I want you! An experiment studying the selection effect when assigning distributive power.

We study whether selection affects motivation. In our experiment subjects first answer a personality questionnaire. They then play a 3-person game. One of the three players decides between an outside option assigning him a positive amount, but leaving the two others empty-handed and allowing one of the other two players to distribute a pie. Treatments differ in the procedure by which distributive power is assigned: to a randomly determined or to a knowingly selected partner. Before making her decision the selecting player could consult the personality questionnaire of the other two players. Results show that knowingly selected players keep less for themselves than randomly selected ones and reward the selecting player more generously.

Sequential formation of coalitions through bilateral agreements

We study a sequential protocol of endogenous coalition formation based on a process of bilateral agreements among the players. We apply the game to a Cournot environment with linear demand and constant average costs. We show that the final outcome of any Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the game is the grand coalition, provided the initial number of firms is high enough and they are sufficiently patient.

A generalized assignment game

The proposed game is a natural extension of the Shapley and Shubik Assignment Game to the case where each seller owns a set of different objets instead of only one indivisible object. We propose definitions of pairwise stability and group stability that are adapted to our framework. Existence of both pairwise and group stable outcomes is proved. We study the structure of the group stable set and we finally prove that the set of group stable payoffs forms a complete lattice with one optimal group stable payoff for each side of the market.

The principal-agent matching market

We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyze an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterize the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit into.

Fair procedures. Evidence from games involving lotteries

Procedural fairness plays a prominent role in the social discourse concerning the marketplace in particular, and social institutions in general. Random procedures are a simple case, and they have found application in several important social allocation decisions. We investigate random procedures in the laboratory. We find that an unbiased random procedure is an acceptable substitute for an unbiased allocation: similar patterns of acceptance and rejection result when either is inserted as a feasible proposal in a sequential battle-of-the-sexes. We also find that unbiasedness, known to be a crucial characteristic of allocation fairness, is important to procedural fairness: in the context of a random offer game, a biased outcome is more readily accepted when chosen by an unbiased random draw than by one that is biased. Procedural fairness is conceptually different than allocation fairness or attribution-based behavior, and none of the current models of fairness and reciprocity captures our results. Post hoc extension of one of these models (ERC) suggests that a deeper understanding of procedural fairness requires further investigation of competing fairness norms.

Distribución de la actividad económica y estructura urbana: el caso de la región metropolitana de Barcelona

La RMB es una ciudad de tipo policéntrico en la que resaltan unas ciudades de tamaño medio con elevada presencia de actividad económica y que, en muchos casos, destacan por sus dinámicas de crecimiento endógeno. El objetivo de esta investigación era hallar evidencia empírica en la RMB acerca de los determinantes de la localización de la actividad económica. Un objetivo que, a la par, requería la inclusión del estudio de la estructura urbana de la región para poder evaluar el efecto que en ella ejercen los determinantes de la localización. Si bien los resultados obtenidos con la Exponencial son buenos, la inclusión de formas funcionales de tipo polinómico para capturar los grumos de densidad han demostrado su eficiencia. Aunque la Cubic-Spline obtiene buenos resultados, tiene el inconveniente de no poder interpretar sus coeficientes. No obstante, nuestra propuesta, la Spline-Lineal, nos permite detectar la presencia de los subcentros que constituyen la región en base a la existencia de gradientes de densidad positivos.

Auditories energètiques a edificis municipals de tipologia administrativa i d'ensenyament a l'any 2005 : mesures d'estalvi per augmentar la sostenibilitat ambiental i econòmica de les instal·lacions públiques municipals

En aquest document es tracta el tema energètic des de la vessant dels consums en edificis municipals i el tipus de model energètic que aquests tenen implementat. Per a poder portar a terme aquesta tasca s’han realitzat vàries auditories energètiques per conèixer els consums actuals dels edificis i el grau d’eficiència d’aquests, i finalment proposar mesures de millora de la gestió energètica dels edificis estudiats (edificis de la tipologia administrativa i d’ensenyament) i analitzar la possibilitat d’implantació d’energia solar, una font d’energia neta, barata i en concordança amb el medi ambient.

