobar que està íntimament relacionat amb els estudis queestem cursant, donat que afecta als pressupostos de l’estat i a la seva restricciópressupostària, i per tant, està directament relacionat amb la macroeconomia. En el nostrecas, reduirem l’àmbit d’estudi al territori català, de manera que estudiarem aquestes duesmalalties dins la despesa en sanitat pública catalana. A demés, estan finançades amb elsnostres impostos, i per tant la seva despesa afecta a la restricció pressupostària delsciutadans.L’elecció d’aquestes malalties no ha estat feta a l’atzar. Inicialment, varem pensar enestudiar els costos dels interns penitenciaris que patien aquestes malalties. Com que laSIDA i d’hepatitis C són les malalties més freqüents dins la presó, i les que tenen unscostos més característics donada la complexitat dels seus tractaments, varem pensar queserien prou representatives.No obstant, a mesura que ens anàvem endinsant en el tema, ens varem adonar que tambéseria molt interessant comparar el cost de les malalties amb el de les persones no recluses, iesbrinar si hi havia algun tipus de cost diferencial. És per això que varem decidir analitzaraquestes dues malalties tant dins com fora.Un altre factor que ens ha impulsat en l’elecció del tema és el fet que el nombre d’interns ales presons té un ritme de creixement constant que s’ha accelerat en els últims anys,sobretot degut a l’augment de la immigració. Això implica un augment progressiu de ladespesa, que es tradueix en una necessitat d’ingressos majors per tal de poder equilibrar larestricció de la qual parlàvem abans.També varem voler anar una mica més lluny i analitzar el pes d’aquestes malalties dins dela despesa que la generalitat ha establert per a la sanitat pública. Com les dues son MDO (malalties de declaració obligatòria ) estan finançades completament pel sector públic.L’objectiu era veure si representaven un cost tant elevat com pensàvem.OBJECTIUS DEL TREBALL:· Demostrar l’elevat cost que suposen certes malalties per l’estat.· Manifestar els canvis en el cost de les malalties amb l’evolució delstractaments.· Analitzar els costos sanitaris extres que es produeixen a les presons.· Destacar l’augment accelerat del nombre d’interns i l’augment del cost sanitarique això suposa. METODOLOGIA: Per tal de poder realitzar l’estudi comparatiu, hem hagut de calcular manualment els costosde les malalties, tot informant-nos del preu dels medicament, les dosis, el cost de lesconsultes externes,etc. A més, per a calcular el cost del tractament dins la presó, ens hemhagut d’informar dels aspectes més generals que envolten a un pres, per poder veure sirealment existeix un cost diferencial respecte la malaltia a l’exterior. Per obtenir aquestesdiverses informacions, ens hem hagut de posar en contacte amb el personal que treballa ala presó que hem pres com a model d’estudi.Així, podem dividir les nostres fonts d’informació en 3 categories:• Obtenció d’informació directament amb el personal de la presó:– Entrevista amb la directora d’infermeria de la Secretaria de ServeisPenitenciaris, Rehabilitació i Justícia Juvenil– Entrevista amb la Cap d’infermeria del Centre Quatre Camins.• Informació a partir de mostres facilitades pels propis funcionaris de la presó• Informació a partir d’estudis sobre el tema i de dades oficials, concretament lesdades oficials sobre els Pressupostos de la Generalitat.

Sovereign Risk, Anonymous Markets, and the Effects of Globalization

The goal of this paper is to study the e¤ects of globalization on the workings of financial markets. We adopt a "technological" view of globalization, which consists of an exogenous reduction in the cost of shipping goods across di¤erent regions of the world. We model financial markets where agents anonymously trade securities issued by every other agent in the world. In the absence of frictions, we show how globalization creates trade opportunities among residents of different regions of the world, thereby raising welfare. In the presence of sovereign risk, however, there emerge two crucial interactions between trade among residents within a region and trade among residents of di¤erent regions. First, the more residents within a region trade with each other, the more they can trade with residents of other regions. Second, the possibility of trade with residents of other regions sometimes leads a government to not enforce payments by its residents, destroying trade opportunities among residents within the region. The net effect on welfare of this process of creation and destruction of trade opportunities is ambiguous. We argue that there are no policies governments can take to avoid the negative effects of globalization on trade among domestic residents. In a dynamic extension, we analyze how our results are a¤ected by reputational considerations.

The Impact of Trade on Technology and Skill Upgrading Evidence from Argentina

In the last 20 years, wage inequality has increased in many developing countries. Most research on this topic focuses on two alternative causes: trade or skill-biased technical change. Several empirical studies in both developed and developing countries document increases in skill intensity within all sectors, favoring the technological change explanation over trade. Instead, I present and test a model where bilateral trade liberalization increases exporting revenues inducing more firms to enter the export market and to adopt skilled-biased new technologies. I find that the increase in the relative demand of skilled labor does not come from labor reallocation across sectors or firms but from skill upgrading within firms. Firms that upgrade technology faster also upgrade skill faster. Finally, firms entering the export market after liberalization become more skill and technology-intensive than non exporters.

Assessing the Political Viability of Labour Market Reform: The Case of Employment Protection

We analyze the political support for employment protection legislation. Unlike my previous work on the same topic, this paper pays a lot of attention to the role of obsolescence in the growth process. In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employees trade off lower living standards (because employment protection maintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. The support for employment protection will then depend on the value of the latter relative to the cost of the former. We highlight two key deeterminants of this trade-off: first, the workers' bargaining power, second, the economy's growth rate-more precisely its rate of creative destruction.