Constrained school choice

Recently, several school districts in the US have adopted or consider adopting the Student-Optimal Stable Mechanism or the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism to assign children to public schools. There is clear evidence that for school districts that employ (variants of) the so-called Boston Mechanism the transition would lead to efficiency gains. The first two mechanisms are strategy-proof, but in practice student assignment procedures impede students to submit a preference list that contains all their acceptable schools. Therefore, any desirable property of the mechanisms is likely toget distorted. We study the non trivial preference revelation game where students can only declare up to a fixed number (quota) of schools to be acceptable. We focus on the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes. Our main results identify rather stringent necessary and sufficient conditions on the priorities to guaranteestability. This stands in sharp contrast with the Boston Mechanism which yields stable Nash equilibrium outcomes, independently of the quota. Hence, the transition to any of the two mechanisms is likely to come with a higher risk that students seek legal actionas lower priority students may occupy more preferred schools.

Repeated games played in a network

Delayed perfect monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted game is modelled by letting the players form a connected and undirected network. Players observe their immediate neighbors' behavior only, but communicate over time the repeated game's history truthfully throughout the network. The Folk Theorem extends to this setup, although for a range of discount factors strictly below 1, the set of sequential equilibria and the corresponding payoff set may be reduced. A general class of games is analyzed without imposing restrictions on the dimensionality of the payoff space. This and the bilateral communication structure allow for limited results under strategic communication only. As a by-product this model produces a network result; namely, the level of cooperation in this setup depends on the network's diameter, and not on its clustering coefficient as in other models.

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games

We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.

La teoria de la recepció i de l’experiència estètica en Hans-Robert Jauss

Es presenta críticament l’obra de Hans-Robert Jauss, fent incís en la seva teoria de l’experiència estètica. El capítol 1 descriu el context de l’obra d’aquest esteta i hermeneuta alemany en tres àmbits: a) l’ històricointel•lectual, que s’emmarca dintre la teoria literària de la recepció o Escola de Constança; b) l’evolució en el temps teòrica de l’obra, i c) la seva pretesa relació amb la postmodernitat. El capítol 2 relaciona les aportacions teòriques de Jauss amb el seu antecedent filosòfic més important: l’hermenèutica de Gadamer. El tercer capítol presenta la teoria de l’experiència estètica de Jauss, deixada al marge pel nostre àmbit acadèmic, malgrat el seu interès, i en fa una valoració crítica. Finalment, un Annex sobre la teoria estètica kantiana i una conclusió indiquen la continuació d’aquesta investigació.

Freedom of choice as control over outcomes

As interactions between individuals are introduced into the freedom of choice literature by the mean of game forms, new issues appear. In particular, in this paper it is argued that individuals face uncertainty with respect to outcomes as they lose the control they implicitely exert over options in the opportunity set framework. A criterion is proposed as to compare alternative game forms in terms of the control they offer to individuals. The CardMin criterion suggests that any game form should be judged on the basis of the strategy offering the lowest number of pairwise different outcomes. An axiomatic characterization is provided in the case of two individuals.

Corrigendum: stable matchings and preferences of couples

We correct an omission in the definition of the domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Does affirmative action reduce effort incentives? A contest game analysis

In this paper a contest game with heterogeneous players is analyzed in which heterogeneity could be the consequence of past discrimination. Based on the normative perception of the heterogeneity there are two policy options to tackle this heterogeneity: either it is ignored and the contestants are treated equally, or affirmative action is implemented which compensates discriminated players. The consequences of these two policy options are analyzed for a simple two-person contest game and it is shown that the frequently criticized trade-off between affirmative action and total effort does not exist: Instead, affirmative action fosters effort incentives. A generalization to the n-person case and to a case with a partially informed contest designer yields the same result if the participation level is similar under each policy.