Economic Booms, Trade Deficits, and Economic Policy

Many economic booms have been accompanied by real exchange rate appreciations, large trade defcits -which have sometimes persisted after the return to the initial exchange rate parity- and a deteriorating traded sector. Those circumstances have typically raised the question of the de-sirability of some stabilization policy. We show that the dynamics induced by an expected productivity shock in an economy where the capital stock is non-mobile across sectors, match those circumstances. Furthermore, we obtain that credit market imperfections tend to exacerbate trade deficits, and to cause an inefficient capacity reduction in the traded sector. Some stabilization policies are explored.

On Globalization and the Growth of Governments

This paper investigates the relationship between trade openness and the size of government, both theoretically and empirically. We show that openness can increase the size of governments through two channels: (1) a terms of trade externality, whereby trade lowers the domestic cost of taxation and (2) the demand for insurance, whereby trade raises risk and public transfers. We provide a unified framework for studying and testing these two mechanisms. First, we show how their relative strength depends on a key parameter, the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods. Second, while the terms of trade externality leads to inefficiently large governments, the increase in public spending due to the demand for insurance is optimal. We show that large volumes of trade may result in welfare losses if the terms of trade externality is strong enough while small volumes of trade are always beneficial. Third, we provide new evidence on the positive association between openness and the size of government and test whether it is consistent with the terms of trade externality or the demand for insurance. Our findings suggest that the positive relationship is remarkably robust and that the terms of trade externality may be the driving force behind it, thus raising warnings that globalization may have led to inefficiently large governments.

Asymmetric information and trade policy

Economists understand protectionism as a costly mechanism to redistribute from the average citizen to special-interest groups; yet political platforms that deviate from free trade have surprising popular appeal. I present an explanation based on heterogeneous information across citizens whose voting decision has an intensive margin. For each politician and each sector, the optimal trade-policy choice caters to the preferences of those voters who are more likely to be informed of that proposal. An overall protectionist bias emerges because in every industry producers are better informed than consumers. This asymmetry emerges in equilibrium because co-workers share industry-specific knwoledge, and because producers have greater incentives to engage in costly learning about their sector. My model implies that more widespread information about trade policy for an industry is associated with lower protection. Cross-sectoral evidence on U.S. non-tariff barriers and newspaper coverage is consistent with this prediction.

Catholic Confession of Sins as Third-Party Moral Enforcement

Catholicism has built up a legalistic religion based on two pillars: salvation by works and 'auricular' confession of sins to a priest with judicial functions. Since the Reformation, many consider auricular confession inferior to less institutional and more individual conceptions of faith. This article analyzes how all these historical solutions trade off specialization advantages against exchange costs to produce moral enforcement. After showing the behavioral foundations of confession and the adaptiveness of its historical evolution, it tests hypotheses on its efficacy, exploitation and opportunity cost. Econometric evidence supports the efficacy but not the exploitative character of Catholic confession. It also explains its secular decline as a consequence of two factors. First, the rise in education, which makes moral self-enforcement less costly. Second, the productivity gap suffered by confession, given its necessarily interpersonal nature.

Trade, Extent of the Market, and Economic Growth 1960-1996

We find that trade and domestic market size are robust determinants of economic growth over the 1960-1996 period when trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in PPP US$ ('real openness'). When trade openness is measured as the US dollar value of imports and exports relative to GDP in exchange rate US$ ('nominal openness') however, trade and the size of domestic markets are often non-robust determinants of growth. We argue that real openness is the more appropriate measure of trade and that our empirical results should be seen as evidence in favor of the extent-of-the-market hypothesis.

Employment Protection, International Specialization, and Innovation

We develop a model to analyse the implications of firing costs on incentives for R&D and international specialization. The Key idea is paying the firing cost, the country with a rigid labor market will tend to produce relatively secure goods, at a late stage of their product life cycle. Under international trade, an international product cycle emerges where, roughly, new goods are first produced in the low firing cost country will specialize in 'secondary innovations', that is, improvements in existing goods, while the low firing cost country will more specialize in 'primary innovation', that is, invention of new goods.

The capital gains from trade are not enough: Evidence from the environmental accounts of Venezuela and Mexico

In principle, a country can not endure negative genuine savings for longperiods of time without experiencing declining consumption. Nevertheless,theoreticians envisage two alternatives to explain how an exporter ofnon-renewable natural resources could experience permanent negativegenuine savings and still ensure sustainability. The first one allegesthat the capital gains arising from the expected improvement in theterms of trade would suffice to compensate for the negative savings ofthe resource exporter. The second alternative points at technologicalchange as a way to avoid economic collapse. This paper uses the dataof Venezuela and Mexico to empirically test the first of these twohypotheses. The results presented here prove that the terms oftrade do not suffice to compensate the depletion of oil reservesin these two open economies.

The impact of trade liberalization on skill upgrading. Evidence from Argentina

In this paper I study the effects of a regional free trade agreement on the demand for skill.I start by documenting a series of facts to shed light on the determinants of a steep increasein the relative demand of skilled labor in a panel of Argentinean industrial firms covering thetrade liberalization period. First, this is not explained by labor reallocation across industriesor firms but by skill upgrading within firms. Second, exporters upgrade skill faster than nonexporters. Third, firms upgrading skill also upgrade technology. These findings are consistentwith a model where a reduction in trading partner s tariffs induces the most productive firms(exporters) to adopt skill-intensive production technologies. Indeed, I find that the reduction inBrazil s tariffs induces the most productive Argentinean firms to upgrade skill, while the leastproductive ones downgrade. One third of the increase in the relative demand for skill can beattributed to the reduction in Brazil s tariffs.